United States v. Rose

by John Archibald Campbell

United States Supreme Court

64 U.S. 262

United States  v.  Rose

THIS was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the northern district of California.

The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Stanton for the United States, and by Mr. Crittenden and Mr. Benjamin for the appellees.

One of the objects of the counsel for the appellees was to induce the court to reconsider the decision in the cases of Bassett and Nye, reported in 21 Howard; and another, to show that if the judgment in those cases were to stand, the present case did not fall within it.

Mr. Crittenden reviewed the facts of the case, and contended that the grant was within the power of the Governor; that it was an exercise of political power, binding on all concerned; that it proceeded from the highest executive authority charged to do that very act; that it rested upon the same principles as the case of Chisolm v. the State of Georgia; that we had no right to inquire into the motives of the Governor. He was besieged, and made a speech to the people, whom he wished to induce to support his authority; that the transaction resembled our revolutionary promises, when Congress appealed to the people to sustain the war of independence; that the Governor conferred a present right, in which there was no ambiguty; that the court appeared to think, in the former decision, that the Governor only promised a grant, whereas it took effect at once; that it was a valid act of political power, no matter what the motives were; that one construction impeached the motives of the Governor and the integrity of the people, and the other only confirmed an act of justice.

With respect to the circumstances which distinguished this case from Nye's, Mr. Crittenden referred to the following:

John Smith was one of the class entitled under the general grant of the 22d December, 1844. It is proved that before that date, in the year 1844, he had presented to the Governor, Micheltorena, his petition, with a map or diseno, for the six leagues of land in question-called or marked on the map, 'Rancho de Yuba,' and 'bounded on the north by the river Yuba, on the west by Sutter's claim, on the south by Johnson's ranch, and extends eastwardly so as to contain six square leagues;' and that he had also obtained the favorable report of Sutter, to whom his petition had been referred, in the usual course.

It is further proved that Sutter recognised Smith as one of the persons entitled, and gave him a copy of the 'general title' as evidence of his right.

It is further proved that Smith lost all his title papers their loss, their authenticity, and their contents, are all clearly proved.

Smith was put in possession by Sutter, and within twelve months after the date of the 'general title,' he was in the occupation of the land, 'made improvements, and built an adobe house, and had upon the said land about 400 head of cattle, with some horses.'

Bidwell's testimony is, that Smith settled on the land in the fall of 1844, or early in 1845, and continued to live upon it till he sold in 1848. He had previously lived on adjoining land, which he had purchased of Sutter.

Smith's petition for the land in question, and the favorable report thereon by Sutter, were made to the Governor in September, 1844; and in that year, according to his own testimony, he not only made improvements, but 'had about six hundred cattle and a few horses on this land.' He was a Canadian by birth, was naturalized as a Mexican, and had been in California since 1835.

It does not appear that he was ever engaged in the military service, or that the grant was made to him otherwise than in the due administration of the colonization laws of Mexico.

These latter circumstances distinguish the present case from those of Nye and Bassett, reported in 21 Howard, 408, et seq.

Mr. Benjamin reviewed the facts of the case, and said the claimant had been put into possession, and the only way to get him out was to drive him from the soil. He then reviewed the preceding decisions in California cases, and contended that the rules established in Fremont's and subsequent cases were reversed in that of Nye. The Louisiana and Florida cases were applicable. Where there was permission to settle and possession taken, it constituted an equitable title. True, there was an uprising of the people and a stump speech; but the political power was there, and ready to act. Had not the Governor power to confirm these grants, one by one? You confirmed Larkin's title, issued from the same place, because it was to one person only. The Governor was sent there, and had extraordinary powers, (for which Mr. Benjamin referred to 3 Archives, in U.S. v. Limantour, page 5.)

Mr. Stanton, in reply to these arguments, said that the only question was, whether or not this was public domain. Sympathy was out of the case. The possession of the claimant was doubtful; but if true, what right did that give? Sovereignty was always in possession, and could not be ousted. The court cannot confirm this claim without obliterating all previous decisions. There are no new facts proved. The court held in Cambuston's case (20 Howard, 59) that they would inquire into the motives of the grant, and all the circircumstances attending it. The Louisiana and Florida cases were not like these; the difference is pointed out by the court in Cambuston's case, (20 Howard, 63.) The instructions to Micheltorena were before the court in a former case. Whatever power he might have proclaimed to the people that he possessed, when his instructions were produced they did not justify him. A change in political government did not authorize the Chief or President to change the law. Santa Anna, in his instructions to Micheltorena, did not attempt to change the law; he made a difference between foreigners and natives, and said that 'foreigners ought to be prevented from taking part in domestic quarrels.' If those people had no claim upon the Mexican Government, they have none on ours. The Mexican laws give them no claim. The cases referred to by the counsel on the other side as being confirmed, were all genuine grants, made strictly within the colonization laws.

Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court.

Notes