subjects to the same political status—a condition of decay rather than of development—does the converse state arise.
The principle of inheritance, becoming established in respect of the classes which militancy originates, and fixing the general functions of their members from generation to generation, tends eventually to fix also their special functions. Not only do men of the slave classes and the artisan classes succeed to their respective positions, but they succeed to the particular occupations carried on in them. This, which is a working out of the tendency toward regimentation, is ascribable primarily to the fact that superiors, requiring from each kind of worker his particular product, have an interest in replacing him at death by a capable successor; while he, prompted to get aid in fulfilling of his tasks, has an interest in bringing up a son to his own occupation: the will of the son being powerless against these conspiring interests. Under the system of compulsory coöperation, therefore, the principle of inheritance, spreading through the producing organization, causes a relative rigidity in this also.
And then a kindred effect is shown in the entailed restraints on movement from place to place. In proportion as the individual is subordinated in life, liberty, and property, to his society, it is needful that his whereabout shall be constantly known. Obviously the relation of the soldier to his officer, and of this officer to his superior, is such that each must be ever at hand; and where the militant type is fully developed the like holds throughout the society. The slave can not leave his appointed abode; the serf is tied to his allotment; the master is not allowed to absent himself from his locality without leave.
So that the corporate action, the combination, the cohesion, the regimentation, which efficient militancy necessitates, imply a structure which strongly resists change.
A further trait of the militant type, naturally accompanying the last, is that organizations other than those forming parts of the state organization are wholly or partially repressed. The public combination occupying all fields, excludes private combinations.
For the achievement of complete corporate action, there must, as we have seen, be a centralized administration, not only throughout the combatant part, but throughout the non-combatant part; and, if there exist unions of citizens which act independently, they in so far diminish the range of this centralized administration. Any structures which are not parts of the state structure serve more or less as limitations to it, and stand in the way of the required unlimited subordination. If private combinations are allowed to exist, it will be on condition of submitting to an official regulation such as greatly restrains independent action; and since private combinations thus officially regulated are inevitably hindered from doing things not conforming to established routine, and are so debarred from improvement,
