seemed to be contemplated, and as it was unfortunately also discussed by Count Hoyos in Berlin.”
So it appears that in Berlin it had even been discussed whether war should be declared on Serbia without any ultimatum. Tisza prevented that. He knew too well that such a proceeding would at the very outset put Austria in the wrong. He wanted an ultimatum—and one that could be carried out. If Serbia were to accept it, a great diplomatic success would have been obtained, and with that one could be content.
After a long discussion it was finally concluded:
“(1) That all present desired as speedy a settlement as possible of the case at issue with Serbia, whether by peace or war.
“(2) That the Ministerial Council was willing to adhere to the view of the Hungarian Premier, according to which mobilization should not take place until concrete demands had been made on Serbia, and an Ultimatum presented.
“On the other hand, all present, with the exception of the Hungarian Premier, are of opinion that a mere diplomatic success, even if it involved a humiliation of Serbia, would be worthless, and that in consequence the demands on Serbia should be of so far-reaching a character that their rejection was to be anticipated; so that the way would be made clear for a radical settlement by military action.”
This pretty scheme was the result of the discussion of the “political situation” held in Potsdam on July 5th. It was at once reported to Berlin, in Tschirschky's
