Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 04.djvu/299

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Causes of Lee's Defeat at Gettysburg.
291

Longstreet says:

"On the morning of the 2nd I went to General Lee's headquarters at daylight and renewed my views against making an attack. He seemed resolved, however, and we discussed the results."

General Lee had been firmly resolved for near twelve hours to attack the enemy, and to attack him before all of his troops had been concentrated, and is it to be credited for a moment that he had not then made up his mind when he should attack, nor where, nor how? Is it not palpable that, finding Longstreet so persistently averse to the attack, and so loth to take the steps necessary to begin it, he again sent Col. Tenable to Ewell to see whether, after viewing the position by daylight, he could not make the attack from his flank. Let us see what General Hood says in his letter to Longstreet. He says:

"I arrived with my staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak, as I have already stated, on the morning of the 2d of July. My division soon commenced filing into an open field near me, where the troops were allowed to stack arms and rest until further orders. A short distance in advance of this point, and during the early part of that same morning, we were both engaged, in company with Generals Lee and A. P. Hill, in observing the position of the Federals. General Lee—with coat buttoned to the throat, sabre-hilt[1] buckled around the waist, and field-glasses pending at his side—walked up and down in the shade of large trees near us, halting now and then to observe the enemy. He seemed fall of hope, yet at times buried in deep thought.

"Colonel Freemantle, of England, was ensconced in the forks of a tree not far off, with glass in constant use, examining the lofty position of the Federal army.

"General Lee was seemingly anxious that you should attack that morning. He remarked to me: 'The enemy is here, and if we don't whip him he will whip us.' You thought it best to await the arrival of Pickett's division—at that time still in the rear—in order to make the attack; and you said to me subsequently, whilst we were seated together near the trunk of a tree: 'The General is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off.'

"Thus passed the forenoon of that eventful day when in the afternoon, about 3 o'clock, it was decided to no longer await Pickett's division, but to proceed to our extreme right and attack up the Emmettsburg road."

Can there longer be any question that General Lee wanted Longstreet to begin the attack very early in the morning—as