have been taught to observe the surfaces, edges, angles, etc., of a cube. The word will, therefore, recall only so many memory pictures of the cube as the child has acquired. But point out some new quality in the cube, and a new memory picture of the cube is formed in the child's mind. When in future the word cube is spoken the child will have a more complete memory of it—in other words, a more complete knowledge of it. The process can be continued until all the qualities of the cube are known to the child, and form parts of its concept or notion of the cube. This notion, or memory, is represented in language by the word cube. The simple ideas or conceptions of its color, shape, weight, hardness, go to form the general idea.
Now, grant that the teacher understands how the visual impressions are carried by the eye to a certain center in the brain; how the tactual are carried by conducting nerves to another center; and how the impression of the spoken word is carried by the ear to still another center. Further, he is supposed to know how these centers are connected with each other, so that hearing the word cube spoken recalls the memories of its shape, surfaces, angles and edges.
Armed with such a knowledge of the mechanism of the nervous system as the basis of thought, the teacher has a magic wand in his possession by means of which he can stimulate his pupils, and make what would otherwise be dreary enough work more interesting than a high-class novel or the story of an exciting adventure. There will then exist in the teacher's mind a reason for the natural method of teaching by appealing to the child's experience of things, and for showing it the object about which a certain lesson is to take place. The Ding an sich of Kant becomes known inductively, as Spencer and Romanes have shown, through an experience with its qualities. This sort of knowledge does not lead to either the idealism of Berkeley nor the skepticism of Hume, but to a true, scientific psychology as expounded by Wundt and Ribot.
In the past, and indeed at present, far too much time has been spent in instructing the child by telling it certain facts, and not enough time in teaching the child how to observe for itself. We can not see through other people's eyes, nor is their reasoning our reasoning. The power to repeat certain formula) or to give answers to certain questions does not indicate knowledge on the part of the child. The great object of education is to make the individual capable of solving his own problems, of doing his own reasoning, of looking after his own affairs, of performing his duties as a citizen, of improving himself socially and morally, and of earning an honest living.
Thus it becomes clear that our knowledge is an aggregation of
