Page:The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 Volume 3.djvu/213

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an open avowal of those reasons, by which we believed before that they were actuated. They said, that, as the States would be opposed to the general government, and at enmity with it, which, as I have already observed, they assumed as a principle, if the militia was under the control and the authority of the respective States, it would enable them to thwart and oppose the general government. They said, the States ought to be at the mercy of the general government, and, therefore, that the militia ought to be put under its power, and not suffered to remain under the power of the respective States. In answer to these declarations, it was urged, that, if after having retained to the general government the great powers already granted, and among those, that of raising and keeping up regular troops without limitations, the power over the militia should be taken away from the States, and also given to the general government, it ought to be considered as the last coup de grace to the State governments; that it must be the most convincing proof, the advocates of this system design the destruction of the State governments, and that no professions to the contrary ought to be trusted; and that every State in the Union ought to reject such a system with indignation, since, if the general government should attempt to oppress and enslave them, they could not have any possible means of self-defence; because, the proposed system taking away from the States the right of organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, the first attempt made by a State to put the militia in a situation to counteract the arbitrary measures of the general government would be construed into an act of rebellion or treason; and Congress would instantly march their troops into the State. It was further observed that, when a government wishes to deprive its citizens of freedom, and reduce them to slavery, it generally makes use of a standing army for that purpose, and leaves the militia in a situation as contemptible as possible, lest they might oppose its arbitrary designs; that, in this system, we give the general government every provision it could wish for, and even invite it to subvert the liberties of the States and their citizens; since we give it the right to increase and keep up a standing army as numerous as it would wish, and, by placing the militia under its power, enable it to leave the militia totally unorganized, undisciplined, and even to disarm them; while the citizens, so far from complaining of this neglect, might even esteem it a favor in the general government, as thereby they would be freed from the burden of militia duties, and left to their own private occupations or pleasures. However, all arguments, and every reason that could be urged on this subject, as well as on many others, were obliged to yield to one that was unanswerable,—a majority upon the division.