Cheatham's division, was removed from the "Craven House slope," and Cumming's brigade, of my own division, from the top of the mountain—General Cumming, as senior officer present, being placed in command of the two brigades. I was advised by Lieutenant-General Hardee to transfer my headquarters to the "Craven house," and subsequently to the camp just vacated by him.
Having thus, without the slightest premonition—not only a large portion of the troops, but even the permanent commands having been removed—been placed in command, at night, at a most critical period, over a wing of the army with whose position and disposition, as I have already stated, I had enjoyed no opportunity of making myself acquainted, I at once used every exertion to gain the necessary information, by sending every officer of my staff, and devoting the whole night myself to riding over and examining the lines. I found the position, at which General Hardee advised me to establish my headquarters, to be on the eastern side of Chattanooga creek, some distance beyond the extreme right of my line, and at least two and a half miles from the base of the mountain. The distance, and the fact that the situation was most unfavorable for personal observation, determined me to return to the mountain, which afforded this advantage in the highest degree, and I accordingly addressed you the appended communication (A). On my way back I examined the whole line, and, at sunrise, reached the "Craven house."
After examining the "Craven House slope," I was convinced that, should it be attacked by the enemy, it would be impossible, with the force at my disposal, to hold any point upon the north-west side, so completely was it commanded by the batteries of the enemy on Moccasin point, and those on the ridge near Lookout creek, recently erected to command that slope, and I was satisfied that the best plan that could be adopted in such an event was hold a line near the "Craven house," placing Walthall on the Northwest slope, with a strong force of skirmishers on the creek to resist the enemy as long as possible, finally falling back fighting to the line selected; posting as many sharpshooters as possible on Lookout point, from which position they could pour upon the enemy a most destructive fire, and by descending Smith's trail with troops from above, to strike him in flank. Accordingly, after seeing General Moore, and conversing with him upon the subject of his line, and his ability to hold it, of which he spoke with some confidence, I went to the top of the mountain to make what I conceived to be the proper disposition of the troops there. I directed Brigadier-General Brown, then commanding my division, to hold the large portion of Pettus' brigade ready to move at a moment's notice to any point to which it should be ordered. I thus provided, as well as the means at my disposal permitted, either for an attack upon Cumming or Jackson.
Immediately upon my arrival on the mountain, I directed the lookouts at the point to keep a close watch, and advise me of any movements that the enemy might make.
