Page:Wittengenstein - Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1922.djvu/157

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TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS

5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori.

Everything we see could also be otherwise.

Everything we can describe at all could also be otherwise.

There is no order of things a priori.

5.64 Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

5.641 There is therefore really a sense in which in philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I.

The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the "world is my world".

The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit—not a part of the world.

6 The general form of truth function is: [\bar p,\bar \xi,N(\bar \xi)].

This is the general form of proposition.

6.001 This says nothing else than that every proposition is the result of successive applications of the operation N(\bar \xi) to the elementary propositions.

6.002 If we are given the general form of the way in which a proposition is constructed, then thereby we are also given the general form of the way in which by an operation out of one proposition another can be created.

6.01 The general form of the operation \Omega ' (\bar \eta) is therefore : [\bar \xi,N(\bar \xi)]' (\bar \eta) (=[\bar \eta,\bar \xi,N(\bar \xi)]) .

This is the most general form of transition from one proposition to another.