Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Mahjoub, Omar Khalif Mohammed Abu Baker (2007)

UNCLASSIFIED Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
	19 December 2007

To:	Mahjoub, Omar Khalif Mohammed Abu Baker
Subject:	Unclassified summary of evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Mahjoub, Omar Khalif Mohammed Abu Baker

1.

An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2.

The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3.

The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he was recruited by his cousin in about 1994 to work for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
2. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group is a terrorist organization that declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization or are active in the international Mujahedin network.
3. The detainee was a member of the military commission of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
4. The detainee stated security increased following Usama bin Laden's visit to a training camp and he was placed in charge of a guard post behind the camp. The detainee stated that after security increased following Usama bin Laden ' s visit to a training camp Jalafabad, he was placed in charge of a guard post behind the camp. The detainee commanded five men during daylight hours and 20-30 men at night.
5. The detainee stated that at the end of 1998, he went to the Taliban to offer his services to fight the Northern Alliance.
6. The detainee stated the leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group arranged a job for him in Khartoum, Sudan. The detainee worked overseeing Sudanese drivers for one of Usama bin Laden's transportation companies.
7. The detainee was identified as Omar the Libyan and on the front lines near Taloqan, Afghanistan, fighting the Northern Alliance in 2001. The detainee was also identified as a military leader in charge of many Arabs from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and other Gulf States while on the front lines and would meet with the other Taliban leaders to plan military operations. The detainee was further identified as having trained another fighter on the use of anti-aircraft weapons.
8. The detainee was identified as an instructor at a camp in Afghanistan and a front line leader. The detainee was also identified as providing training on 32mm anti-aircraft weapons, training mines, rocket propelled grenades, and tactics to Libyan and Tanzanian fighters and to other instructors. The detainee was identified as someone whom others would approach to receive explosives training if they wanted to commit a terrorist act.
9. When the detainee offered his services to the Taliban in 1998, he was asked to join a group clearing mines. While clearing a road for the Taliban to advance, the detainee stepped on a mine that detonated and caused the loss of his right leg.
10. The detainee was identified as the leader of a Libyan training camp ten kilometers from Kabul, Afghanistan.
11. The detainee was identified as a trainer and leader at the Libyan training camp near Kabul, Afghanistan.
12. The detainee was identified as having stayed at the Ashara guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.
13. According to a senior al Qaida operative who controlled three Arab guest houses in Kabul, Afghanistan, the Ashara guest house was a transition point for Arabs going to and coming from either the training camps or frontline areas. The Ashara guest house received fimding from the Taliban and al Qaida.

b. Training

1. In June 1997, the detainee was in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, for about three weeks before he went to the Jihad Wahl Camp for six months. The detainee also instructed explosives at the al Farouq Camp during the time he lived and worked at Jihad Wahl.
2. The detainee stated trainees only went to Jihad Wahl for specialization in ambush techniques after receiving basic military skills at the al Sadiq camp. The detainee worked in the carpentry shop inside al Sadiq camp, building props for ambush technique instruction at Jihad Wahl. The detainee also filmed Jihad Wahl training sessions.
3. At the end of the 40-day basic program, al Qaida selected the most promising trainees from the basic course for more advanced training and specialized coursework at either al Sadiq or Jihadwal camps.
4. The detainee stated that at Jihad Wahl camp, he was taught such things as planning attacks, setting up missions , organizing a resistance cell, leadership, politics, and reasons for the success or failure of past jihad operations. The detainee stated he was also taught about explosive devices and heavy artillery.
5. The detained stated that while he was recovering from having his leg crushed in an accident in Sudan, he went to a Libyan house where weapons and explosives training took place. The detainee stated he could not move due to his injuries, but was able to take the training.
6. The detainee stated he attended a training camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and the purpose of the camp was to prepare fighters to go back to Libya and change the current regime. The detainee stayed at the camp for approximately two months and was trained in weapons like the AK-47, PK, DSHKA, and hand grenades.
7. The detainee stated he received training on Kalashnikov rifles, PK's, Doshka anti-aircraft weapons, and grenades at the camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
8. The detainee stated that he left Sudan in 1995 and traveled to Jalalabad and Kabul and wanted to go to Khowst, Afghanistan, to attend the Khalden Training Camp. Since the detainee lacked the required permission to attend the Khalden camp, he instead attended the Jilted Wahl Camp, where he arrived in early 1996.
9. The detainee stated he was in Afghanistan from 1998 to 2001, and a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, he was trained on the Kalashnikov rifle, pistol, rocket propelled grenade, and anti-aircraft weapons.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that while at the Libyan house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, he spoke extensively with an Egyptian about tactics, front line fighting, and Taliban structure. The Egyptian with whom the detainee spoke was in charge of the security committee for Usama bin Laden.
2. The detainee was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and provided instruction on topography and explosives at the al Farouq training camp.
3. The al Farouq training camp is funded by al Qaida and is more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan.
4. The detainee was seen with Abu Musab al Zargawi.
5. The detainee stated he met Abu Musab al Zarqawi on two occasions. The first time the detainee encountered Zarqawi was at the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group house in 2000 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The second occasion occurred when the detainee saw Zarqawi standing outside of Zarqawi' s house in the Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood in Kabul, Afghanistan, in March 2001.
6. The detainee stated he met Aman al Zawahiri twice by chance, but detainee does not recall exactly where he met al Zawahiri.
7. The detainee was identified as very friendly with and close associate of Mullah Bilal. Bilal was a senior member of al Qaida and the planner and strategist behind the USS Cole bombing in Yemen in October 2000.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was identified as being aware of the signals to initiate the 11 September 2001 attacks before they began.
2. The detainee was arrested in a guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in February 2002.
3. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to obtain military experience and weapons training and was not an instructor or a military leader.
4. The detainee stated he was provided with a fake passport but he did not use it as he was ordered to go to Afghanistan.
5. The detainee stated he had initially lied about his leg amputee injury by stating that it was non-combat related. The detainee stated there was an agreement between all of the detainees at Camp Delta not to tell the truth about anything. The detainee stated he is now being truthful and fought on the front lines for one week until he was injured.
6. The detainee was identified as Omar the Libyan, who was on the front lines in late 1999 fighting with the Taliban against the Northern. Alliance near Mir Bachel Kowt, Afghanistan. The detainee was brought in to clear mines so that the Taliban could advance. The detainee was identified as having his right leg cut off by one of the mines.
7. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group on the front lines at Bagram bad direct communication with Usama bin Laden. The Libyan fighters, al Qaida and the Taliban had the same ideology; which was to demolish the Northern Alliance and the Americans physically and psychologically.

4.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.	The detainee denied being at Taloqan or any place north of Kabul or Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee also stated he never fought against the Northern Alliance or the Americans and that he had never been at the al Farouq Training Camp.
b.	The detainee denied being associated with or being a member of the Taliban or al Qaida.
c.	The detainee denied he was chosen for explosives training at the Yahya camp.
d.	The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution an 11 September 2001 , and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans for future attacks on the United States or its interests.
e.	The detainee stated he and many other Muslims believe that what Usama bin Laden did was wrong.
f.	The detainee stated that he has no problem with the Unites States and does not plan to use what he learned during training to attack the United States.

5.

You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding . The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

	ISN 695 DMO Exhibit I
UNCLASSIFIED