1793.
urged on other occasions, and as I wish to give the fullest satisfaction, I will say a few words to that doctrine. Suppose, therefore, it should be objected, that the reasoning I have now used is not conclusive, because, inasmuch as a State is made subject to the judicial power of
Congress, its sovereignty must not stand in the way of the proper exercise of that power, and, therefore, in all such cafes (though in no other) a State can only be considered as a subordinate corporation merely. I answer, 1ft. That this construction can only be allowed, at the utmost, upon the supposition that the judicial authority of the United States, as it respects States, cannot be effectuated without proceeding against them in that light: a position I by no means admit. 2d. That according to the principles I have supported in this argument, admitting that States ought to be so considered for that purpose, an act of the Legislature is necessary to give effect to such a construction, unless the old doctrine concerning corporations will naturally apply to this particular case. 3d. That as it is evident the act of
Congress has not made any special provision in this case, grounded on any such construction, so it is to my mind perfectly clear that we have no authority; upon any supposed analogy between the two cases, to apply the common doctrine concerning corporations, to the important case now before the Court. I take it for granted, that when any part of an ancient law is to be applied to a new case the circumstances of the new case must agree in all essential points with the circumstances of the old cases to which that ancient law was formerly appropriated. Now there are, in my opinion, the most essential differences between the old cases of corporations to which the law intimated has reference, and the great and extraordinary case of States separately possessing, as to every thing simply relating to themselves, the fullest powers of sovereignty, and yet in some other defined particulars subject to a superior power composed out of themselves for the common welfare of the whole. The only law concerning corporations, to which I conceive the least reference is to be had, is the common law of
England on that subject. I need not repeat the observations I made in respect to the operation of that law in this country. The word “corporations,” in its largest sense, has a more extensive meaning than people generally are aware of. Any body politic (sole or aggregate) whether its power be restricted or transcendant, is in this sense “a corporation.” The
King, accordingly, in
England is called a corporation. 10
Co. 29
b. So also, by a very respectable author (
Shepard, in his abridgement, 1
Vol. 431.) is the Parliament itself. In this extensive sense, not only each State singly, but even the
United States may without impropriety be termed “corporations.” I have therefore in contradiction to this large and indefinite
term
