can we imagine a Universalist clergyman so suffering for such results? How largely also are our notions of right and wrong determined for us by early parental training! A landlady of mine, in Leipsic, a pastor's daughter, of the most rigid type of Protestant orthodoxy, attended church one Sunday morning, and a representation of "Faust" at the theatre the same evening; and saw no incongruity in a course which, by a majority of people in this country, would be regarded as a fearful sin. Both views of Sunday are merely results of religious education at a period when the mind is peculiarly receptive, and when no one claims that a child should decide as to the correctness of the opinions taught. These are only a few out of the infinite number of circumstances, beyond individual control, which decide what shall be the views we take of the qualities of things and the desirableness of action. They mold character; they shape opinions; they make the man what he is. Since by these facts of organization, education, religious training, social position, etc., independent of our wish or will, are determined for us the view s we invariably take of the apparent desirableness of all objects or actions—since upon this apparent desirableness the choice of conduct of mankind invariably depends—it follows that the human will is as subject to the law of causation as the movements of the planets or the flight of an insect in the air.
It is asserted, however, by the advocates of the popular doctrine, that the scientific negation of free-will obliterates what is called "moral responsibility," and places man, as respects bis actions, on the plane of other animals. A full consideration of this point would lead us too far aside from our subject; yet, were all imagined consequences sure to arise from general disbelief in accountability for action, I fail to see how this proves the truth of the doctrine of free-will. It can never be too often repeated that, regarding each and every theory, dogma, or proposition. Science can ask but one question. Is it true? The answer must come from other sources than the imagined sequence of its acceptance or rejection. But let us suppose that mankind should some day admit the proposition that moral responsibility, in the theological sense, does not exist; that the will is determined by the strongest motive: what fearful results would ensue! Would punishment cease to follow crime? On the contrary, its use would never be more logical. If the stronger motive has led an individual to transgress the rights of society, then society must punish for three reasons: 1. That the memory of the punishment may act as a strong motive in deterring from future repetition of the offense; 2. That the example may deter others; and, 3. That society may be protected from a dangerous man. These reasons are all consistent with the doctrine of necessity; what others would the advocates of uncaused volition add? To assert that punishment should only be inflicted where "moral responsibility" exists, is either to confer it upon our domestic animals, or else to deny the justice of our every-day action regarding them. A child throws
