Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Qahtani, Said Muhammed Husyan (2005-07-01)

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Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Qahtani, Said Muhammed Husyan (2005-07-01) (2005)
627571Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Qahtani, Said Muhammed Husyan (2005-07-01)2005
UNCLASSIFIED
Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
1 July 2005
To: Qahtani, Said Muhammad Husyan
Subject:

Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Qahtani, Said Muhammad Husyan

1.

An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2.

The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3.

The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee began to believe that jihad was an important Muslim responsibility when he was 19 or 20. The detainee initially desired to go to Chechnya for jihad, but was told he would need military training, which he could obtain in Kashmir, Pakistan.
  2. One of the religious leaders that influenced the detainee was Sheikh Hamood Al Ugla.
  3. Sheikh Hamud Al-Uqqla was a Saudi Arabian mufti who issued fatwahs and encouraged people to fight jihad against Christians and Jews.
  4. The detainee was issued a fatwah providing a religious justification to join the jihad in Afghanistan.
  5. Detainee made three trips from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan and/or Afghanistan.
  6. During his second trip in June 2000, the detainee joined the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. The detainee spent much of his time on the front lines.
  7. During his third trip in May 2001, the detainee returned to Kabul and rejoined the Taliban forces. He was assigned guard duty on the front line.
  8. A senior al Qaida lieutenant stated he believes that the detainee joined al Qaida after giving al-bay'ah to Bin Laden.
  9. Bayat or oath of allegiance is a spiritually binding commitment to obey a leader and his organization.
  10. According to a senior al Qaida lieutenant, the detainee assisted Abu Ubayda at the front lines in Kabul and was usually by his side.
  11. Abu 'Ubayda Al-Masri was in charge of the front lines or inner perimeter in Kabul, Afghanistan.
b. Training
  1. During his first trip, the detainee traveled in February 2000 to a Taliban-run training camp called "Quba," in Pakistan. The detainee received basic weapons orientation, land navigation, and physical exercise.
  2. The detainee returned to Camp Quba in June 2000 for approximately one week.
  3. The detainee arrived at Khalden Training Camp during May 2000 and trained for approximately 7 weeks.
  4. The detainee trained in small arms weapons , large caliber weapons, mortars, and combat tactics at Camp Khalden.
  5. The detainee received two weeks training on the T-54, T-55, and BMP-1 Soviet tanks at a Taliban Armory in Kwost before proceeding to the front lines north of Kabul.
  6. A senior al Qaida lieutenant saw the detainee at the Rawalpendi House in approximately 1998 - 1999 while the detainee was traveling to Camp Khalden for training.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. In May 2000, the detainee met Abu Zubayda and spent 7-10 days with him in a safehouse while waiting to travel to Afghanistan.
  2. Abu Zubayda is the logistics manager for al Qaida and a close associate of Usama bin Laden.
  3. The detainee met two of the 9111 highjackers. The detainee met Saeed al Ghamdi in a religious class at a mosque in 1999 . The detainee played soccer with Ahmed Alnami on one occasion while visiting his aunt in the city of Wadi Abu Al Harjah, Saudi Arabia.
  4. The detainee stayed at the Raywan Center while waiting to travel to Camp Quba, Pakistan.
  5. The Raywan Center in the suburbs of Lahore, Pakistan, was the nucleus of the Jama'at al Tabligh (JT) in Pakistan and throughout the world.
  6. Jama'at Al Tablighi is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
  7. The detainee's name was on a document recovered during a raid of an al Qaida safehouse in Pakistan on 11 September 2002. The document indicated the detainee had a Saudi passport and a bankcard.
d. Intent
According to a senior al Qaida lieutenant, the detainee volunteered to be a suicide bomber and was ready to martyr himself for jihad. .
e. Other Relevant Data
  1. In September 2001, when the US began bombing Taliban positions, the Taliban fighters began to retreat. The detainee and a small group of Arabs headed towards the Pakistani border.
  2. The detainee was captured by the Northern Alliance in late December 2001.
  3. The detainee escaped from Kabul to Tora Bora with Abu Ubaydah.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
The detainee stated that he would never be involved with an organization, militia, or otherwise, whose purpose was to commit terrorist acts.
5.

You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case . The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.