12 2 STA T .35 53 PUBLIC LA W 11 0– 325 — S E PT. 25 , 200 8PublicLaw1 1 0–325 110 thCongres s A n Act Torest ore t h e in tent a n dp rote c tions o f the Am ericans w ith D isa b i l ities Act of 19 9 0.Beit e nac te dby t h e S enate and Hous eo fR e pr esentati v es of the U nited States of Am erica in C on g ress assemb l ed ,SECTION1. S H O R T TIT L E. ThisActmaybe cite d as the ‘ ‘A D A Ame n dments Act of20 0 8’ ’ . SEC. 2 . F IN D IN G S A ND PU RPOSES. ( a )FIND IN GS . —C on gr ess finds that— ( 1 ) in enacting the Americans w ith Disabi l ities Act of 1 9 90 (ADA) , Congress intended that the Act ‘‘ p ro v ide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimi - nation against individ u als with disabilities’’ and provide broad coverage
(2) in enacting the ADA, Congress recogni z ed that physical and mental disabilities in no way diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society, but that people with physical or mental disabilities are fre q uently precluded from doing so because of pre j udice, antiquated attitudes, or the failure to remove societal and institutional barriers; ( 3 ) while Congress e x pected that the definition of disability under the ADA would be interpreted consistently with how courts had applied the definition of a handicapped individual under the R ehabilitation Act of 19 7 3, that expectation has not been fulfilled; ( 4 ) the holdings of the S upreme Court in Sutton v. U nited Air L ines, I nc., 5 27 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect; (5) the holding of the Supreme Court in Toyota M otor Manufacturing, K entuc k y, Inc. v. W illiams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) further narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA; ( 6 ) as a result of these Supreme Court cases, lower courts have incorrectly found in individual cases that people with a range of substantially limiting impairments are not people with disabilities; (7) in particular, the Supreme Court, in the case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), interpreted the term ‘‘substantially limits’’ to require a greater degree of limitation than was intended by Congress; and 42USC1 21 0 1 note.AD A A m en d ment s A c t o f 200 8 . 42 USC 12101 note. Se p t.2 5, 2008 [ S. 3 40 6]
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