Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 102 Part 2.djvu/1027

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PUBLIC LAW 100-000—MMMM. DD, 1988

PUBLIC LAW 100-456—SEPT. 29, 1988

102 STAT. 2031

(2) To date, there have been seven formal observations and challenge inspections which have been conducted in accordance with the Stockholm agreements. (3) The military leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have concluded that the Stockholm observations and inspections have positively contributed to an improved understanding of Warsaw Pact forces and capabilities. (4) The Conventional Stability Talks (CST), which may begin before the end of 1988, will likely require careful and potentially prolonged negotiation. (5) New negotiations will also begin under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a follow-on to the Stockholm conference. (6) The confidence-building measures established at Stockholm could, if expanded, contribute significantly to the success of the CDE follow-on conference and also to the establishment of a procedural framework for verifying a future CST agreement. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should give high priority to developing, in coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies of the United States, stabilizing and verifiable proposals for expanding the regime of confidence-building measures in conjunction with the follow-on to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) ana the new Conventional Stability Talks (CST). SEC. 902. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON START TALKS

It is the sense of Congress that any agreement negotiated by the President to achieve a reduction and limitation on strategic arms (through the strategic arms reduction talks in (Jeneva or otherwise)— (1) should not prevent the United States from deploying a force structure under the agreement which emphasizes survivable strategic systems and, in particular, should not in any way compromise the security of the United States ballistic-missile carrying submarine force, and (2) should not prohibit or limit the deployment of non-nuclear cruise missiles. SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING ROLE OF CONGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE POLICIES

It is the sense of Congress— (1) that Congress, in exercising its authority under the Constitution "to raise and support Armies" and "provide and maintain Navies" and, in the case of the Senate, to advise and consent to the ratification of treaties, has a role to play in formulating arms control and defense policies of the United States, but (2) that Congress, in exercising that authority, should not usurp, undermine, or interfere with the authority of the President under the Constitution to negotiate and implement treaties, especially in the case of treaties which affect arms control and defense policies of the United States. SEC. 904. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE FIVE-YEAR ABM TREATY REVIEW

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: