service is, I willingly concede; but I am also convinced that the substitution of military management would not in itself obviate existing difficulties, but would add others in effect likely to prove still more serious.
A careful investigation of the subject will convince any fair-minded inquirer that military management will not be more economical in the point of pecuniary outlays than the civil management is now. Of greater importance is the ascertained fact that the Indians have generally a strong dislike for military control—not for the mere reason that the presence of an armed force is distasteful to them, for the success of our Indian police system shows that they submit to the restraints imposed upon them by such a force with great willingness, and exercise the police regulations under the direction of prudent agents with great alacrity; but there is a variety of other reasons for their repugnance which it would lead me too far to mention. It is easy to understand that if the management of Indian affairs were turned over to the military service the interests of the Indians and the interests and convenience of the Army might not always agree; and it is from no disrespect to the Army when I express the opinion that under such circumstances it might sometimes be questionable which interests would have the preference. It is certainly true, and within my own knowledge, that some military officers have shown great aptitude for the management of Indians in their peaceful pursuits and relations; but it is also true that the very spirit of the calling of military men is apt to suggest the application of force as one of the first resorts, even in the cases where peaceful teaching and patient guiding are most required. There have been many instances of this kind. Without going into a full statement of all the reasons upon which my conviction in this respect is based, I will simply quote, with the strongest possible approval, the recommendation of the Peace Commission of 1868, couched in the following language: “This brings us to consider the much mooted question whether the bureau should belong to the civil or military department of the government. To determine this properly we must first know what is to be the future treatment of the Indians. If we intend to have war with them, the bureau should go the Secretary of War; if we intend to have peace, it should be in the civil department. Under the plan which we have suggested, the chief duties of the bureau will be to educate and instruct in the peaceful arts; in other words, to civilize the Indians. The military arm of the government is not the most admirably adapted to discharge duties of this character. We have the highest possible appreciation of the officers of the Army, and fully recognize their proverbial integrity and honor; but we are satisfied that not one in a thousand would like to teach Indian children to read and write, or Indian men to sow and reap. These are emphatically civil, and not military, occupations.” This report was signed by William T. Sherman, then Lieutenant-General of the Army, Brig. Gen. William S. Harney, Bvt. Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, and Bvt. Maj. Gen. C. C. Augur.
