Military Operations of General Beauregard. 443
" General Beauregard," he says, " bitterly reflected on General Sher- man's long and slow march from Atlanta to Savannah, from Savan- nah to Goldsboro', and from Goldsboro' to Raleigh, a distance of 650 miles, which it had taken him 100 days, or an average of six miles a day to accomplish. He knew that this had been effected without material opposition, because of want of forethought on the part of the officers of the War Department, from whom no reinforcement could be obtained, and by reason of whose apathy no concentration could be made at any point, notwithstanding his repeated and urgent appeals. And what added keenness to his regret, was the recollection that had General Hood crossed the Tennessee river at Gantersville, when he should have done so, he would have had ample time to de- stroy the scattered Federal forces in that part of the State, take Nashville, with all the supplies there collected, and march to the Ohio without encountering serious obstacles. Or, possibly, he might, after taking Nashville, have crossed the Cumberland mountains and gone to form a junction with General Lee, so as to strike General Grant before General Sherman could come to his assistance The success of either movement might have compelled General Sherman to fol- low the Confederate forces into Middle Tennessee, thus showing the correctness of General Hood's original plan, which, though badly executed, was, nevertheless, undoubtedly well conceived."
After having read Colonel Roman's book twice with minute atten- tion, we asked ourself what impression it had left on our mind as to the character, the talents, and military career of General Beauregard. Our appreciation we give here for what it is worth. It has, at least, the merit, if no other, of sincerity, impartiality, and conviction.
The moral qualities of General Beauregard are transparent, and cannot be questioned — integrity, high-mindedness, magnanimity, deli- cate sensitiveness under a cold exterior, disinteredness, and a chival- rous refinement of feelings, to which we may add self-abnegation and self-sacrifice, when required by the public good. We are not sure that we might not, with equal proprietv, extend this disposition so as to embrace his usual course of action within the sphere of private in- terests.
As a military man, he shows himself a wonderful organizer, a rare quahty, so much appreciated in Carnot, whom Napoleon called the " organizer of victories." He is equally skillful in the attack and in the retreat, and he unites in his person what is seldom found together, the genius of the engineer with the quick and comprehensive con- ceptions of the strategist in the field. The great Conde was one of
