Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 40.djvu/298

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Southern Historical Society Papers.

attack on their intrenched lines about Falling Waters." ("Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg, by Colonel G. J. Fiebeger, p. 139.)

Reviewing the whole campaign, I think it is plain that Lee lost the battle of Gettysburg by the failure of four splendid soldiers upon whom he had been accustomed to rely. His strategy was not at fault (of his tactics perhaps we cannot say as much); the orders issued were correct, and should have resulted in victory. But one thing-we are compelled to acknowledge; General Lee did not enforce that prompt and implicit obedience to his will as commander-in-chief which he should have done; and without which success in a great campaign can hardly be achieved. Gettysburg was a drawn battle it is true; a fight in which 68,000 men were pitted against at least 105,000.—We may sum up the results by saying that on the first day the Confederates won a great victory; on the second day they also won two important successes both on Culp's Hill and at the Peach Orchard and in the Devil's Den; on the third day the great attack on the center was repulsed, and also that on Meade's left.

Thus it was on the whole a drawn battle, in which the Federals lost many more in killed, wounded and prisoners than the Confederates. But a drawn battle under the circumstances was a defeat. Complete victory was essential to success and although the Army of Northern Virginia afterwards fought many splendid battles, with magnificent courage, and often with great success, between July, '63, and April, '65, nevertheless the battle of Gettysburg does mark the beginning of the decline of the Confederate hopes.

As we ponder the circumstances of that great battle and note how one after another the omens of success were turned to defeat, through no fault of our great commander, we can only feel that Lee, like Hector of Troy, was fighting against the supernal powers. It was not the will of God that we should succeed. And, where I try to understand the ultimate cause of our failure, I am led to the conclusion that it was not the will of the Great Ruler of events that the destinies of the Anglo-Saxon race on the American continent should be left in the hands of those who were then our enemies. The Southern people were neces-