Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 04.djvu/79

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Causes of Lee's Defeat at Gettysburg.
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crossed the Potomac, and not so far from his base as Gettyburg; indeed he said so, but the absence af his cavalry, under Stuart, prevented its movements and the time of its crossing from being definitely known to him. In the language of the official report of the Commander of our army, we find it stated that "the movements of our army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of cavalry." And again: It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked, but coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal army, to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous." Finally, in the fourth place: The great relief to this country the withdrawal of the Federal army would have caused, as well as the immense relief given to the Commissary of the Confederate States, by the absence of the Army of Northern Virginia from the soil of Virginia—the question of supplies for man and beast being even at that time a troublesome one.

I fully agree with ——— in his opinion, expressed in his third declaration, as to a want of co-operation during the battle of the 2d July, 1863. I am decidedly of the opinion that the failure of co-operative effort, so visible upon that day, was the result of the different degrees of promptness with which General Lee's orders for attack were carried out by his subordinate commanders. It is difficult to conceive why, with two out of the three army corps of the Army of Northern Virginia in close contact with the enemy's position on the night of the 1st July, and two-thirds of the remaining corp in camp only four miles in rear, an attack upon the Federal force, not yet wholly concentrated on the 2d, but whose numbers were hourly growing stronger and whose position was hourly rendered more impregnable by the work of thousands of men, should have been delayed until 4 P. M.

I am satisfied that any military man, reading the sworn testimony of the leading Federal participants in that battle, before the Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War, would agree