Hagood's Brigade. 407
the commanding general. My regret is in attempting this attack without full command of all the forces which were to participate. Both the plan of battle and attack were good, but failed in the exe- cution. The enemy became extremely uneasy along his entire line when the attack was made, and had we been successful at that point, our results would have been such as have not been heretofore equalled. General Hagood did everything in his power to give us success, and desired to push forward when, in my judgment, it would have been hazardous. Very respectfully,
" R. F. HOKE, Major- General. "To Captain John M. O/ey, A. A. G."
( Endorsement. )
" Respectfully forwarded to General R. E. Lee for his information. It will be seen by the reports of Generals Hoke and Hagood that they are not responsible for the failure of the attack on the 24th ult., which would undoubtedly have been successful had the supports ad- vanced in time. General Hoke is mistaken, if he refers to me, when he says : ' I have heard unofficially that both I and my command have been censured by the commanding general.' I stated only that ' the success would have been most brilliant had the skirmishers been properly supported.' His report and that of General Hagood prove the correctness of my assertion.
"General Hoke says on second page of his report: 'After a lapse of five minutes the fire of the guns ' (*. e. , forty-four guns on the north side of the Appomattox,) ' was directed upon the batte- ries of the enemy, drawing in a great degree their fire from the advancing infantry, which, as far as I could see, was the only service rendered by them. Indeed, I fear we were injured more than we gained by the use of our guns, as it notified the enemy of our in- tended attack.' The object of opening the fire of the batteries, referred to during the half hour preceding the infantry attack, was to demoralize the enemy's troops occupying the defensive lines which were to be attacked, and which were enfiladed and taken in reverse by those batteries. It was expected also that the heavy artillery fire would throw into confusion any supports the enemy might have con- cealed in the woods near his line. The best proof of the entire suc- cess of the plan is the facility with which an unsupported line of skir- mishers got possession of those lines, with a loss of only twenty-five killed and seventy- two wounded. I am decidedly of opinion that,
