204 Southern Historical Society Papers.
thousand strong, with two hundred and fifty pieces of artillery; while Johnston's army numbered between fifty and sixty thousand. And I here remark that General Sherman was too sagacious, too well acquainted with the skill and ability of his wily adversary, ever to jeopardize a general offensive engagement with him, or even to attack him, with the major portion of his command, at any time throughout the campaign. His policy was, in moving upon John- ston's various positions, to press forward a heavy line of skirmishers, strongly supported, as near to his position as possible without bring- ing on a general engagement, thereby developing the location of Johnston's line, and if he found a salient or supposed weak link in his line, then to furiously assault that particular point with a massed force, evidently intending, if the assault succeeded, then to wheel right and left on the flanks of the broken line, and at the same time to order a general attack along our entire front. But it so happened with all these gallant assaults, that Johnston's line was never broken or seriously embarrassed, but the assaulting columns were invariably repulsed, and in some instances with losses that were frightful. And thus it was that Sherman was compelled to dislodge Johnston (if he would dislodge him at all) from his various positions by making flank movements, which he did slowly and continuously, and fortifying as he went, as if anticipating an offensive movement by his vigilant antagonist. By this policy he finally forced Johnston beyond the Chattahoochie river to a point in front of Atlanta, which city was then fortified and garrisoned by several thousand State troops of Georgia, and from which position in front of Atlanta General John- ston informed the speaker soon after the war that he intended to move forward and attack Sherman with his entire veteran army, as he crossed the Chattachoochie river, leaving the State troops in the works to protect Atlanta; and that if he failed 'to demolish or defeat him he then intended to fall back to the fortifications around Atlanta, and hold the place as long as possible. But just as this movement was about to be inaugurated he was relieved of the command of his army, and thus ended his military operations in Georgia.
During this celebrated campaign, and upon which the eyes of the whole country, both North and South, seemed to be fixed in anx- ious suspense, Sherman had the advantage of superior numbers, as also the moral advantage of being the attacking force, while John- ston had the inestimable physical advantage of fighting for the most part from behind strong entrenchments, and was thereby enabled to inflict a loss upon his adversary of about four to one Sherman's
