1785.
On the whole, after the preſent practice on replevins has been of ſo many years ſtanding and ſeems founded on a law of our own, we think it would be improper to make ſuch an alteration, as would be occaſioned by iſſuing judicial writs de proprietate probanda.
Taylor verʃus Knox, et al.
F
OREIGN attachments.—In theſe rules had been obtained to ſhew cauſe of action, and why the attachments ſhould not be quaſhed.
On the argument, the garniſhee Henderʃon (who was alſo a co-partner with the defendant) produced ſeveral witneſſes, by whoſe teſtimony the following facts were eſtablifhed:—That David Knox came to Philadelphia in the ſpring of 1784; that he brought furniture with him, hired a dwelling houſe and ſtore, and profeſſed an intention “to lay his bones here.” That he went to Virginia in February 1785, and ſailed thence to England, in conſequence of receiving intelligence of ſome miſconduct of another partner, named Cowan, who reſided there, and had never been in America. That during his abſence, and at the time of laying the attachments, the copartner, now garniſhee, continued in poſſeſſion of the houſe in Philadelphia, with much the ſame eſtabliſhment of ſervants &c. but after the attachments were laid, he broke up houſe-keeping. That David Knox was a ſingle man, and it was not known, whether he had taken the oath of allegiance to this ſtate, or not.
The plaintiffs to ſhew their cauſe of action, produced affidavits of accounts from their reſpective books, ſworn to before the Lord Mayor of London.
The queſtion being argued by Ingerʃol and Rowle, in ſupport of the motion, and by Lewis and Wilcocks againſt it, the President, at an adjourned ſitting on the 15th of February 1786, delivered the opinion of the Court.
Shippen, Preʃident.—The firʃt point to be decided, is, whether the foreign attachments ought not to be diſſolved, on the proofs given of Knox's being an inhabitant of Penʃylvania at the time they iſſued?
We would avoid laying down any general rules as to what will or will not, make a perſon an inhabitant within the attachment law, leſt cafes ſhould hereafter happen, which might come within thoſe general rules, but were not in the contemplation of the Court in the particular caſe before them. We think, however, if any general rule was made, it would be reaſonable, and very conſonant to our laws and conſtitution, that the perſon's reſidence here, to make him
