Kant, whether it means Dr. Hodgson's own view, or whether the expression has a more general meaning, I have simply to reply that the metaphysical view is incorrect. Dealing with the Kantian version of this doctrine, that Space is a form of intuition, I have pointed out that only with certain classes of phenomena is Space invariably united; that Kant habitually considers phenomena belonging to the visual and tactual groups, with which the consciousness of Space is inseparably joined, and overlooks groups with which it is not inseparably joined. Though, in the adult, perception of sound has certain space-implications, mostly, if not wholly, acquired by individual experience; and though it would seem, from the instructive experiments of Mr. Spalding, that, in creatures born with nervous systems much more organized than our own are at birth, there is some innate perception of the side from which a sound comes; yet it is demonstrable that the space-implications of sound are not originally given with the sensation as its form of intuition. Bearing in mind the Kantian doctrine, that Space is the form of sensuous intuitions not only as presented but also as represented, let us examine critically our musical ideas. As I have elsewhere suggested to the reader—
"Let him observe what happens when some melody takes possession of his imagination. Its tones and cadences go on repeating themselves apart from any space-consciousness—they are not localized. He may or may not be reminded of the place where lie heard them; this association is incidental only. Having observed this, he will see that such space-implications as sounds have are learned in the course of individual experience, and are not given with the sounds themselves. Indeed, if we refer to the Kantian definition of form, we get a simple and conclusive proof of this. Kant says form is 'that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations.' How then can the content of the phenomenon we call sound be arranged? Its parts can be arranged in order of sequence—that is, in Time. But there is no possibility of arranging its parts in order of coexistence—that is, in Space. And it is just the same with odor. Whoever thinks that sound and odor have Space for their form of intuition may convince himself to the contrary by trying to find the right and left sides of a sound, or to imagine an odor turned the other way upward."—(Principles of Psychology, § 399.)
As I thus dissent, not I think without good reason, from "the metaphysical view of Space and Time" as "elements in all phenomena," it will naturally be expected that I dissent from the first criticism which Dr. Hodgson proceeds to deduce from it. Dealing first with the arguments I have used to show the incomprehensibility of Space and Time, if we consider them as objective, and stating in other words the conclusion I draw, that, "as Space and Time cannot be either non-entities nor the attributes of entities, we have no choice but to consider them as entities," Dr. Hodgson continues:
