Page:S v Makwanyane and Another.djvu/32

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jurisdiction. If issues arise in respect of the protection of the right to life, priority must not be accorded to the domestic laws of other countries or to (bilateral) treaty articles. Discretion of any nature permitted under an extradition treaty cannot apply, as there is no room for it under Covenant obligations. It is worth repeating that no derogation from a State's obligations under article 6, paragraph 1, is permitted. This is why Canada, in my view, violated article 6, paragraph 1, by consenting to extradite Mr. Kindler to the United States, without having secured assurances that Mr. Kindler would not be subjected to the execution of the death sentence.[1]

[83]An individual's right to life has been described as "[t]he most fundamental of all human rights",[2] and was dealt with in that way in the judgments of the Hungarian Constitutional Court declaring capital punishment to be unconstitutional.[3] The challenge to the death sentence in Hungary was based on section 54 of its Constitution which provides:

(1) In the Republic of Hungary everyone has the inherent right to life and to human dignity, and no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of these rights.

(2) No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel or inhuman or degrading punishment

[84]Section 8, the counterpart of section 33 of our Constitution, provides that laws shall not impose any limitations on the essential content of fundamental rights. According to the finding of the Court, capital punishment imposed a limitation on the essential content of the fundamental rights to life and human dignity, eliminating them irretrievably. As such it was unconstitutional. Two factors are stressed in the judgment of the Court. First, the relationship between the rights of life and dignity, and the importance of these rights taken together. Secondly, the absolute nature of these two rights taken together. Together they are the source of all other rights. Other rights may be limited, and may even be withdrawn and then granted again, but their ultimate limit is to be found in the preservation of the twin rights of life and dignity. These twin rights are the essential content of all rights under the Constitution. Take them away, and all other rights cease. I will deal later with the requirement of our Constitution that a right shall not be limited in ways which negate its essential content. For the present purposes it is sufficient to point to the fact that the Hungarian Court held capital punishment to be unconstitutional on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the right to life and the right to dignity.

[85]Our Constitution does not contain the qualification found in section 54(1) of the Hungarian constitution, which prohibits only the arbitrary deprivation of life. To that extent, therefore, the right to life in section 9 of our Constitution is given greater protection than it is by the Hungarian Constitution.

[86]The fact that in both the United States and India, which sanction capital punishment, the highest courts have intervened on constitutional grounds in particular cases to prevent the carrying out of death sentences, because in the particular circumstances of such cases, it would have been cruel to do so, evidences the importance attached to the protection of


  1. Joseph Kindler v Canada, supra note 94, at 23.
  2. Per Lord Bridge in R v Home Secretary, Ex parte Bugdaycay (1987) AC 514 at 531G.
  3. Supra note 55.