The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades/An Interlude Of Peace
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Chapter VIII: An Interlude Of Peace
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|Illustrations Not Included|
- ”It seems certain that atomic, and other new weapons, which we may expect a major ruthless opponent to use in the foreseeable future, will not alter the nature of warfare to such an extent that the immediate ground combat need for versatile, mobile, and hard-hitting divisions will be diminished or altered.”
- General Jacob L. Devers 1
By the summer of 1946 the peacetime Army fielded sixteen active divisions, to be backed by an additional fifty-two in the reserve components. For the first time in its history the United States kept more than a token army in the aftermath of victory. This radical departure from tradition resulted from the international instability that characterized the postwar years and spawned the Cold War, an era of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. To counter the threat of Soviet expansion, successive administrations made extensive political and military commitments around the world that matured into a foreign policy known as "containment." Associated with containment were several collective defense treaties, most notably the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which required a significant degree of peacetime readiness on land and sea and in the air.
Shortly after establishing the postwar force, the Army leadership reorganized divisions based upon the lessons from World War II. Despite the Soviet military threat, various obstacles hindered the Army's effort to maintain readiness-the totality of the recent victory, an apathetic public, and an economy-minded Congress. One of the most critical, but widely ignored, issues facing the nation was the possible use of atomic weapons in future wars. That nuclear war did not receive extensive attention during the early postwar years was a consequence of the nation's short-lived monopoly of atomic weapons and the complexity of military decision making in a dangerous international environment.
Demobilization, Occupation, and the General Reserve
In late 1945 the Army began to retool for new missions, which included occupying former enemy territories and establishing a General Reserve, while demobilizing the bulk of the World War II forces. The point system developed earlier, which served as an interim demobilization measure until the defeat of
Japan, provided the basic methodology for execution but did not control the pace of the reduction. As after World War I, the Army failed to prepare a general demobilization plan. Demobilization thus proceeded rapidly, driven largely by public pressure and reduced resources, without the benefit of sound estimates about the size and location of the occupation forces that the Army would need or the length of time that they would have to serve overseas. The divisions that returned to the United States in 1945 and 1946 were generally administrative holding organizations without any combat capability. They were paper organizations "to bring the boys home.."2
Within a year after the end of the war in Europe, the number of divisions on active duty dropped from 89 to 16 (Table 17); of these, 12 were engaged in occupation duty: 3 in Germany, 1 in Austria, 1 in Italy, 1 in the Philippine Islands, 4 in Japan, and 2 in Korea. The remaining 4 were in the United States. By the end of January 1947 three more infantry divisions overseas were inactivated: the 42d in Austria; the 9th in Germany; and the 86th in the Philippine Islands. In addition, the 3d Infantry Division was withdrawn from Germany and sent to Camp (later Fort) Campbell, Kentucky, where it replaced the 5th Division. When demobilization ended in 1947, the number of active divisions stood at twelve.3
To replace the divisions on occupation duty in Germany that were being inactivated, the US. European Command organized the US. Constabulary. Heavily armed, lightly armored, and highly mobile, the Constabulary served as an instrument of law enforcement, supporting civil authority, quelling civil disorders, and providing a covering force to engage a hostile enemy until the United States could deploy larger tactical units overseas. The 1st and 4th Armored Divisions, both experienced in mobile warfare, furnished many of the Constabulary's units.4
Although the US. Army saw no action in Korea during World War II, the 6th, 7th, and 40th Infantry Divisions arrived there in September and October 1945 to occupy the southern portion of the country and assist in the demobilization of the Japanese Army. An agreement with the Soviet Union had divided the former Japanese colony at the 38th Parallel. The Korean contingent for a short time remained at three divisions but soon dropped to two, the 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions. Following establishment of an independent South Korean government in 1948, the Far East Command inactivated the 6th and moved the 7th to Japan, leaving only a military advisory group in Korea.5
Demobilization and the ensuing personnel turbulence played havoc with the active divisions. During a twelve-month period the 88th Infantry Division in Italy received 29,500 officers and enlisted men and shipped out 18,500. The 1st Cavalry Division in Japan operated at one-fourth of its authorized strength during the first year on occupation duty, and most replacements were teenaged recruits. Divisions in the United States fared no better. The 3d Infantry Division was authorized approximately 65 percent of its wartime strength but fell well below that figure. Demobilization, far from being orderly, became what General George C. Marshall described as a "tidal wave" that completely disrupted the internal cohesion of the Army.6
As the nation demobilized, Congress approved, with the consent of the Philippine government, the maintenance of 50,000 Philippine Scouts (PS) as occupation forces for Japan. On 6 April 1946 Maj. Gen. Louis E. Hibbs, who had commanded the 63d Infantry Division during the war, reorganized the Philippine Division, which had surrendered on Bataan in 1942, as the 12th Infantry Division (PS). Unlike its predecessor, the 12th's enlisted personnel were exclusively Philippine Scouts.7
The War Department proposed to organize a second Philippine Scout division, the 14th, but never did so. After a short period President Harry S. Truman decided to disband all Philippine Scout units, determining that they were not needed for duty in Japan. The United States could not afford them, and he felt the Republic of the Philippines, a sovereign nation, should not furnish mercenaries for the United States. Therefore, the Far East Command inactivated the 12th Infantry Division (PS) in 1947 and eventually inactivated or disbanded all Philippine Scout units.8
Besides the requirement for occupation forces, an urgent need existed for some combat-ready divisions in the United States, where none had been maintained since February 1945. The War Department scaled back its earlier estimate for "strategic" forces and decided to maintain one airborne, one armored, and three infantry divisions, all at 80 percent strength. Initially the department designated the force as the Strategic Striking Force but soon renamed it the General Reserve, to reflect its mission more adequately. But the General Reserve quickly felt the effects of demobilization, and it was soon reduced to four divisions the 82d Airborne, the 2d Armored, and the 2d and 3d Infantry Divisions.9
Departing from its post World War I policy, the War Department kept divisional units in the United States concentrated on large posts to foster training and unit cohesion. However, shortages in personnel, obsolete equipment, and insufficient maintenance and training funds prevented the divisions from being combat effective. By the winter of 1947-48 the General Reserve consisted of the airborne division at Fort Bragg at near war strength, two half-strength infantry divisions, one at Fort Campbell and the other at Fort Lewis, and the armored division at Fort Hood with fewer than 2,500 men.10
As many divisions were eliminated from the active rolls, various divisional commanders jockeyed to have their units retained in the active force. By what some thought was chicanery, the 3d Infantry and 82d Airborne Divisions had replaced the 5th Infantry and the 101st Airborne Divisions on the active rolls. These changes caused considerable resentment within the ranks, and unit designations became a contentious issue with many active duty personnel as well as veterans. Thus, the adjutant general solicited recommendations from the commanders of Army Ground Forces and the overseas theaters for divisional numbers to be represented in the Regular Army. In the ensuing study, the adjutant general recommended the numbers 1 through 10 and 24 and 25 for infantry divisions (the 10th Mountain Division to be redesignated as the 10th Infantry Division); the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 for armored divisions (when elements of the 4th Armored Division serving in the Constabulary were inactivated, they were to revert to divisional units); and 82 and 101 for airborne divisions. The recommendations also included the priority for the retention of divisions on the active rolls.11
The study recommended that the 1st Cavalry Division be inactivated upon completion of its occupation duties and its elements retained as nondivisional units. Large horse units were not to be included in the post World War II Army. Chief of Staff General Dwight D. Eisenhower disagreed with the elimination of the division. Therefore, the Army Staff reworked the list, designating the 1st Cavalry Division eighth on the retention list for infantry (the division had been organized partially under infantry and partially under cavalry tables during World War II) and recommending modification of the unit's designation to show its character as infantry. After examining several proposals, Eisenhower approved the name "1st Cavalry Division (Infantry)." 12
No change in the number of divisions on active duty resulted from the study; it simply provided the nomenclature for the Regular Army's divisional forces. Eventually the 1st Cavalry Division, the 10th Mountain Division, and the Constabulary units conformed to these decisions. Also, the 101st Airborne Division and the 10th and 25th Infantry Divisions (Army of the United States units) and the 82d Airborne Division (an Organized Reserve organization) were allotted to the Regular Army. 13
Reorganization of Reserve Divisions
With the nation victorious in war and alone armed with the most awesome weapon known to man, the atomic bomb, a lasting peace appeared at hand. Some military planners believed, however, that the need for ground combat units remained unchanged. Planning for a postwar conventional force had begun in 1943, and over the next three years those plans, which included reserves, were debated in Congress and by the War Department and state officials. 14
When Maj. Gen. Ellard A. Walsh, president of the National Guard Association, learned the staff was studying a postwar reserve structure, he pressed for consideration of reserve officers' views, petitioning Congress to ensure that the War Department establish reserve affairs committees in agreement with the provisions of the National Defense Act. In August 1944 Deputy Chief of Staff McNarney appointed a six-member committee of Regular Army and National Guard officers to prepare policies and regulations for the Guard. Then, in October, he authorized a similar committee for the Organized Reserves. He also arranged for joint meetings of the two groups where they discussed matters common to both.15
On 13 October 1945 the War Department published a postwar policy statement for the entire Army. It called for a ground military establishment consisting of the Regular Army, the National Guard of the United States, and the Organized Reserve Corps, 16 which were to form a balanced force for peace and war. The Regular Army was to retain only those units required for peacetime missions, which were the same as those identified after World War I. The dual-mission Guard was to furnish units needed immediately for war and to provide the states with military resources to protect life and property and to preserve peace, order, and the public safety. The Organized Reserve Corps was to supplement the Regular Army and National Guard contributions sufficiently to meet any projected mobilization requirements. 17
After the policy statement was published, the Army Staff prepared a postwar National Guard troop basis, which included twenty-four divisions. It derived that number by counting the prewar eighteen National Guard infantry and four National Guard cavalry divisions, the Americal Division (which had been largely composed of Guard units), and the 42d Infantry Division. Most soldiers considered the 42d, initially organized with state troops in 1917, as a Guard unit. The fact that the new plan allowed each of the forty-eight states to have at least one general officer also helped earn its acceptance. In the end it was necessary to approve a 27-division structure with 25 infantry divisions and 2 armored divisions to accommodate the desires of all the states. During this process New York, for example, successfully petitioned the War Department for the 42d Infantry Division. When the allotment was completed, the Guard contained the 26th through 48th and the 51st and 52d Infantry Divisions and the 49th and 50th Armored Divisions. The number 39 was used for the first time since 1923. Although a 44th Infantry Division had existed during the interwar years, the postwar 44th in Illinois was a new unit, as were the 46th, 47th, 48th, 51st, and 52d Infantry Divisions and 49th Armored Division. The 50th Armored Division replaced the 44th Infantry Division in New Jersey. 18
While the states and the War Department settled troop basis issues, the National Guard Bureau changed the procedures for organizing the units. In the past states had raised companies, forming regimental headquarters only when sufficient companies existed to make a regiment. Under the new regulations, divisional and regimental headquarters were to be organized first, and they were to assist the division commander in raising the smaller units. 19
During the spring of 1946 the National Guard Bureau surfaced the complex problem of how to preserve historical continuity in the Guard units. In 1942 the divisions had been reorganized from square to triangular units, which left them only vaguely resembling the formations inducted into federal service in 1940 and 1941. Furthermore, the expanded troop basis of 1946 compounded the problem by adding units that had never before existed. To keep from losing the historical link with the prewar units, some dating as far back as 1636, the bureau and the Historical Section, Army War College, reaffirmed an earlier policy validated between World Wars I and II. Units were to perpetuate organizations that had been raised in the same geographic areas, regardless of type or designation. For example, New Jersey, which had supported part of the 44th Division before the war, now supported the 50th Armored Division. Therefore most of its elements "inherited" the history of the organic units of the old 44th, and elements of the new 44th perpetuated the history and traditions of former units in Illinois.20
The command arrangement within the multistate divisions presented another quandary. The War Department did not rule on the question, but some states that shared a division developed and signed formal command arrangement documents. For example, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina, states that contributed to the 48th and 51st Infantry Divisions, contracted to rotate command of the units every five years.21
After the state governors formally notified the National Guard Bureau that they accepted the new troop allotments (Table 18), the bureau authorized reorganization of the units with 100 percent of their officers and 80 percent of their enlisted personnel. The first division granted federal recognition after World War II was the 45th Infantry Division from Oklahoma on 5 September 1946. Within one year all Guard division headquarters had received federal recognition.22
On Veterans Day 1946, at Arlington National Cemetery, President Truman announced the return of the National Guard colors and flags of those units that had served during the war. In concurrent ceremonies in state capitals, forty-five governors received those colors and flags. The other three states obtained their standards in separate ceremonies. These actions did much to express the tie of the postwar National Guard forces to prewar units.23
The rebuilding of the Organized Reserve Corps divisions posed some similar problems and others that were unique to it. A tentative troop basis, prepared in March 1946 (after the National Guard organizational structure had been presented to the states), outlined 25 divisions-3 armored, 5 airborne, and 17 infantry. These divisions and all other Organized Reserve Corps units were to be maintained in one of three strength categories, labeled Class A, B, and C. Class A units were divided into two groups, one for combat and one for service, and units were to be at required table of organization strength; Class B units were to have their full complement of officers and enlisted cadre strength; and Class C were to have officers only. The troop basis listed nine divisions as Class A, nine as Class B, and seven as Class C.24
Maj. Gen. Milton A. Reckord, the adjutant general of Maryland, and General Walsh of the National Guard Association protested the provision for Class A divisions, whose cost, they believed, would detract greatly from funds available to the Guard. They argued that if Class A units were needed, they should be allotted to the Regular Army or the National Guard, not to the Organized Reserve Corps, because these units were augmentations to rather than essential components of the immediate mobilization force. Maj. Gen. Ray E. Porter, director of the Special Plans Division, supported the Guard's view regarding funds and noted that facilities were not available for use by Class A divisions. Furthermore, he believed the Organized Reserve Corps divisions would compete with Guard formations for available personnel. Porter therefore proposed reclassification of all Class A divisions as Class B units. Eventually the War Department agreed and made the appropriate changes.25
Although the dispute over Class A units lasted several months, the War Department proceeded with the reorganization of the Organized Reserve Corps divisions during the summer of 1946. That all divisions were to begin as Class C (officers only) units, progressing to the other categories as men and equipment became available, undoubtedly influenced the decision. Also, the War Department wanted to take advantage of the pool of trained reserve officers and enlisted men from World War II. By that time Army Ground Forces had been reorganized as an army group headquarters that commanded six geographic armies (Map 3). The armies replaced the nine corps areas of the prewar era, and the army commanders were tasked to organize and train both Regular Army and Organized Reserve Corps units. The plan the army commanders received called for twenty-five Organized Reserve Corps divisions the 19th, 21st, and 22d Armored Divisions; the 15th, 84th, 98th, 99th, and 100th Airborne Divisions; and the 76th, 77th, 79th, 81st, 83d, 85th, 87th, 89th, 90th, 91st, 94th, 95th, 96th, 97th, 1024, 103d, and 104th Infantry Divisions. Demography served as the basic tool for locating the units within the army areas, as after World War I.26
The twenty-five reserve divisions activated between September 1946 and November 1947 (Table 19) differed somewhat from the original troop basis. The First Army declined to support an airborne division, and the 98th Infantry Division replaced the 98th Airborne Division. A note on the troop list nevertheless indicated that the unit was to be reorganized and redesignated as an airborne unit upon mobilization and was to train as such. After the change, the Organized Reserve Corps had four airborne, three armored, and eighteen infantry divisions. The Second Army insisted upon the number 80 for its airborne unit because the division was to be raised in the prewar 80th Division's area, not that of the 99th. Finally, the 103d Infantry Division, organized in 1921 in New Mexico, Colorado, and Arizona, was moved to Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota, and North Dakota in the Fifth Army area. The Seventh Army (later replaced by Third Army), allotted the 15th Airborne Division, refused the designation, and the adjutant general replaced it by constituting the 108th Airborne Division, which fell within that component's list of infantry and airborne divisional numbers.27
A major problem in forming divisions and other units in the Organized Reserve Corps was adequate housing. While many National Guard units owned their own armories, some dating back to the nineteenth century, the Organized Reserve Corps had no facilities for storing equipment and for training. Although the War Department requested funds for needed facilities, Congress moved slowly in response.28
Given a smaller Organized Reserve Corps troop basis that called for infantry, armored, and airborne divisions, six prewar infantry divisions in that component were not reactivated in the reserves. The War Department deleted the 86th, 97th, and 99th Infantry Divisions when other divisions took over their recruiting areas, and the Regular Army, as noted, retained the 82d and 101st Divisions, which had been reorganized as airborne during the war. The future of the 88th Infantry Division, still on occupation duty in Italy, remained unsettled. Within the Organized Reserve Corps' block of numbers fell the 92d and 93d Infantry Divisions, but they were not classified as a part of that component. The War Department, however, decided not to maintain all-black divisions or use their traditional numbers in the postwar reorganization.29
Two changes took place shortly after the reorganization of the reserve divisions. In 1947 the 13th Armored Division replaced the 19th in the Organized Reserve Corps, and the 52d Infantry Division became the 49th in the National Guard. Redesignation of the 52d coincided with California's centennial celebration. The division's home area covered the region where gold had been discovered in 1849, and the state requested the name change to honor the "Forty-Niners" of that era. The 13th replaced the 19th Armored Division, also at California's bidding, because of the former unit's association with the state; the 13th had served there during and after World War II.30
The War Department tentatively planned to organize the 106th Infantry Division in Puerto Rico using units from all three components. The Regular Army and the National Guard were to furnish the regimental combat teams and the Organized Reserve Corps the combat support units. By early 1948 the combat elements had been organized, and the formation of most other units had been authorized, including the headquarters company of the division. The War Department determined, however, that the 106th Infantry Division was not needed and never added it to the reserve troop list. The division headquarters company was inactivated in 1950, but most other units remained active as nondivisional organizations. 31
Manning reserve units proved to be a difficult task. Initially the Army planned that the rank and file of the units would be men who had undergone universal military training in centers operated by Regular Army divisions. With public sentiment opposed to universal military training, Congress declined to approve it. The reserves therefore relied upon volunteers who had prior service, the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and personnel who had to complete a commitment after serving on active duty in conjunction with the draft, which was reenacted in 1948. That year to stimulate interest in the Organized Reserve Corps, Congress authorized pay for inactive duty training. With a small portion of the postwar Army dependent upon the draft, it generated few reservists for the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps, and those units fell considerably below full strength.32
Although the War Department did not use divisions as a part of a universal military training program, it decided to use divisional designations for replacement training centers in the summer of 1947. The 3d Armored Division and the 4th, 5th, and 9th Infantry Divisions were activated and their elements reorganized for that purpose. The cadres who trained the recruits responded favorably to the use of divisions as a means of building esprit since they wore the divisional shoulder sleeve insignia, and the recruits were inspired by the accomplishments of historic units. The Army authorized more training centers divisional designations in the summer of 1948 (Table 20). As the training load fluctuated, so did the number of "divisional" training centers, which stood at four two years later.33
Postwar Divisional Organizations
In reorganizing the postwar divisions, the Army used World War II tables of organization and equipment, but studies of combat experience that were under way portended revisions. The U.S. European Theater of Operations established the General Board, consisting of many committees, to analyze the strategy, tactics, and administration of theater forces. A committee headed by Brig. Gen. A. Franklin Kibler, formerly the G-3, 12th Army Group, examined the requirements for various types of divisions. After weighing divisional strengths and weaknesses and considering new combinations of arms and services, the committee recommended the retention of infantry, armored, and airborne divisions. The committee concluded that a standard infantry division could accomplish missions that might require either light or mountain troops, and that therefore such special divisions were unnecessary. However, it also recommended that the Army maintain at least one horse cavalry division to guarantee that a few officers and enlisted men would continue to be trained as mounted troops. No other postwar study urged the retention of the cavalry division, and, as noted, the War Department rejected any large horse units for the future.34
Other General Board committees examined the requirements for each type of division. The committee for the infantry division surfaced many of the same requirements identified previously in the spring of 1945 and recommended a unit of 20,578 men. Additional men were needed in the infantry regiment to provide communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and administration, and improved weapons were required for cannon and antitank companies. The committee proposed the development of a low silhouette 105-mm. self-propelled howitzer, but until its adoption the cannon company was to use a 105-mm. howitzer mounted on a medium tank. To arm the antitank company, the planners proposed either a self-propelled antitank gun or a medium tank, with most favoring the latter. Some committee members advocated removing the antitank company from the infantry regiment and adding a three-battalion tank regiment to the division. Because of the size and complexity of the infantry regiment, the committee urged that its commander be a brigadier general.35
Cavalry and field artillery arms were also expanded within the infantry division. To ensure adequate intelligence and counterreconnaissance (i.e., security), a divisional cavalry squadron replaced the troop. Because the division often lacked sufficient field artillery, the committee recommended adding a towed 155-mm. howitzer battalion for a total of two 155-mm. howitzer battalions and three self-propelled 105-mm. howitzer battalions. All fifteen artillery batteries were to have six pieces each.36
Divisional combat and combat service support also grew. An antiaircraft artillery battalion was added for air defense, an engineer regiment replaced the battalion, and a military police company supplanted the platoon. Given the increases in the arms and combat support elements, the division needed greater maintenance and quartermaster resources, and the committee urged expansion of these units to battalions. Finally, a new reinforcement battalion was suggested to process and forward replacements. In sum, the General Board committee preserved the division's three regimental combat teams used during the war, but added or enlarged units that had been organic or habitually attached and organizations to service them.37
The committee analyzing the airborne division concluded it should have the same organization and equipment as the infantry division, along with augmentations needed to perform its airborne missions. Two sets of equipment were thus recommended for the division, a lightweight set for airborne assaults and a heavy set for sustained ground combat. All divisional elements were to be trained in parachute, glider, and air transport techniques, making all divisional elements airborne units.38
The General Board's third committee on divisional organization reviewed the armored division. Examination of both the early heavy armored division and the lighter variant introduced in 1943 revealed defects that had been corrected by attaching units. Using the 1943 division as a base, the committee added a fourth 105-mm. howitzer battalion, an antiaircraft artillery battalion, and a tank destroyer battalion. During combat operations these units had been added to the division, as was an infantry battalion or regiment, when available. The committee viewed the combat command as a major weakness because it did not have assigned units, a violation of unity of command. Furthermore, both types of armored divisions had only two authorized combat commands, but in combat they normally had operated with three. To provide the third command in the heavy division, the headquarters and headquarters company of the armored infantry regiment had been organized provisionally as a combat command headquarters, and in the light division a headquarters and headquarters company of an armored group augmented the reserve command. The committee recommended that the combat commands be replaced with three regiments, each made up of one tank and two armored rifle battalions, and that brigadier generals command the regiments. Upon reflection, the committee omitted one unit previously attached to the division, the tank destroyer battalion, because of the wartime trend toward arming American tanks with high-velocity weapons capable of destroying enemy armor, an evolution that made the lightly armored tank destroyer redundant. The strength of the projected armored division rose to 19,377 officers and enlisted men, nearly double the size of light armored divisions of 1943.39
The Army Staff received the reports from the General Board and passed them along to the Army Ground Forces. In September 1945 that command began preparing new tables of organization for the postwar Army, but General Devers, commander of Army Ground Forces, refrained from making any decisions about divisional organization pending review of the board's findings and the recommendations of infantry and armored conferences being held in the spring of the following year. In July 1946 he finally forwarded proposals to the General Staff for new infantry and armored divisions that combined recommendations of the committees and of the conferences. The new tables for the infantry division were similar to those developed in 1945 when restrictions were lifted on their manning. The armored division retained its 1943 configuration with augmentations to correct organizational deficiencies. Devers believed these divisions would meet the Army's needs for versatile, mobile, hard-hitting units. Despite the availability of the atomic bomb, the nature of ground combat had not changed. The infantry division was capable of operating in jungle, arctic, desert, and mountain terrain or on plains; the armored division remained a highly mobile unit to break through a line or exploit success on the battlefield. He questioned, however, the appropriate rank for commanders of the new infantry combat teams (formerly infantry regiments) in the infantry division and combat commands in the armored division-a colonel or brigadier general.40
Eisenhower sent the divisional proposals to senior officers, including his own advisory group, for comment.41 He was concerned that units were too large, possessing everything they might need under almost any condition, violating the principles of flexibility and economy of force followed during the war. He also requested the officers' views as to whether the Army should break each division into three smaller units, and if so whether the infantry regiment should be renamed an infantry combat team.42
The advisory group concurred with the Army Ground Forces proposals. It did not believe that divisions had too many people and too much equipment; they had only those units habitually attached during combat. The group did not fear a diminution of morale because the infantry regiment was to be known by another name. Moreover, it supported the rank of brigadier general for the commanders of infantry combat teams in the infantry division and combat commands in the armored division because it was commensurate with the assigned responsibilities.43
Among the other general officers who commented on the divisions, General Omar N. Bradley, head of the Veterans Administration, wanted the staff to develop a division organization that combined aspects of both infantry and armored divisions. For the time being, however, he deemed the proposed units sound. Lt. Gens. Walton H. Walker and Oscar W Griswold, the Fifth and Seventh Army commanders, also endorsed the organizational proposals but disagreed on the appropriate rank for combat command and infantry combat team leaders. Eisenhower approved the divisions on 21 November 1946, but disapproved the change in general officer positions and the new name for infantry units. The following month Army Ground Forces prepared draft tables of organization for a 17,000-man infantry division and a 15,000-man armored division.44
In 1948, when the Department of the Army 45 finally published new tables for the infantry division, it authorized 18,804 officers and enlisted men (Chat 23). The division, however, remained basically the same as approved by Eisenhower. The ratio of combat to service troops was 4 to 1, and a 50 percent increase in firepower was attained by merely authorizing each field artillery firing battery six pieces.46
Some changes made between the time Eisenhower approved the division and publication of its tables, however, are noteworthy. In the medical service, a medical company replaced the attached medical detachment in each infantry regiment, and artillery, engineer, and tank battalions fielded organic medical detachments as did the division headquarters. The medical battalion was to provide only clearing and ambulance services. The reconnaissance troop was redesignated as a reconnaissance company to eliminate the term "troop" from the Army's nomenclature except for cavalry and constabulary units. At the insistence of officers who attended an Infantry conference in 1946 that discussed the status of the arm, Army Ground Forces added a replacement company to receive and process incoming personnel. One unit that did not survive the postwar revision was headquarters, special troops, because it was deemed unnecessary. A major general continued to command the division, and it was authorized two brigadier generals, the assistant division commander and the artillery commander. Regimental commanders remained colonels.47
A controversial area that affected development of the tables for the infantry division was the postwar battlefield's greater depth and breadth, which increased the difficulty of conducting reconnaissance and intelligence collection. Ten airplanes had been assigned to the division artillery in 1943 and an additional three to the infantry regiments in 1945. In 1946 Army Ground Forces proposed assigning aircraft to the division headquarters and to tank and engineer battalions. The Army Staff endorsed the additional planes but wanted them pooled in one unit, except for those in the division artillery. Opposition to that proposal came from the Army Air Forces, which argued that all air units came under their jurisdiction.48 The Army countered that the National Security Act of 1947 authorized it to organize, train, and equip aviation resources for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.49 Nevertheless the tables provided no aviation unit, but ten planes were assigned to the division artillery and eight to the division headquarters company.50
The postwar armored division (Chart 24) retained the flexible command structure of the 1943 organization with three medium tank battalions, three armored infantry battalions, and three 105-mm. howitzer battalions, along with some significant changes. Army Ground Forces made the reserve command identical to the two existing combat commands, replaced the attached tank destroyer battalion with a heavy tank battalion, and added an antiaircraft artillery battalion, and a replacement company. Paralleling the infantry division, the military police platoon was expanded to a company and the reconnaissance squadron was redesignated as a battalion. A 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer battalion was added to give the division more general support fire, and, in the division trains, the quartermaster supply battalion, eliminated in 1943, was restored to transport fuel, provide bath and laundry facilities, and assume graves registration duties. Besides the field artillery's aircraft, ten planes were placed in the division headquarters company to serve division and combat command headquarters, the engineer battalion, and the reconnaissance battalion. The number of general officers was increased from two to three, a division commander and two combat command commanders. The commanders of the reserve command and the division artillery remained colonel billets.51
Infantry and armored divisions were reorganized between the fall of 1948 and the end of 1949. Most divisions, however, never attained their table of organization strengths prior to the Korean War. Only the 1st Infantry Division in Germany was authorized at full strength. Strengths in other Regular Army divisions fell between 55 and 80 percent. In the National Guard the strength of the divisional elements varied, with some units being cut by individuals, by crews (the field artillery batteries had four rather than six gun crews), or by companies (the engineer battalion had three instead of four line companies and there was no divisional replacement company). Strengths in the Guard units ranged between 5,000 and 10,500 men of all ranks. The divisions of the Organized Reserve Corps remained either Class B or Class C units.52
The development of the postwar airborne division took almost two years longer than infantry and armored divisions. On 16 August 1946 Army Ground Forces forwarded to the General Staff an outline for an airborne division. It was an infantry division with the addition of a pathfinder platoon and a parachute maintenance company. The division had approximately 19,000 jump-qualified officers and enlisted men and two sets of equipment, one for air assault and the other for sustained combat. Eisenhower rejected the proposal because the unit could not be air-transported. He directed Army Ground Forces to prepare an organization that could be moved by existing aircraft. Eisenhower also rejected the resulting proposal, but a third idea developed by the Organizational and Training Division of the General Staff won acceptance. The staff proposed an airborne division with two categories of units, organic elements that could be airlifted and attached ground units that were to link up with them. To make the unit air-transportable, the staff eliminated heavy mortars and tanks from infantry regiments and restricted the number of howitzers in field artillery batteries to four. The attached units included two heavy tank battalions, a 155-mm. howitzer battalion, a reconnaissance company, a medium maintenance company, and a quartermaster company, which totaled 2,580 officers and enlisted men. Those units along with the division's organic elements, which numbered 16,470, made the division's size approximately the same as the Army Ground Forces proposa1.53
With the proposed airborne division attempting to meet two competing needs, strategic mobility and tactical sustainment, the General Staff decided to test it. The 82d Airborne Division (less one regimental combat team at Fort Benning) adopted the new structure on 1 January 1948. After the test, Army Field Forces (AFF), the successor of Army Ground Forces, recommended organizing the airborne division in the same manner as an infantry division. As organized for the test, the airborne division was not air-transportable. The Army Staff, nevertheless, still sought a large airborne unit for strategic mobility. Therefore, on 4 May 1949 the new Chief of Staff, General Omar Bradley, directed that the attached combat elements be made organic to the division and that only 11,000 of its 17,500 men be airborne qualified. The Department of the Army published new tables (Chart 25) mirroring these decisions on 1 April 1950. Reorganization of Regular Army and Organized Reserve Corps airborne divisions followed shortly thereafter. 54
The State of Divisional Forces
While the Army developed and reorganized its postwar divisions, it continued to maintain and redeploy its existing forces to meet changing international situations. With the ratification of the Italian peace treaty in the fall of 1947, the Army inactivated the 88th Infantry Division (less one infantry regiment, which remained in Trieste) and, as noted, withdrew its forces from Korea at the end of 1948. To make room in Japan for the 7th Infantry Division, the 11th Airborne Division, which had been stationed there since 1945, redeployed to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, where it was reorganized with only two of its three regimental combat teams. The reduction of forces in Korea also resulted in the inactivation of the 6th Infantry Division.55
Four years after the end of World War II the number of Regular Army divisions had fallen to ten. Overseas the 1st Infantry Division was scattered among installations in Germany, while the 1st Cavalry Division and the 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions were stationed throughout Japan. In the United States the 2d Armored Division was split between Camp (later Fort) Hood, Texas, and Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The 2d Infantry Division was based at Fort Lewis, Washington; the 3d Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort Devens, Massachusetts; the 11th Airborne Division (less one inactive regimental combat team) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The twenty-five Organized Reserve Corps and twenty-seven National Guard divisions were at various levels of readiness.
Initially overwhelmed by the tidal wave of demobilization after World War II, the Army had struggled to rebuild both Regular Army and reserve divisions during the late 1940s. Its new divisional structures were based on combat experiences during the war, under the assumption that atomic weapons would not alter the nature of ground combat. Units previously attached to divisions from higher headquarters during combat were made organic to divisions, which also received additional firepower. Although the postwar divisions of the era were not fully prepared for combat because they were not properly manned and equipped, they nonetheless represented an unprecedented peacetime force in the Army of the United States, reflecting the new Soviet-American tensions.
Endnotes for Chapter VIII
1 Disposition Form (DF), AGF to CofS, USA, 22 Jul 46, sub: New Infantry and Armored Divisions, App II, AGF/AG 322 Divisions, case 100, RG 337, NARA. 2 Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization, pp. 229-30.
3 William W. Epley, America's First Cold War Army, 1945-1950 (Arlington, Va.: Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the U.S. Army, 1993), p. 4; Ltr, AGE to CG, Second Army, 31 Aug 46, sub: Inactivation of 5th Infantry Division, 322/107 (5th Inf Div) (31 Aug 46), and Ltr, TAG to U.S. Forces, European Theater, 13 Feb 47, sub: Inactivation of Units, AGAO-I 322 (13 Feb 47)-M. both AG Reference files, DAMH-HSO; Ltr, TAG to U.S. Forces, European Theater, 6 May 46, sub: Inactivation of Units, AG 322 (29 Apr 46) AO-I-E-M, 42d Inf Div file, and Ltr, TAG to CinC, Far East, 30 Dec 46, sub: Activation, Inactivation, Reorganization and Redesignation of Certain Units in the Pacific Theater, AG 322 (13 Dec 46) AO-I-WDGOT-M, 86th Inf Div file, both DAMH-HSO; Mission Accomplished: Third United States Army Occupation of Germany, 9 May 7945-15 February 1947 (n.p., 1947), p. 23.
4 Ernest N. Harmon, "U.S. Constabulary," Armored Cavalry Journal 55 (Sep-Oct 1946): 16; James M. Snyder, The Establishment and Operations of the U.S. Constabulary (Frankfurt. Germany: Historical Sub-Section, G-3, U.S. Constabulary, 1947), pp. 52-59; Ltr, TAG to CG, U.S. Forces, European Theater, 17 Jun 46, sub: Reconstitution, Redesignation, Reorganization, Activation and Assignment of Units for Constabulary Force in Europe, AG 322 (11 Jun 46) AG-IGNGCT-M, 4th Armd Div file, DAMH-HSO.
5 James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 6-12; Ltr, TAG to CGs, Boston. New York and other ports of embarkation, 7 Jan 46, sub: Inactivation of Certain Army Air, Ground and Service Forces Type Units, AG 322 (4 Jan 47) OB-I-SPMOU-M, 40th Inf Div file, Ltr, TAG to CinC, Far East, 24 Jan 49, sub: Inactivation of Certain Units in FECOM, AGAO-I 322 (31 Dec 48) CSGOT (Organization and Training Division, General Staff)-M, 6th Inf Div file, and AGAZ 373, Historical Data Cards, 6th, 7th, and 40th Inf Divs, all DAMH-HSO; History of the 7th Infantry (Bayonet Division) (Tokyo, Japan: Dai Nippon Printing Co., 1967), no pagination.
6 John P. Delaney, The Blue Devils in Italy. A History of the 88th Infantry Division in World War 17 (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), p. 275; Wright, The Ist Cavalry Division in World War 11, p. 206; Ltr, TAG to CG, Second Army, 26 Sep 46, sub: Reorganization of the 3d Infantry Division, AG 322 (20 Sep 46) AO-I-GNGCT-M, 3d Inf Div file, DAMH-HSO; George C. Marshall, Remarks by the Secretary of Defense at the National Preparedness Orientation Conference, 30 Nov 50, Marshall Papers.
7 WD Bull 19, 1945; Ltr, TAG to CinC, US Army Forces, Pacific, 26 Mar 46, sub: Constitution, Activation, Inactivation, Disbandment, Reorganization and Redesignation of Certain Philippine Scout Units, AG 322 (19 Mar 46) OB-I-GNGCT-M, 5th Ind, U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific, to CinC, Army Forces, Pacific, 20 Aug 46, 12th Inf Div file, DAMH-HSO.
8 Ltr, TAG to CinC, US Army Forces, Pacific, 26 Mar 46, sub: Constitution, Activation, Inactivation, Disbandment, Reorganization and Redesignation of Certain Philippine Scout Units; Semi-Annual Report. U.S. Army Forces Western Pacific, 1 .Ian-30 Jun 46, p. 33; Robert R. Smith, "The Status of Members of the Philippine Military Forces During World War II," Ms, pp. 45-47, Reference Paper files, Philippine Scouts, DAMN-HSO; "Philippine Scouts," Military Review 29 (Jul 1949): 72; Ltr, TAG to CinC, Far East, 29 Apr 47, sub: Reorganization, Assignment and Inactivation of Certain Units in the Far East Command, AGAO-I 322 (28 Mar 47) WDGOT-M, and DF, TAG to Historical Division, WD Special Staff, sub: Shoulder Sleeve Insignia, PhilippineRyukyus Command, 27 Aug 47, AGAO-I 421.4 (30 Apr 47), both 12th Inf Div file, DAMH-HSO.
9 Joseph Rockis, "Reorganization of AGE During Demobilization," Demobilization Series, Study No. 3 (Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948), pp. 366, DAMH-HSR.
10 Ibid.; First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1948, pp. 60-63; Strength Reports of the Army, 1 Jan 1948, pp. 4-6.
11 Mission Accomplished, p. 23; James M. Gavin, On to Berlin, p. 295; SS, WDGOT to Cofs, 27 Aug 46, sub: Regular Army Divisions to be Retained in the Postwar Army, 27 Aug 46, WDGOT 322 (26 Jun 46), 1 st Cav Div file, DAMH-HSO.
12 Statement by the CofS, Approved WD Policies Relating to Postwar National Guard and Organized Reserve, 13 Oct 45, Reference Paper files, Army Reserve, DAMH-HSO; SS, WDGOT to CofS, sub: Regular Army Divisions to be Retained in the Postwar Army, 27 Aug 46; Memo, WDGOT for Assistant Deputy CoIS, same subject, 30 Sep 46, WDGOT 322 (26 Jun 46), Ist Cav Div file, DAMH-HSO.
13 Ltr, TAG to CinC, Far East, 14 Mar 49, sub: Redesignation and Reorganization of the 1st Cavalry Division, Special, AGAO-I 322 (28 Feb 49) GCSGOT-M (General and Special Staffs, U.S. Army, Organization and Training Division), 1st Cav Div file; Lit, TAG to CG, Armies, Zone of the Interior (ZI), 25 Jun 48, sub: Activation and Reorganization of Certain Divisions (Training), AGAO-I 322 (18 Jun 48) CSGOT-M, 10th Mt Div file; Ltr, TAGO to TAG, 27 Jun 49, sub: Designation of the 25th Infantry Division as Regular Army, AGAO-I (27 Jun 49)-M, 25th Inf Div file; and Ltr, TAGO to TAG, 15 Nov 48, sub: Designation of the 1 Ith and 82d Airborne Divisions as Regular Army, AGAOI 322 (15 Nov 48), 82d Abn Div file, all AG Reference files, DAMH-HSO.
14 Memo, AGF for chiefs all staff sections, 6 Mar 48, sub: Inter-relations between professional and non-professional personnel in the armed forces of a democratic state, GNGSE (AGF Secretariat) 300.6 (6 Mar 48), National Guard, Reference Paper files, DAMH-HSO.
15 Ibid.; Memo, Army Service Forces for Cofs, 4 Aug 44, sub: Appointment of Committee under Section 5 of the National Defense Act of 1916, as amended, Memo, OCS for G-1, G-2, G-3. G-4, OPD, 3 Oct 44, sub: Committee to study policies affecting the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Organized Reserve Corps, and the Enlisted Reserve Corps, and Memo, OCS for CofS, 21 Sep 44, sub: Recommended War Department Policies for the Post War National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps, all National Guard Reference Paper files, DAMH-HSO.
16 The 1920 amendments to the National Defense Act designated the third component of the Army as the Organized Reserves, but in all post-World War H planning documents the term Organized Reserve Corps was used and it was officially adopted in 1948. Therefore, to be consistent with the planning documents, the term Organized Reserve Corps is used hereafter.
17 Statement, Approved WD Policies Relating to Postwar National Guard and Organized Reserve, 13 Oct 45.
18 Memo, WDGCT for CofS, 2 Nov 45, sub: National Guard Troop Basis, WDGCT 320 Troop Basis (2 Nov 45), National Guard, Reference Paper files, DAMN-HSO; Report of the Chie/ of the National Guard Bureau, 1946, pp. 324-76; National Guard Troop Basis and Troop Allotments, 1 Sep 46, National Guard, Reference Paper files, DAMH-HSO; Ltr, Sec of War to W. G. Andrews, House of Representatives, 13 May 46, and DF, Chief, NGB, to TAG, 26 Jun 46, sub: Numerical Designation, 325.42 Div 3, AG 322 file, RG 407, NARA; Ltr, TAG to CG, AGE, and Chief, NGB, 17 Sep 46, sub: Allotment of 42d Infantry Division to the National Guard, AG 322 (17 Sep 46) AG-I-WDSNG-M (National Guard Bureau, WD Special Staff), 42d Inf Div file, DAMH-HSO.
19 Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 1946, pp. 110-11.
20 Memo, NGB for Chief, Historical Section, AWC, 18 Apr 46, sub: Continuity of History of the National Guard Units, WDNGR (National Guard Register, WD) 314.7 Gen.-23 (18 Apr 46), NGB Cir 9, 1932, and Memo, Historical Section, AWC, for Col. E. Colby, National Guard Bureau. 19 Apr 46, all National Guard, Policy and Precedence files, DAMH-HSO.
21 Draft agreement between the States of Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida, undated, and Ltr, Florida National Guard (FNG) to Chief, NGB, 25 Feb 59, sub: Reorganization of 48th Armored Division, FNG-10, both 48th Armd Div file, DAMH-HSO.
22 Ltr, AGE to CGs First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Armies and other addresses, 6 Jun 46, sub: Training and Administration of the Civilian Components, Incl 1, AGF plan for the National Guard of the U.S., 6 Jun 46, 326/215 (6 Jun 46) GNGCT-I1, AGE Pt. 1. RG 319. NARA; see National Guard Federal Recognition Reports, 19467, National Guard General files, DAMN-HSO; Report of the Chic/ the of _Vcrtional Guard Bureau. 7947, p. 73.
23 Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 1947, pp. 8-10.
24 Statement, Approved WD Policies Relating to the Postwar NG and ORC, 13 Oct 45; Ltr. AGF to CGs, First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Armies and other addresses, 6 Jun 46, sub: Training and Administration of the Civilian Components, Incl 3, AGF Plan for the Organized Reserve Corps; Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 86.
25 Memo, WDSSP (Special Planning Division, General and Special Staffs), for ACofS, G-3, 14 Mar 46, sub: Class A Units, Organized Reserve Corps, and Memo, WD Gen Staff, Organization and Training Division, for all WD Agencies, 20 Dec 46, sub: Clarification of WD Policies Pertaining to the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps, WDGOT 325 (9 Oct 46), both Army Reserve, Reference Paper files, DAMN-HSO.
26 Err, AGF to CGs, First and Second Armies, and other addresses, 6 Jun 46, sub: Training and Administration of Civilian Components, Incl 3, AGF Plan for the Organized Reserve Corps; WD Cir 138, 1946; C. T. Tench, "The New Organization," Infantry Journal 59 (Jul 46): 18-22.
27 Ltr, AGF to CGs, First and Second Armies, and other addresses, 6 Jun 46, sub: Training and Administration of Civilian Components, Incl 3, Plan for the Organized Reserve Corps; see author's notes for activation dates of ORC divisions, which are based on unit divisional files in DAMH-HSO.
28 "Our Floundering Army Reserve Program," Reserve Officer 25 (Jul 1948): 4-6ff
29 AGF map showing location of division headquarters and states to which division have been allotted, 27 Apr 47, Army Reserve Reference Paper files, DAMN-HSO; WD Cir 124, 1946.
30 Ltr, TAG to CG, Sixth Army, 8 Aug 47, sub: Inactivation and Assignment of 19th Armored Division and Assignment and Activation of 13th Armored Division, AGAO-I 322 (31 Jul 47) GNGCT-M, 13th Armd Div file, DAMH-HSO; Assembly Joint Resolution No. 38 Relative to the perpetuation of the 13th Armored Division to this State, Ch. 191, 57th Sess, California State Legislature, 13th Armd Div file, DAMN-HSO; Biennial Report of the Adjutant General, California, 1947-1948, p. 11, and GO 56, Adjutant General of California, 1947, reprinted in the report, pp. 72-73.
31 Ltr, Michael S. Davison to author, 13 Feb 78; Ltr, TAG to CG, U.S. Army Caribbean, 25 Mar 48, sub: Activation of Units of the Organized Reserves, AGAO-322 Org Res (8 Feb 48) GSCOT-M, Lit, CG, U.S. Army Caribbean to TAG, 21 Aug 50, sub: Inactivation of ORC TOE Units not included in the New ORC troop Program, AG 326 (CG), and Err, TAG to CG, U.S. Army Caribbean, 27 Sep 50, sub: Inactivation of Units of the Organized Reserve, AGAO-I Org Res (21 Aug 50) G -3-M, all 106th Inf Div file, DAMN-HSO.
32 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army, 1948, pp. 34-35; Joint Army and Air Force Bull No. 9, 1948 (in 1948 and 1949 the Departments of the Army and Air Force jointly published bulletins).
33 Ltr, TAG to CGs, First, Second, Third, and Sixth Armies, 8 Jul 47, sub: Discontinuance of Replacement Training Centers and Activation of the 3d Armored and the 4th, 5th, and 9th Infantry Divisions, AGAO-I 322 (10 Jun 47), GNGCT-M, 3d Armd Div file, DAMN-HSO; C. D. Dunlap, Jr., "The Third Armored Training Division," Armored Cavalry Journal 57 (Jul-Aug 48): 26-29; Ltr, TAG to CG, Armies, ZI, 25 Jun 48, sub: Activation and Reorganization of Certain Division (Training), AGAO-I 322 (18 Jun 48) CSGOT-M, 3d Armd Div file, DAMN-HSO; also see the unit files of 3d and 5th Armored, the 4th, 5th, 9th, and 10th Inf, and the 17th and 101st Abn Divs in DAMH-HSO.
34 General Board, "Types of Divisions Postwar Army," Rpt 17, U.S. Forces, ETO.
35 General Board, "The Infantry Division," Rpt 15, U.S. Forces, ETO.
38 General Board, "Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment of the Airborne Division," Rpt 16, U.S. Forces, ETO.
39 General Board, "Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment of the Armored Division," Rpt 48, U.S. Forces, ETO.
40 DF, AGF to CofS, 22 Jul 46, sub: New Infantry and Armored Divisions, Appendix 11.
41 The Chief of Staff's Advisory Group, established in May 1946, consisted of senior officers who advised him on matters pertaining to the Army's long-range program. Lt Gen Wade H. Haislip; Maj Gens Gilbert Cook (who had written the 1935 memorandum to General Craig advocating the studies that resulted in the triangular division), Alexander D. Surles, and Howard M. Snyder; and Brig Gen William E. Hall made up the group. Memo, OCS for CGs, AAF, AGF, ASF, and other addresses, 8 May 46, OCS (1946) 334 "A," RG 165, NARA.
42 Memo, DCofS for CofS's Advisory Group, 10 Sep 46, no subject, WDCSA 322 (6 Aug 46), OCS (1946) 334 "A," RG 165, NARA.
43 Memo, Lt Gen Haislip to DCofs, 13 Sep 46, no subject, OCS (1946) 334 "A," RG 165, NARA.
44 Memo, Acting CofS for Generals Stilwell, Bradley, Walker, Eddy, and Griswold, 24 Sep 46, no subject, Memo, Omar N. Bradley to Gen Thomas T. Handy, 6 Nov 46, sub: Comments on proposed divisional organization for Infantry and Armored Divisions, Memo, Lt Gen Walton H. Walker to Gen Handy, 29 Oct 46, no subject, Ltr, Lt Gen O. W. Griswold to General Handy, 3 Oct 46, no subject, Memo, Maj Gen Louis A. Craig for Army Commander, 27 Sep 46, no subject, WDCSA 332 file, and Ltr, C. P. Hall to CG, AGF, 22 Nov 46, sub: Types of Divisions in the Postwar Army (Armored and Infantry), WDGOT 370.01 (22 Nov 46), G-3 (1946) 370.01, vol. 3, all RG 165, NARA.
45 In 1947 Congress established the Department of Defense comprising the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The War Department was perpetuated by the Department of the Army.
46 TOE 7 N, Infantry Division, 1948.
47 Ibid.; Ltr, AGF to CGs, First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Armies and other addresses, 28 Feb 47, sub: Charts for New Infantry Division, 322/101 (Divs) (28 Feb 47) GNGCT71/4365, Division General file, DAMH-HSO; DA Cir 47, 1947; "The Division Replacement Company," Infantry School Quarterly 33 (Oct 48): 67-74.
48 Ltr, AGF to Dir of Organization and Training, WDGS, 16 Jun 47, sub: Headquarters and Headquarters Company New Divisions (Infantry and Armored), with 1st, 2d, and 3d Inds, 322 (Divs) (16 Jun 47) GNGCT-71-5066, and Memo, Organization and Training Division, General Staff, for Brig Gen Benjamin F. Caffey, 31 Oct 47, sub: Liaison Aircraft in New Divisions TOES, with Bolte's hand written comments, 3 Nov 47, AFG/AG 322 Divisions, case 100, RG 337, NARA; Wilson B. Powell, "Army Ground Force During the Demobilization Period," Demobilization Series, Study 4 (Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, undated), p. 149, DAMH-HSR.
49 Kenneth W. Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955-1956, vol. 6, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), p.72.
50 TOE 7 N, Infantry Division, 1948.
51 Ltr, AGF to CGs, First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Armies and other addresses, 13 Mar 47, sub: Charts for New Armored Division, 322/101 (Divs) (13 Mar 47) GNGCT-71556, Division General file, DAMH-HSO; TOE 17, Armored Division, 1948; James I. King and Melvin A. Goers, "Modern Armored Cavalry Organization," Armored Cavalry Journal 57 (Jul-Aug 1948): 47-50.
52 See AG letters of instruction, "Reorganization of Regular Army Divisions, 1948-1949." and "Reorganization of ORC Divisions, 1949," author's files; also see division files, DAMH-HSO; "The New T/O-Greater Firepower, Greater Strength," National Guardsman 2 (Nov 48): 25; Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 1949, pp. 3, 29, and 109; Program Review and Analysis Division, Comptroller of the Army, The Troop Program and Troop List: Part III, Arnr_r Reserve Establishment, 1 Jun 50, CMH Library.
53 DF, WD Dir Organization and Training, to CG AGF, 26 Aug 46, sub: Organization of the Airborne Division, 322 (Div) (26 Aug 46- GNGPS, AGF/AG 322 Div, Case 100, RG 337, NARA; Donald T. Kellett and William Friedman, "Airborne On Paper Wings," Part I, Infantry Journal 62 (May 1948): 9-14, Part II (Jun 1948): 333; Powell, "AGF During the Demobilization Period," p. 150; Ltr, AGF to CGs First. Second, Third, Fourth. Fifth, and Sixth Armies and other addresses, 16 Oct 47, sub: Charts for New Airborne Division, 322/101 (Divs) (16 Oct 47) GNGCT-71-5521, Division General file, DAMH-HSO.
54 Annual History, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF), 1 Jan 1949-31 Dec 1949. Ch. 8, pp. 4-6, Manuscript Collection, DAMN-HSR; TOE 71, Airborne Division, 1 Apr 1950; Ltr, TAG to CGs, ZI, 19 May 50, sub: Reorganization of Organized Reserve Airborne Divisions. AGAO-1-322 (OR Res) (24 Mar 50) G-3-M, Ltr, TAG to CG, Second Army, 14 Jun 50, sub: Reorganization of the 11th Airborne Division, AGAO-I 322 11th Abn Div (31 May) G-1-M, and Ltr, TAG to CG, Third Army, 12 Jun 50, sub: Reorganization of the 82d Airborne Division, AGAO-I 322 82d Abn Div (25 May 50) G-1 M, all AG Reference files and airborne divisions files, DAMN-HSO.
55 Ltr, TAG to CG, USAF in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 12 Nov 47, sub: Inactivation of Units, AGAO-I 322 (12 Nov 47)-M, Ltr, TAG to CG, Second Army, 10 Mar 49. sub: Reorganization of the 11th Airborne Division, AGAO-I 322 11th Abn Div (12 Feb 49) CSGOT-M, Ltr, TAG to CinC, Far East, 24 Jan 49, sub: Inactivation of Certain Units in FECOM. AGAO-I 322 (31 Dec 48) CSGOT-M, and Ltr, TAG to CinC, Far East, 22 Jut 49, sub: Reorganization of Certain Infantry Divisions, AGAO-I 322 (22 Jul 49)-M, all AG Reference files. and AGAZ 373 Historical Data Cards, 6th. 7th, and 88th Infantry Divisions and 11th Airborne Division, division files. all DAMH-HSO.