Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 25.djvu/844

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826
THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY.

gradually to the higher gratifications arising from altruistic relations. But, apart from such considerations, our whole inquiry has been into the development of conduct by the natural operation of those laws which influence the development of happiness.

In passing I would, however, note that the law of conduct thus considered is by no means that abstraction which has been called "the happiness of the greater number," according to which each person is to regard himself and to be regarded as one, while the rest, being many, are to be regarded as of very much greater importance. This abstraction has not and never had any value whatever, as a rule of conduct, either in a man's self or in his relation to others. Even if we can adopt any meaning for the word happiness as thus used, it will be found that no rational way of apportioning the happiness thus regarded as a sort of common property, can be conceived. If the law instead of being an abstraction were real and could be definitely applied, it could result only in this, that each person, being but one, should utterly neglect his individual welfare in favor of the general happiness, and, as it can be readily seen that no benefits he might receive from those around him (obeying, we may assume, the same law) could possibly compensate for the direct and immediate effects of this complete self-abnegation, it follows that a community of persons obeying this law would be a community of miserable beings; so that obedience to this law for obtaining general happiness would in reality insure universal misery.

Taking concrete instead of abstract happiness as the guide of conduct, were cognize far different results. We see that, though there must of necessity be a compromise between egoistic satisfactions and altruistic cares, the compromise need by no means imply antagonism. Regard for the welfare of others, though in its inception more or lass of an effort, becomes more and more spontaneous as social relations develop. After spontaneity has been attained, altruistic actions involve more and more of egoistic satisfaction. Conversely, the care of self, which in the earlier stages of social development appears to involve more or less of disregard for the interests of others, becomes more and more altruistic in its effect as society advances. Thus also we recognize the answer to what at first might seem a difficulty, viz., that with the improvement of social relations the opportunity for altruistic actions might seem likely to steadily diminish. We see that the domain available for altruistic actions changes in position rather than in extent; nay, that such change of extent as actually accrues is toward increase. In a society where, owing to the steady improvement of the relation between egoistic and altruistic interests, the number of those depending for their happiness or even for their existence on altruistic cares has steadily diminished, the number of those who are the subject of altruistic emotions will as steadily have increased. Sympathy becomes more widely extended, its development becomes surer and more rapid,