Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 37.djvu/344

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Southern Historical Society Papers.

do so to advantage. I could not bring artillery to bear upon it, and all the troops with me were jaded by a number of hours of marching and fighting, and I was notified that General Johnston's division (the only one of my corps that had not been engaged), was close to the town." Now, that is General Ewell's reasons assigned for not pushing the advantage of the first day. I am not military man enough to express an opinion as to their sufficiency. There are many different opinions upon the subject.

GENERAL EWELL DEFENDED.

But what does General Lee say? "General Ewell was therefore instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable; but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward. He decided to await Johnston's division, which had marched from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains to guard the trains of his corps, and consequently did not reach Gettysburg until a late hour." Now, General Lee left it entirely to the discretion of his subordinate, when he might have given a peremptory order. Of course, that grand man is to magnanimous to blame him for the way he exercised this discretion. The responsibility placed upon General Ewell was tremendous. Instead of blaming him, for he says: "It was ascertained from the prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the army formerly commanded by General Hooker, and the remainder of that army, under General Meade, was approaching Gettysburg. Without information as to its proximity, the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops."

General Hill says: "My own two divisions being exhausted by six hours 5 hard fighting, prudence led me to be content with what had been gained, and not push forward troops exhausted and necessarily disordered, probably to encounter fresh troops of the enemy."

Now, with such testimony as this, I coudl never never see the