Watts v. Camors Camors/Opinion of the Court

by Horace Gray

United States Supreme Court

115 U.S. 353

Watts  v.  Camors Camors

 Argued: November 16, 1885. ---

In such cases, accordingly, the courts of the United States, sitting in admiralty, award the damages actually suffered, whether they exceed or fall short of the amount of the penalty. The Salem's Cargo, 1 Spr. 389; The Marcella, 1 Woods, 302. In England and in this country, a court of admiralty, within the scope of its powers, acts upon equitable principles; and when the facts before it, in a matter within its jurisdiction, are such that a court of equity would relieve, and a court of law could not, it is the duty of the court of admiralty to grant relief. The Juliana, 2 Dod. 504, 521; The Harriett, 1 W. Rob. 182, 192; The Virgin, 8 Pet. 538, 550; Brown v. Lull, 2 Sum. 443; Hall v. Hurlbut, Taney, 589, 600; Richmond v. New Bedford Copper Co., 2 Low. 315.

The provisions of the Civil Code of Louisiana, and the decisions of her supreme court, tend to show that in the courts of that state, in case of a total breach of the contract by one party, the other might have judgment for the full amount of the penalty stipulated by the parties, although for a partial breach he could only recover his actual damages. Civil Code La. 1870, arts. 1945, 2117, 2124, 2125, 2127; M'Nair v. Thompson, 5 Mart. (La.) 525, 563, 564; English v. Latham, 3 Mart. (N. S.) 88; Welch v. Thorn, 16 La. 188, 196; Barrow v. Bloom, 18 La. Ann. 276.

But the law of Louisiana does not govern this question, whether it is treated as a question of construction of the contract of the parties, or as a question of judicial remedy. If it is considered as depending upon the intent of the parties as manifested by their written contract, the performance of that contract is to be regulated by the law which they must be presumed to have had in view when they executed it. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 48; Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124; S.C.. 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 102. Americans and Englishmen, entering into a charter-party of an English ship for an ocean voyage, must be presumed to look to the general maritime law of the two countries, and not to the local law of the state in which the contract is signed. If it is considered as a question of the remedy and relief to be judicially administered, the equity and admiralty jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, under the national constitution and laws, is uniform throughout the Union, and cannot be limited in its extent, or controlled in its exercise, by the laws of the several states. U.S. v. Howland, 4 Wheat. 108; Livingston v. Story, 9 Pet. 632; Russell v. Southard, 12 How. 139; Neves v. Scott, 13 How. 268; The Chusan, 2 Story, 455; The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 522; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; Rev. St. §§ 913, 914. The circuit court therefore rightly held that the charterers were liable only for the amount of damages which their breach of the contract had actually caused to the owner of the ship.

3. It is contended in behalf of the charterers that, as the ship was tendered on September 11th, and refused in writing on the next day, it was the duty of the master and the owner at once to seek another cargo, and thus prevent any damage that might follow, instead of lying idle until the lay days had expired; and therefore, within the rule laid down in Warren v. Stoddart, 105 U.S. 224, no damages should have been decreed. But the circuit court having found as facts that various negotiations were pending between the parties after the first refusal until September 30th, and that it was by reason of the failure of the charterers to accept the ship, furnish a cargo, and comply with their contract, that the owner suffered damages to the amount decreed, no error in law is shown in the decree, and it is not open to revision by this court in matter of fact. Act February 16, 1875, c. 77, § 1; 18 St. 315; The Abbotsford, 98 U.S. 440; The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381; The Connemara, 108 U.S. 352; S.C.. 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 754.

Decree affirmed.

Notes