first; and between all, filling up any imaginable gaps, are numberless other cases which belong to the same family. All these are cases of altruistic suicide. Who shall point out the place where suicide ceases to be honorable and becomes dishonorable? Who shall draw the line and say, "Thus far and no farther"? The later Stoics attempted it, and the distinction which they made was not unlike that of orthodoxy. "If you have no further need for me in prison," says Epictetus, "I will come out; if you want me again, I will return." "For how long?" "Just so long as reason requires that I should continue in this body; when that is over, take it, and fare ye well. Only let us not act inconsiderately, nor from cowardice, nor on slight grounds, since that would be contrary to the will of God, for he hath need of such a world and such beings to live on earth. But if he sounds a retreat, as he did to Socrates, we are to obey him when he sounds it, as our General." Here likewise the decision concerning what constitutes a summons from God rests with the individual. Each person determines for himself the propriety of terminating life.
Condemnation of even egoistic suicide should be indulged in cautiously. Epictetus, indeed, thought that it might sometimes be allowable. "But remember the principal thing," he says, "that the door is open. Do not be more fearful than children; but as they, when the play does not please them, say, 'I will play no longer,' so do you, in the same case, say, 'I will play no longer,' and go; but, if you stay, do not complain." The doctrine was this: A man is directed to play the game of life. God deals the cards. The man may receive hands with which it is impossible for him to win; yet he must play the game to the best of his ability. But suppose he detects his adversaries cheating. He may then throw down the cards and leave the table. It is not always safe to pronounce suicide unjustifiable, even where the motive is a wish to avoid self-suffering. I do not find it easy to regard Ridley and Latimer as criminals instead of martyrs. I do not consider myself competent to declare that he who receives harsh treatment at the inn of life is not warranted in curtailing his visit and returning home.
But, granting that egoistic suicide is blameworthy, who shall pass judgment upon the character of that suicide which has for its motive a desire for the welfare of others? Surely not man. He has no moral balance so absolutely true that he can safely weigh the motives which lead to suicidal self-abnegation, and pronounce some sufficient and others insufficient. Let the decision be left where it belongs—with Omniscience.
