Page:United States Reports, Volume 209.djvu/227

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209 U. 8. H?ltl,,t,?, J., dissentln? individnals, but solely by virtue of their holding such offices, that they prefer and pre?ecute indictments in the name of the State. A State can only act or be proceeded against through its officers. If a decree could be entered against the State of Rhode Island enjoinlng prosecutions under this act, it could only operate against the State through enjoinlng these defend- ants. An order restra?ng the Attorney General and his assistant from the enforcement of this statute is an order re- straining the State itself. The present suit, therefore, is as much against the State of Rhode Island as if the State itself were named a party defendant." After referring to In re A?ters, and F?ts v. McGhee, and upon 'a review of the cases, the'court proceeded: "The defendants Stearns and Grecnough hold no special relation to the act of June 1, 1902. They are not spe- cially charged with its execution. They are not thereby con- stituted a board or commission with administrative pewers? nor are they as individuals, and apart from the official au- thority under which they act, threatening to seize the prop- erty of the complainant, or to commit any wrong or trespass against its personal or property rights. They have no other connection with this statute than the institution of formal judicial proceedings for its enforcement in the courts of the State in the name and behalf of the State. Upon reason and authority the pr ?e??nt bill is a suit against the State of Rhode Island, within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." In More?nc? Copper Co. v. Freer, 127 Fed. Rep. 199, 205, which was an action in equity to restrain and inhibit the de- fendant, in his official capacity as Attorney General of West Virginia, from proceeding to institute an action in the state court for forfeiture of the charter of the. plaintiff corporation for a failure to pay a license tax impeded by a state statute, and which statute was alleged to be in violation of the Federal Constitution, the Circuit Court reviewed the decisions of this court upon the question as to what were and what were not suits a?ir?t the State. The Circuit Court held that it had no juris-