Military Operations of General Beauregard. 259
labor shown in the preparation, as well as the mass of valuable ma- terials it contains, render this book indispensable to the student of the history of the war.
We regret that we cannot go farther in praise of this book, but its whole tone, temper and manner of composition forbid it. Its faults are too glaring to be overlooked. The chief sufferer from its publication is likely to be General Beauregard himself, and it had been better for his reputation if he had assumed less directly the responsibility for Colonel Roman's work. The book is not so much a history of Gen- eral Beauregard's career as it is a fulsome panegyric of him, an over- strained and often disingenuous defence of everything he did, or did not do, during the war, and an unfair and ill-natured critique upon the conduct of his superiors. We believe there is not a single supe- rior officer of General Beauregard that is not disparaged in this book, and accused of damaging, at one time or another, the cause of which General Beauregard is represented as the only ever wise and ever unselfish defender. The object of our author's special hostility is Mr. Davis, but the Confederate Secretaries of War, the chiefs of the war bureaus in Richmond, and Generals Cooper, Lee, A. S. Johnston, J. E. Johnston, besides many of lower rank, come in for their share of criticism — a criticism often ill-judged, in most cases partial, and nearly always truculent.
The author's mode of dealing with history is illustrated by his ac- count of the first battle of Manassas. The facts in regard to this are simple. In July, 1861, the Confederate Government had two principal bodies of troops, hastily collected, to oppose the invasion of Virginia, threatened by the as hastily gathered levies of the Federal Government. The larger of these, under General Beauregard, held the line of Bull Run, and in its front was the principal Federal army under General McDowell. Beauregard's force was being augmented by new regiments as fast as they could be armed and equipped out of the meagre supplies the South could then command, and by the middle of July numbered about 20,000 men. The other Confederate army, of about 10,000 men, under General J. E. Johnston, was op- posing General Patterson's advance into the Shenandoah Valley. Besides these. General Holmes had a small force on the lower Poto- mac. Both of the larger bodies were greatly inferior to the Federal forces opposing them. McDowell had about 35,000 men and Patter- son about 20,000. As McDowell's was the principal Federal army, it was pretty clear that the first serious advance would be made by it. It was also evident that the Confederate forces at Manassas would
