Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 48.djvu/205

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193
SUGGESTIBILITY AND KINDRED PHENOMENA.

disastrous to symmetrical development. This type of figure is seen at its best in such skaters as the Donahues, McCormick, the old-time professional, who still skates a fast race although now forty years of age, and in Wilson Breen, a professional, who has been a winner of much gold and glory by means of his long legs and powerful thighs.

The conclusion that speed skating alone is not a good exercise to develop a well-built, symmetrical man will be patent to any one who reviews the facts. If indulged in, it should be, as done by McCulloch, in conjunction with other forms of athletics which bring into action the muscles of the arm, calf, shoulders, and chest.


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SUGGESTIBILITY, AUTOMATISM, AND KINDRED PHENOMENA.[1]

By W. ROMAINE NEWBOLD, Ph. D.,

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

I. MENTAL CO-ORDINATION AND ORGANIZATION.

THE thoroughgoing parallelism of mind and brain may be regarded as an accepted principle of current psychology. There remain, it is true, a few psychologists who dispute it, and many of those who accept it as a working principle refuse to regard it as final. It is conceivable, say they, that when our knowledge is more complete we shall discover that the relation of mind and brain is very different from what we now suppose it to be. Yet we may be sure that the facts upon which the doctrine of parallelism rests will never be set aside by any new discoveries, and will find their place in that final theory toward which we are slowly moving.

It is somewhat surprising that few, even of those who accept this theory as a working hypothesis, have endeavored to carry it out into all its logical implications and to see how far they will fit the actual facts. It is my own belief that the more thoroughly this is done the more probable does it appear that every mental state has its accompanying physical process, and the more rigorously we apply the dynamic conceptions suggested by our scanty knowledge of these physical processes to their accompanying

  1. I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the recent French and English writers on these topics, especially to Pierre Janet, with whose theory as developed in his work, L'Automatisme Psychologique, the above doctrines are essentially identical. It should be noted, however, that Janet expressly repudiates any attempt to bring his psychological theory into connection with our psycho-physiological speculations.