Slater v. Maxwell
APPEAL from the District Court for Western Virginia.
Slater filed a bill in that court to compel one Maxwell to release whatever apparent right he, Maxwell, might have acquired to a large tract of land (19,944 acres) in Virginia, under a sale of the same, made in October, 1845, by the sheriff of Ritchie County, for taxes amounting to $30.03, accrued for 1841-2-3-4, and the deeds executed upon such sale.
The grounds of relief set forth and relied on were—
1. That the sale had been made at a grossly inadequate price; the land having been worth $6000, and the sale having been made to the defendant for $30.03.
2. That, although the land was composed of parts, capable of being sold separately, and any one of which would have more than paid all the taxes claimed, the whole had been set up and sold.
3. That there were many persons at the sale, bystanders, desirous of purchasing different parts, but that the defendant stated to them that the owner would redeem them all, and having thus prevented all competition, had the lands knocked down to himself for the paltry sum named.
As to the facts, it appeared to be true that the land had been sold at a price merely nominal, and wholly below its value, and also that the sheriff had sold the whole; but that in selling he had asked, 'Who will pay the taxes and damages for the least quantity of acres?' and that getting no bid for a less quanity of acres, he had then sold the whole. The answer positively averred that no bid could be got for a part. It appeared, also, that in 1840, the complainant had sold 7955 acres of the original tract; but notwithstanding this sale, the entire tract was charged in his name on the books of the commissioner of the revenue of the county, with the taxes, and was returned delinquent for their nonpayment, and was sold.
The main questions, accordingly, were: Had the defendant stated to the bystanders that the plaintiff would redeem the land from the tax sale with a view of preventing their bidding, and so of having the land knocked down to himself at a very low price; and if so, what was the effect in equity, upon the sale, of these statements of his?
As respected the matter of fact. In reply to a positive charge in the bill, that he had made statements of the sort above mentioned, the defendant in his answer said, 'that he has no recollection of making said statement, nor does he believe that he stated that William Slater would redeem his land;' and that he 'believes the charge that he stated to the bystanders attending said sale, that William Slater would redeem his land from the purchaser, to be untrue.'
The testimony from witnesses was thus:
One Zinn stated, that 'he was present when the sheriff was crying the land, and that Maxwell stepped up, and said he knew the owners, and it was not worth while for any person to buy it, that they would pay the taxes.' Being asked, on cross-examination, by the defendant himself, whether he was certain and positive that those words were used, he answered I am.' And being asked, whether he, the defendant, 'might not have alluded to some of the tracts lying in the Siater connection? his repl was: 'The defendant might have alluded to those tracts, or he might not. They were crying the Slater land at the time he stepped up and made the observations.'
One J. R. Jones, also at the sale, testified that Mr. Maxwell, S. T. Bukey, and Manly Zinn, were present; that Mr. Zinn 'appeared like as if he wanted some of the land; that Maxwell said that he knew the men, and that it was no use for them to bid, that it would be redeemed'-as the witness understood Mr. Maxwell to mean-'by the owner of the land.'
In reply to a question, whether any other person would have bid on the Slater land, if the defendant had not made the representations he did, in relation to its being redeemed, Jones said: 'It appeared to me that Mr. Bukey and Mr. Zinn were going to bid; they said they were going to bid on the Slater land.' Mr. Bukey was dead at the time when the evidence was taken.
Among the exhibits filed by the complainant was certificate from the clerk of the Ritchie County Court, that the defendant was the purchaser at $31.53 of 19,944 acres in Richie County, returned delinquent and sold in the name of Slater, for taxes due in October, 1845 (the taxes which had accrued in 1841-2-3-4), amounting to $30.03. And also a certificate, that 9944 acres of land (evidently the same 19,944 which were sold in 1845, or a part thereof) were returned delinquent in the name of Slater, for taxes of 1846-7-8-9, amounting to $23.78; that twenty-five acres thereof were sold in September, 1850, to satisfy the said taxes; and were bought by Maxwell for $24.96. And then followed, under date of 30th August, 1852, a receipt from the defendant Maxwell to the plaintiff Slater, by the hand of Slater's attorney, for $30, in redemption 'for twenty-five acres of land purchased by me in September, 1850, for taxes, and sold as land belonging to said Slater, by the sheriff of Ritchie County.'
There was a general replication to the answer.
The court below dismissed the bill.
Mr. Frick, for the appellant, contended that the gross inadequacy of price-1/200th part of value-shocked the conscience, and amounted, in itself, to conclusive evidence of fraud; [1] that it was, moreover, plain that the sheriff had made no sufficient effort to get bidders for a part; and that above all, in preventing persons from bidding, as it was plain that he had done the answer being evasive on this point-Maxwell had violated a rule of the highest obligation on persons attending auction sales, [2] and applicable especially to sales for tax-titles; [3] that his statements thus operated as a fraud on the sale, which was to be set aside accordingly; and that the case was one especially for relief through equity: made more plainly so by the certificate from the clerk of Ritchie County Court.
Messrs. G. H. Lee and C. Boggs, contended:
1. That the inadequacy of the price, in the absence of fraud, was without import. That the purchase was the purchase of a mere chance, and that in such a case values could not enter into consideration. [4]
2. That the allegation of breach of duty by the sheriff in selling the whole instead of part, was denied by the answer, and disproved.
3. That the allegation of what was said by Maxwell was sufficiently denied by him to put the complainant to full proof both under the Virginia statute and according to the rules of equity pleadings; that where a conversation alleged had occurred more than six years before, a denial on recollection or belief is sufficient, [5] even if the objection new set up to the sufficienty of the denial on belief only had not b en, as it was here, waived by a general replication. That if true, the allegation was of an immaterial thing; of a mere impression or conjecture. At most it was a gratuitous dictum in respect of which Maxwell, who stood in no relation of confidence to Slater, was under no legal obligation to anybody for precise accuracy of statement or certainty of inference or conclusion; and if any one who heard what he said chose to give implicit credence to it, and forbear to bid, it was his own folly or indiscretion; especially as Maxwell, by bidding himself, showed that he knew he might be mistaken about the owners redeeming, and set the example of taking the chance that he might not redeem. [6]
4. That on the whole, the complainant had no remedy through a court of equity. The injury to the complainant resulted from his own gross laches and neglect of duty as a landholder, in failing to pay his taxes and redeem his land within the time allowed by law.
Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:
Notes[edit]
- ↑ Osgood v. Franklin, 2 Johnson's Chancery, 22.
- ↑ Doolin v. Ward, 6 Johnson, 194; Jones v. Caswell, 3 Johnson's Cases, 29; Phippen v. Stickney, 3 Metcalf, 386; Gardiner v. Morse, 25 Maine, 140; Brisbane v. Adams, 3 Comstock 130.
- ↑ Dudly v. Little, 2 Hammond, 504.
- ↑ Borell v. Dann, 2 Hare, 440, 450; Hansford v. Barbour, 3 A. K. Mar shall, 515.
- ↑ Code of Virginia [ed. 1860], ch. 171, § 40, p. 713; Hall v. Wood, 1 Page, 404; Brooks v. Byam, 1 Story, 296; 1 Daniels's Chancery Practice, 254, 257.
- ↑ Phillips v. Duke of Buckingham, 1 Vernon, 227; Neville v. Wilkinson, 1 Brown's Chancery, 546; Turner v. Harvey, Jacob, 178; Vernon v. Keys, 12 East, 637; Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Vesey, 173; Small v. Attwood, 1 Younge, 407, S.C.. on appeal, 6 Clarke & Finelly, 292, 295; Trower v. Newcome, 3 Meriv. 704; Laidlaw v. Organ, 2 Wheat. 178, 195; Davis v. Meeker, 5 Johnson, 354.
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