PUBLIC LAW 106-65—OCT. 5, 1999 113 STAT. 811 (3) A list of all contractors and subcontractors for each of the Titan, Inertial Upper Stage, and Centaur systems and their responsibilities and five-year records for meeting program requirements. (4) A comparison of the practices of the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the commercial launch industry regarding the management and oversight of the procurement and launch of expendable launch vehicles. (5) An assessment of whether consolidation in the aerospace industry has affected mission success, including whether costsaving efforts are having an effect on quality and whether experienced workers are being replaced by less experienced workers for cost-saving purposes. (6) Recommendations on how Government contracts with launch service companies could be improved to protect the taxpayer, together with the Secretary assessment of whether the withholding of award and incentive fees is a sufficient incentive to hold contractors to the highest possible quality standards and the Secretary's overall evaluation of the award fee system. (7) A short summary of what went wrong technically and managerially in each launch failure and what specific steps are being taken by the Department of Defense and space launch contractors to ensure that those errors do not reoccur. (8) An assessment of the role of the Department of Defense in the management and technical oversight of the launches that failed and whether the Department of Defense, in that role, contributed to the failures. (9) An assessment of the effect of the launch failures on the schedule for Titan launches, on the schedule for development and first launch of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, and on the ability of industry to meet Department of Defense requirements. (10) An assessment of the impact of the launch failures on assured access to space by the United States, and a consideration of means by which access to space by the United States can be better assured. (11) An assessment of any systemic problems that may exist at the eastern launch range, whether these problems contributed to the launch failures, and what means would be most effective in addressing these problems. (12) An assessment of the potential benefits and detriments of launch insurance and the impact of such insurance on the estimated net cost of space launches. (13) A review of the responsibilities of the Department of Defense and industry representatives in the launch process, an examination of the incentives of the Department and industry representatives throughout the launch process, and an assessment of whether the incentives are appropriate to maximize the probability that launches will be timely and successful. (14) Any other observations and recommendations that the Secretary considers relevant. (c) INTERIM REPORT. — Not later than December 15, 1999, the Deadline Secretary shall submit to the specified congressional committees an interim report on the progress in the preparation of the report
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