claims are overridden by public claims, and the subject loses that freedom of action which he had in the primitive state. One result is that the system of regimentation pervading the society as well as the army causes detailed regulation of conduct. The dictates of the ruler, sanctified by ascription of them to his divine ancestor, are unrestrained by any conception of individual liberty; and they specify men's actions to an unlimited extent—down to kinds of food eaten, modes of preparing them, shaping of beards, fringing of dresses, sowing of grain, etc. The omnipresent control, which the ancient eastern nations in general exhibited, was exhibited also in large measure by the Greeks; and was carried to its greatest pitch in the most militant city, Sparta. Similarly during mediæval days throughout Europe, characterized by chronic warfare with its appropriate political forms and ideas, there were no recognized bounds to Governmental interference: agriculture, manufacture, trade, were regulated in detail; religious beliefs and observances were imposed; and rulers said by whom only furs might be worn, silver used, books issued, pigeons kept, etc., etc. But along with increase of industrial activities, and implied substitution of the régime of contract for the régime of status, and growth of associated sentiments, there went (until the recent reaction accompanying reversion to militant activity) a decrease of meddling with people's doings. Legislation gradually ceased to regulate the cropping of fields, or dictate the ratio of cattle to acreage, or specify modes of manufacture and materials to be used, or fix wages and prices, or interfere with dresses and games (except where there was gambling), or put bounties and penalties on imports or exports, or prescribe men's beliefs, religious or political, or prevent them from combining as they pleased, or traveling where they liked. That is to say, throughout a large range of conduct, the right of the citizen to uncontrolled action has been made good against the pretensions of the State to control him. While the ruling agency has increasingly helped him to exclude intruders from that private sphere in which he pursues the objects of life, it has itself retreated from that sphere; or, in other words—decreased its intrusions.
Not even yet have we noted all the classes of facts which tell the same story. It is told afresh in the improvements and reforms of law itself, as well as in the admissions and assertions of those who have effected them. "So early as the fifteenth century," says Professor Pollock, "we find a common-law judge declaring that, as in a case unprovided for by known rules, the civilians and canonists devise a new rule according to 'the law of nature, which is the ground of all laws,' the Courts of Westminster can and will do the like."[1] Again, our system of equity, introduced and developed as it was to make up for the shortcomings of Common-law, or rectify its inequities, proceeded
- ↑ "The Methods of Jurisprudence: an Introductory Lecture at University College, London," October 31, 1882.
