Starin v. Mayor Etc of the City of New York Independent Steam-Boat Company/Opinion of the Court

by Morrison Waite

United States Supreme Court

115 U.S. 248

Starin  v.  Mayor Etc of the City of New York Independent Steam-Boat Company

 Argued: November 2, 1885. --- Decided: by the defendants, or any or either of them, for such transportation Both Manhattan island and Staten island are in the state of New York The cause of action as stated in the complaint is that the city, under its charter granted originally January 15, 1730, by the province of New York, and since confirmed by the state of New York, has the exclusive right of establishing ferries from Manhattan island to the opposite shores, in such and so many places as the common council may think fit; that the defendants, without the permission of the city, have set up and are maintaining a ferry between Manhattan island and certain landing places on Staten island, and for that purpose employ the boats above named; that the defendant Starin is the owner of the Castleton and the D R Martin, and the person chiefly interested in Starin's City, River & Harbor Transportation Company, of New York, which owns the Laura M Starin, and in the New York & Staten Island Steam-boat Company, which owns the Pomona; that while the business in done in the name of the Independent Steam-boat Company, that company was organized and incorporated through his instrumentality and in his interest, and is composed of but three persons, all of whom are in his employ and under his control; that the incorporation of the company was a device for his own personal benefit; and that he is in fact the person actually operating the ferry The certificate of incorporation, a copy of which is attached to the complaint, shows that the company was organized under the laws of New Jersey, July 26, 1884, with a capital of $5,000, divided into 500 shares of $10 each, all owned by three persons, for the transportation of persons and property upon water as common carriers for hire; that the principal part of the business of the company in New Jersey was to be transacted in Jersey City; and that the business out of that state was to be done in the cities of New York and Brooklyn, and the several villages, landing-places, cities, and towns on the Hudson river, Staten island, and Long island, in New York, accessible by water

We will first consider whether the suit is one which arises under the constitution or laws of the United States; for, if it is not, the order to remand was right, so far as the removal upon the application of all the defendants is concerned.

The character of a case is determined by the questions involved. Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 9 Wheat. 824. If from the questions it appears that some title, right, privilege, or immunity, on which the recovery depends, will be defeated by one construction of the constitution or a law of the United States, or sustained by the opposite construction, the case will be one arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, within the meaning of that term as used in the act of 1875; otherwise not. Such is the effect of the decisions on this subject. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 379; Osborn v. Bank of U.S., supra; Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 252; Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 201; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 264; Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 140; Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 462; S.C.. 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 437; Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 112 U.S. 416; S.C.. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208; Provident Sav. L. Assur. Soc. v. Ford, 114 U.S. 641; S.C.. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1104; Pacific R. R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 11; S.C.. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1113.

The questions in this case, as shown by the pleadings, are, (1) whether the city of New York has, under its charter, the exclusive right to establish ferries between Manhattan island and the shore of Staten island on the Kill von Kull; and, if it has, then, (2) whether the defendants have, in law and in fact, interfered with that right by setting up and operating such a ferry. The determination of these questions depends (1) on the construction of the grant in the charter of the city; and (2) on the character of the business in which the defendants are engaged. It is not contended that there is anything either in the constitution or the laws of the United States which takes away the right from the city, if it was in fact granted by the original charter before the Revolution, or which defines what a ferry is or shall be, or provides that enrolled and licensed steam-boats, managed by licensed officers, may be run on the public waters as ferry-boats, without regard to grants that may have been made by competent authority of exclusive ferry privileges; and that is not the defense set up in the answers in this case. The question here is as to the extent of the ancient grant made to the city, not as to the rights of the defendants in the navigation of the waters of the United States irrespective of this grant. It is not pretended that the United States have in any manner attempted to interfere with the power of a state to grant exclusive ferry privileges across public waters between places within its own jurisdiction. No attempt is made by the city to control the use of the licensed and enrolled vessels of the defendants, or their licensed officers, in any other way that by preventing them from running as a ferry between the points named. They may run as they please, and engage in any business that may be desirable, not inconsistent with the exclusive ferry rights of the city. The claim of the city is based entirely on its charter, and it seeks in its complaint to control only that part of the navigation of the public waters in question which is connected with the establishment and operation of ferries between New York and the specified landing-places on Staten Island. Although the prayer for judgment when taken by itself may appear to go further, it must be construed in connection with the cause of action as stated in the complaint, and limited accordingly. The defense is that the defendants are not operating a ferry within the meaning of the charter, or, if they are, that it is not such a ferry as comes within the monopoly of the city. If they are not operating such a ferry, or if they are, and it appears that the monopoly granted to the city does not include ferries between New York and Staten island on the Kill von Kull, they must prevail in the final determination of the suit. The decision of these questions does not depend on the constitution or laws of the United States. There is nothing in the constitution or laws of the United States entering into the determination of the cause, which, if construed one way, will defeat the defendants, or, in another, sustain them.

It remains to consider the removal on the application of the Independent Steam-boat Company alone. The suit is against all the defendants jointly on the allegation that, acting in common, they are all engaged in violating the rights of the city by keeping up and maintaining the ferry in question. The averment in the complaint is that the defendant Starin is in reality the person actually operating the ferry, and that he uses the other defendants as his instruments for that purpose. It is conceded that the Independent Steamboat Company does not own the boats running on the route. They all belong to Starin, or to companies in which he is the person chiefly interested. The Independent Company was not organized until a few days before this suit was begun. It has a capital of only $5,000, and while it claims to have chartered the boats in question from their respective owners, and to be engaged in running them on the route, it does not deny that the other defendants are directly interested in the establishment and maintenance of the ferry, if it be one, which is being operated by and in the name of the company. The only controversy in the case, as stated in the complaint, is as to the right of the defendants to keep up and maintain a ferry on the route in question. Upon one side of that controversy is the plaintiff, and upon the other all of the defendants. There cannot be a full determination of this one controversy unless all the defendants are parties. The case as stated in the complaint makes Starin the principal defendant, and the Independent Company only an instrument of his. The object is to prevent him, as well as the others, from using these boats, or any others they may own or control, in the way these are being used. There is, according to the complaint, but a single cause of action, and that is the violation of the exclusive ferry rights of the plaintiff by the united efforts of all the defendants. The case is therefore within the rule established in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ide, 114 U.S. 52; S.C.. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735; Putnam v. Ingraham, 114 U.S. 57; S.C.. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 746; Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U.S. 41; S.C.. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1034, 1161,-that a separate defense by one defendant in a joint suit against him and others upon a joint, or a joint and several, cause of action does not create a separate controversy so as to entitle that defendant, if the necessary citizenship exists as to him, to a removal of the cause under the second clause of section 2 in the act of 1875.

It follows that the case was properly remanded, and the orders of the circuit court to that effect are affirmed.

Notes