States, Nov. 25, 1814, Works, II, 593. General references: Adams, VIII, 222–228; Dwight, 337–351; Hildreth, VI, 531–535; McMaster, IV, 246–248; Schouler, II, 424, 425; Von Hoist, 258–262.
36. Extracts from the Report of the Committee of the General Court of Massachusetts, October 15, 1814.
[After reviewing the policy of the Federal Government toward the New England States, the report concludes:]
It is, therefore, with great concern that your Committee are obliged to declare their conviction that the Constitution of the United States, under the administration of the persons in power, has failed to secure to this Commonwealth, and as they believe, to the eastern section of this union, those equal rights and benefits which were the great objects of its formation, and which they cannot relinquish without ruin to themselves and posterity. These grievances justify and require vigorous, persevering and peaceable exertions, to unite those who realize the sufferings, and foresee the dangers of the country, in some system of measures, to obtain relief, for which the ordinary mode of procuring amendments to the constitution, affords no reasonable expectation, in season to prevent the completion of its ruin. The people, however, possess the means of certain redress; and when their safety, which is the supreme law, is in question, these means should be promptly applied. The framers of the constitution made provision to amend defects, which were known to be incident to every human institution; and the provision itself was not less liable to be found defective upon experiment, than other parts of the instrument. When this deficiency becomes apparent, no reason can preclude the right of the whole people, who were parties to it, to adopt another; and it is not a presumptuous expectation, that a spirit of equity and justice, enlightened by experience, would enable them to reconcile conflicting interests and obviate the principal causes of those dissentions, which unfit government for a state of peace and of war; and so to amend the constitution, as to give vigor and duration to the union of the States. But as a proposition for such a convention from a single State, would, probably, be unsuccessful, and our dangers admit not of delay, it is recommended by the Committee, that in the first instance, a conference should be invited between those States, the
