Page:The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 Volume 3.djvu/428

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National Legislature.—Whether a publication of them ought to be promoted, as having a useful tendency, you will probably be better able to decide, on a perusal of the document than one who can not take the same abstract view of the subject.


ⅭⅭⅭⅩⅩⅠ. James Madison to James Monroe.[1]

Montpellier, Dec. 27, 1817.

These considerations remind me of the attempts in the Convention to vest in the Judiciary Dept. a qualified negative on Legislative bills. Such a Controul, restricted to Constitutional points, besides giving greater stability & system to the rules of expounding the Instrument, would have precluded the question of a Judiciary annulment of Legislative Acts.


ⅭⅭⅭⅩⅩⅡ. Rufus King in the United States Senate.[2]

January 12, 1818.

Without adverting to the several branches of the executive power, for the purpose of distinguishing the cases in which it is exclusively vested in the President, from those in which it is vested in him jointly with the Senate, it will suffice on this occasion to observe that, in respect to foreign affairs, the President has no exclusive binding power, except that of receiving the Ambassadors and other foreign Ministers, which, as it involves the decision of the competence of the power which sends them, may be an act of this character; to the validity of all other definitive proceedings in the management of the foreign affairs, the Constitutional advice and consent of the Senate are indispensable.

In these concerns the Senate are the Constitutional and the only responsible counsellors of the President. And in this capacity the Senate may, and ought to, look into and watch over every branch of the foreign affairs of the nation; they may, therefore, at any time call for full and exact information respecting the foreign affairs, and express their opinion and advice to the President respecting the same, when, and under whatever other circumstances, they may think such advice expedient.

There is a peculiar jealousy manifested in the Constitution concerning the power which shall manage the foreign affairs, and make treaties with foreign nations. Hence the provision which requires the consent of two-thirds of the Senators to confirm any compact with a foreign nation that shall bind the United States;

  1. G. Hunt, Writings of James Madison, Ⅷ, 406.
  2. Annals of Congress, Fifteenth Congress, First Session, Ⅰ, 106–107.