Page:Psychology and preaching.djvu/157

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BELIEF 139

consciousness, no criteria of reality, no basis for the forma tion of a judgment as to the reality or unreality of any thing. When it believes in the existence of Santa Claus the presentation bears some relation to the existing content of consciousness, a relation which may be described as nega tive agreement, and any presentation which bears this rela tion to its experience is accepted as true. But in James illustration there is no relation whatever with any other content of the mind for the simple reason that there is no other content, and therefore no mental attitude of belief such as is here described. This type of belief may well be described as primitive credulity. Many of the contents of the child s mental world are of this character. Indeed, to the end of its life, though it may grow to be a great philos opher with an extensive and critically constructed mental system, many of its beliefs will continue to be of this order, accepted simply because it is of the nature of the mind to accept what is presented to it, if there is no conscious con flict with the mental life as previously organized. But the building up of an elaborate and reflective correlation of ex perience establishes a habit of critical examination, which takes the form of intellectual caution and which is applied, often with no conscious intention, to new presentations, especially in the sphere of one s principal activity and usually in matters of incidental interest ; so that, as a general rule, with broadening experience credulity becomes a diminish ing factor in determining beliefs. But it is an extremely im portant factor in the lives of children, of ignorant persons and of all persons of limited experience.

3. The mind may positively receive the new presentation, may welcome it with more or less cordiality. As in the second case, it is not of the sensory or axiomatic type. It does not come bearing credentials of inherent and irresistible validity, like the clear testimony of the senses or the logical axiom. But though it is not in itself irresistible, it is at once felt to be in positive agreement with the existing mental content. It fits into the system. With more or less definite-

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