will be chosen by the people, as well as the members of the House of Delegates, if not immediately, yet mediately, being chosen by the members of the State legislature, which members are elected by the people; and that it makes no real difference, whether we do a thing in person, or by a deputy or agent appointed by him for that purpose.
[44] That no argument can be drawn from the House of Lords in the British constitution, since they are neither mediately nor immediately the representatives of the people, but are one of the three estates composing that kingdom, having hereditary rights and privileges distinct from, and independent of, the people.
[45] That it may, and probably will, be a future source of dispute and controversy between the two branches, what are or are not revenue bills, and the more so as they are not defined in the constitution; which controversies may be difficult to settle, and may become serious in their consequences, there being no power in the constitution to decide upon, or authorized, in cases of absolute necessity, to terminate them by a prorogation or dissolution of either of the branches; a remedy provided in the British constitution, where the King has that power, which has been found necessary at times to be exercised, in case of violent dissensions between the Lords and Commons on the subject of money bills.
[46] That every regulation of commerce, every law relative to excises, stamps, the post-office, the imposing of taxes and their collection, the creation of courts and offices; in fine, every law for the Union, if enforced by any pecuniary sanctions, as they would tend to bring money into the continental treasury, might, and no doubt would, be considered a revenue act; that, consequently, the Senate, the members of which will, it may be presumed, be the most select in their choice, and consist of men the most enlightened, and of the greatest abilities, who, from the duration of their appointment and the permanency of their body, will probably be best acquainted with the common concerns of the States, and with the means of providing for them, will be rendered almost useless as a part of the legislature; and that they will have but little to do in that capacity, except patiently to wait the proceedings of the House of Representatives, and afterwards examine and approve, or propose amendments.
[47] There were also objections to that part of this section which relates to the negative of the President. There were some who thought no good reason could be assigned for giving the President a negative of any kind. Upon the principle of a check to the proceedings of the legislature, it was said to be unnecessary; that the two branches having a control over each other’s proceedings, and
