federacy, the consideration being that France would send an army to the aid of Jefferson Davis and otherwise co-operate in the establishment of his government in the rest of the Southern States. The scheme did not have the approval of all the leading Confederates—perhaps it was not liked by a majority of them; but disapproval of Mr. Davis was by no means uncommon at that time—indeed, it had been the rule rather than the exception since his removal of Joseph E. Johnston, at a critical moment in the Tennessee campaign some months before. At all events, Polignac, accompanied by Moncure, went to Paris—via Galveston, we think—and, though their mission was barren of result, so far as concerned the Confederacy, it leaked out when Moncure returned that Louis Napoleon had frequently consulted with Lord Palmertson, and that, so far from refusing to consider the proposition at all—whatever it may have been—the latter had given it a great deal of his time, and had finally dismissed it with reluctance. We have since been told that the Queen herself intervened, but we rather think that the appearance of the Russian fleets at New York and San Francisco—with orders, as afterwards transired, to place themselves at the disposal of the United States Government—cut at least some figure in Lord Palmertson's philosophy.
It is hardly probable that the details of this remarkable incident will ever find their way into authenticated history; but many men who knew of it—who knew Polignac and Moncure and heard the latter's account of the mission—still survive and still recall the events, the disclosures, and the accepted conclusions growing out of it.
