Perry v. Schwarzenegger/5:Trial Proceedings and Summary of Testimony
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5:Trial Proceedings and Summary of Testimony
|6:Credibility Determinations--Plaintiffs' Witnesses→|
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
The parties' position on the constitutionality of Proposition 8 raised significant disputed factual questions, and for the reasons the court explained in denying proponents' motion [p. 11] for summary judgment, Doc #228 at 72-91, the court set the matter for trial.
The parties were given a full opportunity to present evidence in support of their positions. They engaged in significant discovery, including third-party discovery, to build an evidentiary record. Both before and after trial, both in this court and in the court of appeals, the parties and third parties disputed the appropriate boundaries of discovery in an action challenging a voter-enacted initiative. See, for example, Doc ##187, 214, 237, 259, 372, 513.
Plaintiffs presented eight lay witnesses, including the four plaintiffs, and nine expert witnesses. Proponents' evidentiary presentation was dwarfed by that of plaintiffs. Proponents presented two expert witnesses and conducted lengthy and thorough cross-examinations of plaintiffs' expert witnesses but failed to build a credible factual record to support their claim that Proposition 8 served a legitimate government interest.
Although the evidence covered a range of issues, the direct and cross-examinations focused on the following broad questions:
WHETHER ANY EVIDENCE SUPPORTS CALIFORNIA'S REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE MARRIAGE BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE BECAUSE OF THEIR SEX;
WHETHER ANY EVIDENCE SHOWS CALIFORNIA HAS AN INTEREST IN DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN SAME-SEX AND OPPOSITE-SEX UNIONS; and
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SHOWS PROPOSITION 8 ENACTED A PRIVATE MORAL VIEW WITHOUT ADVANCING A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT INTEREST.
Framed by these three questions and before detailing the court's credibility determinations and findings of fact, the court abridges the testimony at trial:
[p. 12] WHETHER ANY EVIDENCE SUPPORTS CALIFORNIA'S REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE MARRIAGE BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE BECAUSE OF THEIR SEX
All four plaintiffs testified that they wished to marry their partners, and all four gave similar reasons. Zarrillo wishes to marry Katami because marriage has a "special meaning" that would alter their relationships with family and others. Zarrillo described daily struggles that arise because he is unable to marry Katami or refer to Katami as his husband. Tr 84:1-17. Zarrillo described an instance when he and Katami went to a bank to open a joint account, and "it was certainly an awkward situation walking to the bank and saying, 'My partner and I want to open a joint bank account,' and hearing, you know, 'Is it a business account? A partnership?' It would just be a lot easier to describe the situation—might not make it less awkward for those individuals, but it would make it—crystalize it more by being able to say...'My husband and I are here to open a bank account.'" Id. To Katami, marriage to Zarrillo would solidify their relationship and provide them the foundation they seek to raise a family together, explaining that for them, "the timeline has always been marriage first, before family." Tr 89:17-18.
Perry testified that marriage would provide her what she wants most in life: a stable relationship with Stier, the woman she loves and with whom she has built a life and a family. To Perry, marriage would provide access to the language to describe her relationship with Stier: "I'm a 45-year-old woman. I have been in love with a woman for 10 years and I don't have a word to tell anybody about that." Tr 154:20-23. Stier explained that marrying Perry would make them feel included "in the social fabric." Tr [p. 13] 175:22. Marriage would be a way to tell "our friends, our family, our society, our community, our parents...and each other that this is a lifetime commitment...we are not girlfriends. We are not partners. We are married." Tr 172:8-12.
Plaintiffs and proponents presented expert testimony on the meaning of marriage. Historian Nancy Cott testified about the public institution of marriage and the state's interest in recognizing and regulating marriages. Tr 185:9-13. She explained that marriage is "a couple's choice to live with each other, to remain committed to one another, and to form a household based on their own feelings about one another, and their agreement to join in an economic partnership and support one another in terms of the material needs of life." Tr 201:9-14. The state's primary purpose in regulating marriage is to create stable households. Tr 222:13-17.
Think tank founder David Blankenhorn testified that marriage is a "socially-approved sexual relationship between a man and a woman" with a primary purpose to "regulate filiation." Tr 2742:9-10, 18. Blankenhorn testified that others hold to an alternative and, to Blankenhorn, conflicting definition of marriage: "a private adult commitment" that focuses on "the tender feelings that the spouses have for one another." Tr 2755:25-2756:1; 2756:10-2757:17; 2761:5-6. To Blankenhorn, marriage is either a socially approved sexual relationship between a man and a woman for the purpose of bearing and raising children who are biologically related to both spouses or a private relationship between two consenting adults.
[p. 14] Cott explained that marriage as a social institution encompasses a socially approved sexual union and an affective relationship and, for the state, forms the basis of stable households and private support obligations.
Both Cott and Blankenhorn addressed marriage as a historical institution. Cott pointed to consistent historical features of marriage, including that civil law, as opposed to religious custom, has always been supreme in regulating and defining marriage in the United States, Tr 195:9-15, and that one's ability to consent to marriage is a basic civil right, Tr 202:2-5. Blankenhorn identified three rules of marriage (discussed further in the credibility determinations, section I below), which he testified have been consistent across cultures and times: (1) the rule of opposites (the "man/woman" rule); (2) the rule of two; and (3) the rule of sex. Tr 2879:17-25.
Cott identified historical changes in the institution of marriage, including the removal of race restrictions through court decisions and the elimination of coverture and other gender-based distinctions. Blankenhorn identified changes that to him signify the deinstitutionalization of marriage, including an increase in births outside of marriage and an increasing divorce rate.
Both Cott and Blankenhorn testified that California stands to benefit if it were to resume issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Blankenhorn noted that marriage would benefit same-sex couples and their children, would reduce discrimination against gays and lesbians and would be "a victory for the worthy ideas of tolerance and inclusion." Tr 2850:12-13. Despite the multitude of benefits identified by Blankenhorn that would flow to [p. 15] the state, to gays and lesbians and to American ideals were California to recognize same-sex marriage, Blankenhorn testified that the state should not recognize same-sex marriage. Blankenhorn reasoned that the benefits of same-sex marriage are not valuable enough because same-sex marriage could conceivably weaken marriage as an institution. Cott testified that the state would benefit from recognizing same-sex marriage because such marriages would provide "another resource for stability and social order." Tr 252:19-23.
Psychologist Letitia Anne Peplau testified that couples benefit both physically and economically when they are married. Peplau testified that those benefits would accrue to same-sex as well as opposite-sex married couples. To Peplau, the desire of same-sex couples to marry illustrates the health of the institution of marriage and not, as Blankenhorn testified, the weakening of marriage. Economist Lee Badgett provided evidence that same-sex couples would benefit economically if they were able to marry and that same-sex marriage would have no adverse effect on the institution of marriage or on opposite-sex couples.
As explained in the credibility determinations, section I below, the court finds the testimony of Cott, Peplau and Badgett to support findings on the definition and purpose of civil marriage; the testimony of Blankenhorn is unreliable. The trial evidence provides no basis for establishing that California has an interest in refusing to recognize marriage between two people because of their sex.
[p. 16] WHETHER ANY EVIDENCE SHOWS CALIFORNIA HAS AN INTEREST IN DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN SAME-SEX AND OPPOSITE-SEX UNIONS
Plaintiffs' experts testified that no meaningful differences exist between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples. Blankenhorn identified one difference: some opposite-sex couples are capable of creating biological offspring of both spouses while same-sex couples are not.
Psychologist Gregory Herek defined sexual orientation as "an enduring sexual, romantic, or intensely affectional attraction to men, to women, or to both men and women. It's also used to refer to an identity or a sense of self that is based on one's enduring patterns of attraction. And it's also sometimes used to describe an enduring pattern of behavior." Tr 2025:5-11. Herek explained that homosexuality is a normal expression of human sexuality; the vast majority of gays and lesbians have little or no choice in their sexual orientation; and therapeutic efforts to change an individual's sexual orientation have not been shown to be effective and instead pose a risk of harm to the individual. Proponents did not present testimony to contradict Herek but instead questioned him on data showing that some individuals report fluidity in their sexual orientation. Herek responded that the data proponents presented does nothing to contradict his conclusion that the vast majority of people are consistent in their sexual orientation.
Peplau pointed to research showing that, despite stereotypes suggesting gays and lesbians are unable to form stable relationships, same-sex couples are in fact indistinguishable from opposite-sex couples in terms of relationship quality and [p. 17] stability. Badgett testified that same-sex and opposite-sex couples are very similar in most economic and demographic respects. Peplau testified that the ability of same-sex couples to marry will have no bearing on whether opposite-sex couples choose to marry or divorce.
Social epidemiologist Ilan Meyer testified about the harm gays and lesbians have experienced because of Proposition 8. Meyer explained that Proposition 8 stigmatizes gays and lesbians because it informs gays and lesbians that the State of California rejects their relationships as less valuable than opposite-sex relationships. Proposition 8 also provides state endorsement of private discrimination. According to Meyer, Proposition 8 increases the likelihood of negative mental and physical health outcomes for gays and lesbians.
Psychologist Michael Lamb testified that all available evidence shows that children raised by gay or lesbian parents are just as likely to be well-adjusted as children raised by heterosexual parents and that the gender of a parent is immaterial to whether an adult is a good parent. When proponents challenged Lamb with studies purporting to show that married parents provide the ideal child-rearing environment, Lamb countered that studies on child-rearing typically compare married opposite-sex parents to single parents or step-families and have no bearing on families headed by same-sex couples. Lamb testified that the relevant comparison is between families headed by same-sex couples and families headed by opposite sex couples and that studies comparing these two family types show conclusively that having parents of different genders is irrelevant to child outcomes.
[p. 18] Lamb and Blankenhorn disagreed on the importance of a biological link between parents and children. Blankenhorn emphasized the importance of biological parents, relying on studies comparing children raised by married, biological parents with children raised by single parents, unmarried mothers, step families and cohabiting parents. Tr 2769:14-24 (referring to DIX0026 Kristin Anderson Moore, Susan M Jekielek, and Carol Emig, Marriage from a Child's Perspective: How Does Family Structure Affect Children, and What Can We Do about It, Child Trends (June 2002)); Tr 2771:1-13 (referring to DIX0124 Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps (Harvard 1994)). As explained in the credibility determinations, section I below, none of the studies Blankenhorn relied on isolates the genetic relationship between a parent and a child as a variable to be tested. Lamb testified about studies showing that adopted children or children conceived using sperm or egg donors are just as likely to be well-adjusted as children raised by their biological parents. Tr 1041:8-17. Blankenhorn agreed with Lamb that adoptive parents "actually on some outcomes outstrip biological parents in terms of providing protective care for their children." Tr 2795:3-5.
Several experts testified that the State of California and California's gay and lesbian population suffer because domestic partnerships are not equivalent to marriage. Badgett explained that gays and lesbians are less likely to enter partnerships than to marry, meaning fewer gays and lesbians have the protection of a state-recognized relationship. Both Badgett and San Francisco economist Edmund Egan testified that states [p. 19] receive greater economic benefits from marriage than from domestic partnerships. Meyer testified that domestic partnerships actually stigmatize gays and lesbians even when enacted for the purpose of providing rights and benefits to same-sex couples. Cott explained that domestic partnerships cannot substitute for marriage because domestic partnerships do not have the same social and historical meaning as marriage and that much of the value of marriage comes from its social meaning. Peplau testified that little of the cultural esteem surrounding marriage adheres to domestic partnerships.
To illustrate his opinion that domestic partnerships are viewed by society as different from marriage, Herek pointed to a letter sent by the California Secretary of State to registered domestic partners in 2004 informing them of upcoming changes to the law and suggesting dissolution of their partnership to avoid any unwanted financial effects. Tr 2047:15-2048:5, PX2265 (Letter from Kevin Shelley, California Secretary of State, to Registered Domestic Partners). Herek concluded that a similar letter to married couples would not have suggested divorce. Tr 2048:6-13.
The experts' testimony on domestic partnerships is consistent with the testimony of plaintiffs, who explained that domestic partnerships do not satisfy their desire to marry. Stier, who has a registered domestic partnership with Perry, explained that "there is certainly nothing about domestic partnership...that indicates the love and commitment that are inherent in marriage." Tr 171:8-11. Proponents did not challenge plaintiffs' experts on the point that marriage is a socially superior status to domestic partnership; indeed, proponents stipulated that "[t]here [p. 20] is a significant symbolic disparity between domestic partnership and marriage." Doc #159-2 at 6.
Proponents' cross-examinations of several experts challenged whether people can be categorized based on their sexual orientation. Herek, Meyer and Badgett responded that sexual orientation encompasses behavior, identity and attraction and that most people are able to answer questions about their sexual orientation without formal training. According to the experts, researchers may focus on one element of sexual orientation depending on the purpose of the research and sexual orientation is not a difficult concept for researchers to apply.
As explained in the credibility determinations, sections I below, and the findings of fact, section II below, the testimony shows that California has no interest in differentiating between same-sex and opposite-sex unions.
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SHOWS PROPOSITION 8 ENACTED A PRIVATE MORAL VIEW WITHOUT ADVANCING A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT INTEREST
The testimony of several witnesses disclosed that a primary purpose of Proposition 8 was to ensure that California confer a policy preference for opposite-sex couples over same-sex couples based on a belief that same-sex pairings are immoral and should not be encouraged in California.
Historian George Chauncey testified about a direct relationship between the Proposition 8 campaign and initiative campaigns from the 1970s targeting gays and lesbians; like earlier campaigns, the Proposition 8 campaign emphasized the importance of protecting children and relied on stereotypical images of gays and [p. 21] lesbians, despite the lack of any evidence showing that gays and lesbians pose a danger to children. Chauncey concluded that the Proposition 8 campaign did not need to explain what children were to be protected from; the advertisements relied on a cultural understanding that gays and lesbians are dangerous to children.
This understanding, Chauncey observed, is an artifact of the discrimination gays and lesbians faced in the United States in the twentieth century. Chauncey testified that because homosexual conduct was criminalized, gays and lesbians were seen as criminals; the stereotype of gay people as criminals therefore became pervasive. Chauncey noted that stereotypes of gays and lesbians as predators or child molesters were reinforced in the mid-twentieth century and remain part of current public discourse. Lamb explained that this stereotype is not at all credible, as gays and lesbians are no more likely than heterosexuals to pose a threat to children.
Political scientist Gary Segura provided many examples of ways in which private discrimination against gays and lesbians is manifested in laws and policies. Segura testified that negative stereotypes about gays and lesbians inhibit political compromise with other groups: "It's very difficult to engage in the give-and-take of the legislative process when I think you are an inherently bad person. That's just not the basis for compromise and negotiation in the political process." Tr 1561:6-9. Segura identified religion as the chief obstacle to gay and lesbian political advances. Political scientist Kenneth Miller disagreed with Segura's conclusion that gays and lesbians lack political power, Tr 2842:4-8, pointing to some successes on the state and [p. 22] national level and increased public support for gays and lesbians, but agreed that popular initiatives can easily tap into a strain of antiminority sentiment and that at least some voters supported Proposition 8 because of anti-gay sentiment.
Proponent Hak-Shing William Tam testified about his role in the Proposition 8 campaign. Tam spent substantial time, effort and resources campaigning for Proposition 8. As of July 2007, Tam was working with Protect Marriage to put Proposition 8 on the November 2008 ballot. Tr 1900:13-18. Tam testified that he is the secretary of the America Return to God Prayer Movement, which operates the website "1man1woman.net." Tr 1916:3-24. 1man1woman.net encouraged voters to support Proposition 8 on grounds that homosexuals are twelve times more likely to molest chldren, Tr 1919:3-1922:21, and because Proposition 8 will cause states one-by-one to fall into Satan's hands, Tr 1928:6-13. Tam identified NARTH (the National Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality) as the source of information about homosexuality, because he "believe[s] in what they say." Tr 1939:1-9. Tam identified "the internet" as the source of information connecting same-sex marriage to polygamy and incest. Tr 1957:2-12. Protect Marriage relied on Tam and, through Tam, used the website 1man1woman.net as part of the Protect Marriage Asian/Pacific Islander outreach. Tr 1976:10-15; PX2599 (Email from Sarah Pollo, Account Executive, Schubert Flint Public Affairs (Aug 22, 2008) attaching meeting minutes). Tam signed a Statement of Unity with Protect Marriage, PX2633, in which he agreed not to put forward "independent strategies for public messaging." Tr 1966:16-1967:16.
[p. 23] Katami and Stier testified about the effect Proposition 8 campaign advertisements had on their well-being. Katami explained that he was angry and upset at the idea that children needed to be protected from him. After watching a Proposition 8 campaign message, PX0401 (Video, Tony Perkins, Miles McPherson, and Ron Prentice Asking for Support of Proposition 8), Katami stated that "it just demeans you. It just makes you feel like people are putting efforts into discriminating against you." Tr 108:14-16. Stier, as the mother of four children, was especially disturbed at the message that Proposition 8 had something to do with protecting children. She felt the campaign messages were "used to sort of try to educate people or convince people that there was a great evil to be feared and that evil must be stopped and that evil is us, I guess.... And the very notion that I could part of what others need to protect their children from was just—it was more than upsetting. It was sickening, truly. I felt sickened by that campaign." Tr 177:9-18.
Egan and Badgett testified that Proposition 8 harms the State of California and its local governments economically. Egan testified that San Francisco faces direct and indirect harms as a consequence of Proposition 8. Egan explained that San Francisco lost and continues to lose money because Proposition 8 slashed the number of weddings performed in San Francisco. Egan explained that Proposition 8 decreases the number of married couples in San Francisco, who tend to be wealthier than single people because of their ability to specialize their labor, pool resources and access state and employer-provided benefits. Proposition 8 also increases the costs associated with [p. 24] discrimination against gays and lesbians. Proponents challenged only the magnitude and not the existence of the harms Egan identified. Badgett explained that municipalities throughout California and the state government face economic disadvantages similar to those Egan identified for San Francisco.
For the reasons stated in the sections that follow, the evidence presented at trial fatally undermines the premises underlying proponents' proffered rationales for Proposition 8. An initiative measure adopted by the voters deserves great respect. The considered views and opinions of even the most highly qualified scholars and experts seldom outweigh the determinations of the voters. When challenged, however, the voters' determinations must find at least some support in evidence. This is especially so when those determinations enact into law classifications of persons. Conjecture, speculation and fears are not enough. Still less will the moral disapprobation of a group or class of citizens suffice, no matter how large the majority that shares that view. The evidence demonstrated beyond serious reckoning that Proposition 8 finds support only in such disapproval. As such, Proposition 8 is beyond the constitutional reach of the voters or their representatives.