Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 1.djvu/334

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322
THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY.

been interpreted in terms of Matter and Motion, nothing remains to be explained. This, however, is by no means the fact. The Doctrine of Evolution, under its purely scientific form, does not involve Materialism, though its opponents persistently represent it as doing so. Indeed, among adherents of it who are friends of mine, there are those who speak of the Materialism of Buchner and his school, with a contempt certainly not less than that felt by Mr. Martineau. To show how entirely anti-materialistic my own view is, I may, perhaps, without impropriety, quote passages which I have written elsewhere:

"Hence, though of the two it seems easier to translate so-called Matter into so-called Spirit, than to translate so-called Spirit into so-called Matter (which latter is, indeed, wholly impossible), yet no translation can carry us beyond our symbols."[1]

And again:

"See, then, our predicament. We can think of Matter only in terms of Mind. "We can think of Mind only in terms of Matter. When we have pushed our explorations of the first to the uttermost limit, we are referred to the second for a final answer; and, when we have got the final answer of the second, we are referred back to the first for an interpretation of it. "We find the value of a; in terms of y; then we find the value of y in terms of x; and so on we may continue forever, without coming nearer to a solution. The antithesis of subject and object, never to be transcended while consciousness lasts, renders impossible all knowledge of that Ultimate Reality in which subject and object are united."[2]

It is thus, I think, manifest that the difference between Mr. Martineau's view and the view he opposes is by no means so. wide as he makes it appear; and further, it seems to me that such difference as exists is, in truth, rather the reverse of that which his exposition implies. Briefly expressed, the difference is this, that, when he thinks there is no mystery, the doctrine he combats recognizes a mystery. Speaking for myself only, I may say that, agreeing entirely with Mr. Martineau in repudiating the materialistic interpretation as utterly futile, I differ from him simply in this, that while he says he has found another interpretation, I confess that I cannot find any interpretation; while he holds that he can understand the Power which is manifested in things, I feel obliged to admit, after many failures, that I cannot understand, it. This contrast does not appear of the kind which bis Essay tacitly implies. I fail to perceive humility in the belief that human thought is capable of comprehending that which is behind appearances; and I do not see how piety is especially exemplified in the assertion that the Universe contains no mode of existence higher in Nature than that which is present to us in consciousness. On the contrary, I think it quite a defensible proposition that humility is better shown by a confession of incompetence to grasp in thought the Cause

  1. "Principles of Psychology," second edition, vol. i., § 63.
  2. Ibid., § 272.