PUBLIC LAW 101-189—NOV. 29, 1989 103 STAT. 1547 the proviso in the first sentence of section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573) that no action may be taken under that Act or any other Act that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treatymaking power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress. SEC. 1012. REPORT ON EFFECT OF SPACE NUCLEAR REACTORS ON GAMMA-RAY ASTRONOMY MISSIONS Not later than April 30, 1990, the President shall submit to President of U.S. Congress a report on the potential for interference with gamma-ray astronomy missions that could be caused by the placement in Earth orbit of space nuclear reactors. SEC. 1013. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: (1) The proliferation of chemical weapons and the repeated use of chemical weapons represent a grave threat to the secu- rity and interests of the United States. (2) The most comprehensive and effective response to the threat posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons is the completion of an effectively verifiable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons. (3) The successful completion of a treaty banning all chemiceil weapons through the negotiations at the multinational United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should be one of the highest arms control priorities of the United States. OJ) SENSE OF CONGRESS. — In light of the findings in subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that— (1) the President should continue ongoing efforts to establish an agreement with the Soviet Union and other countries establishing a mutual and effectively verifiable agreement to stop the production, proliferation, and stockpiling of all lethal chemical weapons; and (2) the United States negotiators in Geneva should take con- crete steps to initiate proposals regarding the composition of the verification regime for such an agreeement that will meet the legitimate concerns of other parties while addressing the secu- rity concerns of the United States. SEC. 1014. UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS UNDER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS (a) FINDINGS CONCERNING ON-SITE INSPECTION PERSONNEL. —Con- 22 USC 2595 gress makes the following findings: ^°^- (1) The United States is currently engaged in multilateral and bilateral negotiations seeking to achieve treaties or agreements to reduce or eliminate various t)rpes of military weapons and to make certain reductions in military personnel levels. These negotiations include negotiations for (A) reductions in strategic forces, conventional armaments, and military personnel levels, (B) regimes for monitoring nuclear testing, and (C) the complete elimination of chemical weapons. (2) Requirements for monitoring these possible treaties or agreements will be extensive and will place severe stress on the monitoring capabilities of United States national technical means.
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