ning a campaign or in organizing a single engagement. This is to make our knowledge of climate and of weather of immediate practical use, however much we may deplore the occasion which necessitates such use. Heavy rains make roads muddy and often impassable; delay the movements of troops, and of supplies; necessitate the abandonment of heavy guns and of ammunition; flood trenches and camps; cause discomfort and suffering, and bring on illness. Deep snows have many similar effects, but in addition are often accompanied by severe cold. Unless proper clothing, protection and fires can be provided, and often in spite of such precautions, severe cold almost inevitably increases the sufferings of the men, especially of the sick and wounded, causing an increase in the sick and mortality rates; disabling men through frostbites; making them unfit to march or to use their hands; freezing up water supplies, etc. Hot spells necessitate shorter marches, and may disable hundreds of men through sunstroke or heat prostration. Droughts make it difficult to secure water and food; cause dust which hampers the movements of troops, and may make their presence known to the enemy, and interferes with the accuracy of cannon and rifle firing. It does make a difference whether an army marches on dry, hard roads, or through deep and slippery mud; whether it suffers from frozen feet or is warm and comfortable; whether snow is falling or the sky is clear and the sun is shining; whether the wounded on the battlefield are soaked with rain, and beaten by hail, and covered with ice, or can be cared for under favorable conditions. As Sir John French put it, a few years ago: "The darker the night, the more inclement the weather, the more disagreeable the surroundings, the more valuable the training will be, and our young soldiers will gain some glimmering of what they must expect to meet in war."
Picked troops; discipline; a well-organized system of transport; proper clothing—in short, all that goes to make up the most efficient military organization, is of vastly more importance than the weather. But we fail to read history aright if we do not recognize that the weather element is by no means the least important of the many external factors which have affected military campaigns.
The present war gives us an immediate opportunity to study the influence of weather upon military operations. Although the war has lasted but three months, there are already many cases which may be cited in illustration.
During the first six weeks of the war the despatches made practically no mention whatever of the weather. Only incidentally was reference made to the oppressive heat. We may, therefore, conclude that there was nothing in the meteorological conditions in August and early September which had any noticeable effect upon the campaign. The mild and pleasant weather of the European late summer apparently ran its ac-
