123STA T . 22 4 4 PUBLIC LA W 111 –8 4 —O CT. 28 , 2 0 0 9(1)insubpar a g rap h ( A )b y ins e r t ing ‘ ‘ ,of the N ationa l Aeronauti c san dS pace Ad m inistration, ’ ’ after ‘‘the D epartment of Defense’’
and ( 2 ) by adding at the end the follo w ing new subparagraph ( C )
‘‘(C) A federally funded research and de v elopment center of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration that functions primarily as a research laboratory may respond to broad agency announcements under programs authori z ed by the F ederal G overn - ment for the purpose of promoting the research, development, dem- onstration, or transfer of technology in a manner consistent with the terms and conditions of such program . ’’. SEC.25 5. N E XTG ENE RA T IO N B O M BER AIRCRA F T. (a) F IND IN GS . — Congress ma k es the following findings: (1) L ong-range strike is a critical mission in which the U nited States needs to retain a credible and dominant capa- bility. (2) Long range, penetrating strike systems provide— (A) a hedge against being unable to obtain access to forward bases for political reasons; ( B ) a capacity to respond q uickly to contingencies; (C) the ability to base outside the reach of emerging adversary anti-access and area-denial capabilities; and (D) the ability to impose disproportionate defensive costs on prospective adversaries of the United States. ( 3 ) T he2 0 0 6 quadrennial defense review found that there was a requirement for a ne x t generation bomber aircraft and directed the United States Air Force to ‘‘develop a new land- based, penetrating long range strike capability to be fielded by 201 8 ’’. ( 4 ) O n April 6, 200 9 , Secretary of Defense R obert Gates announced that the United States ‘‘will not pursue a develop- ment program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until we have a better understanding of the need, the requirement and the technology’’. ( 5 )On M ay 7 , 2009, P resident Barack Obama announced the termination of the next generation bomber aircraft program in the document of the Office of Management and Budget entitled ‘‘Terminations, Reductions, and Savings’’, stating that ‘‘there is no urgent need to begin an expensive development program for a new bomber’’ and that ‘‘the future bomber fleet may not be affordable over the next six years’’. (6) The United States will need a new long-range strike capability because the conflicts of the future will likely feature heavily defended airspace, due in large part to the proliferation of relatively inexpensive, but sophisticated and deadly, air defense systems. (7) General Michael Maples, the Director of the Defense I ntelligence Agency, noted during a March 10, 2009, hearing of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on worldwide threats that ‘‘Russia, quite frankly, is the developer of most of those [ advanced air defense ] systems and is exporting those systems both to China and to other countries in the world’’. (8) The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, submitted to Con- gress on May 6, 2009, states that ‘‘[t]he bomber force is valuable
