Air Strategy in Asia

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Air Strategy in Asia (1935)
by Otto Corbach
2512952Air Strategy in Asia1935Otto Corbach

Air Strategy in Asia

By Otto Corbach

Translated from the Berliner Tageblatt, Berlin National-Socialist Daily

First published: The Living Age, 1 July, 1935, pp.397-398

Republished: Corbach (2018) Air Strategy in Asia Poplar: Unpopular Books

Otto Corbach (1877-1938) was a German journalist and publicist.

This essay is in the Public Domain

I

After long, painful consideration, American diplomacy has recognized the decisive importance of air armaments in the increasingly vital political decisions that are to be made in the Far East. The Japanese islands resemble a fox's lair with many entrances. Japan's dependence on imports from far-away districts overseas has decreased because imports of raw materials from nearby Asia have increased. Since the Japanese navy controls the communication lines with Asia, the United States has become deeply involved. Consider, for instance, the dependence of the American automobile industry on the rubber plantations of the Dutch East Indies. Time is obviously working on the side of Japan's defensive naval power and against the offensive naval power of the United States.

But, while naval preparations were making the Japanese island kingdom immune from American attack, military aviation was going forward at a rapid rate and exposing the nerve centres of the foremost yellow nation in the world to attack from the Asiatic continent. Almost a third of the population of the largest Japanese island is concentrated in the four thickly settled cities of Kobe, Osaka, Tokyo, and Yokohama. A successful attack by a powerful bombing squadron would incapacitate all of Japan.

In spite of old and new rivalries, England and the United States have worked out a common strategy since the Great War to 'save civilization,' which means to defend Anglo-Saxon rule throughout the world. The prime consideration has been to assure England of enough rear support in Europe to permit it to bring its full strength to bear on India and the Pacific Ocean. Then, the naval superiority that the Anglo-Saxon Powers enjoyed by reason of their dreadnaughts had to be maintained by preventing an armament race in submarines and bombing planes. For a thousand military planes cost no more than one big battleship, and, since one bomb dropped from one plane or one torpedo from one little submarine can destroy a battleship, the most powerful navy in the world becomes worthless if its freedom of movement cannot be protected from hostile submarines and bombing planes.

II

Shortly after the World War, Admiral Sims declared, “The battleship was once the backbone of the fleet, but it has ceased to be. Submarines and airplanes have begun to end its rule. Even a small Power can attack a blockading fleet with enough submarines and airplanes to make the maintenance of the blockade completely impossible.” 'Disarmament' conferences retarded this development, and the fighting power of the old expensive battleships was protected from revolutionary novelties. Undeveloped countries were prevented from arming themselves with cheap modern weapons. 'Pacts' favourable to the traditional naval domination of the big Powers were created, and they resembled so many 'trusts.'

The struggle for control of the Pacific Ocean has been overshadowed by struggle for the domination of Asia's airways. In penetrating Central Asia by way of Manchuria, Japan is not always seeking for new sources of raw material but is also trying to thrust back as far as possible the points of departure for possible airplane attacks on the Pacific islands. The Americans are now planning to help build a huge airplane-motor factory in Russia in order to enable the Soviet air forces to protect their Far Eastern possessions. The rebellion in Fukien was fomented by pro-American Chinese militarists and politicians. They endeavoured to set all of South China in motion against the pro-Japanese tendencies of Chiang Kai-shek and to provide the United States with a concession on the island of Tung Shan as a base for regular air service with the Philippines and, hence, as a base for air attacks in some future war.

Japan was especially alarmed by this plan because the island of Formosa lies close to the coast of Fukien and to the predominantly Communist province of Kiangsi, whose Red army recently tried to reach the coast by way of Fukien. Furthermore, the Nineteenth Route Army, whose General Staff included six of the eleven members of the revolutionary Foochow Government, served at least to cover the Communist rear.

Meanwhile, Japanese-American rivalry for the control of the rapidly developing commercial and military aviation of China has aroused England. Three air squadrons have been established at Singapore. A flying school has been set up in Hong-Kong. The post of a special air attache for China has been created, and the extensive preparations for the air defence of Australia indicate that England's sudden enthusiasm for an air force second to none reflects the recent changes in the Far Eastern balance of power.

Equally significant in this connection is the speeding-up of work on the Canton-Hankow air line, which is financed by British capital and provides Hong-Kong and Hankow with the one air line that does not follow the sea. Hankow, situated in the centre of the Yangtze basin, may be the ultimate goal of the Tibetan expeditionary troops as they head down the Yangtze through northeastern Yunnan and the Province of Szechwan. It is probable that England is endeavouring to fortify her land routes with air bases in the hope of bringing force to bear from HongKong and India on the hinterland of Shanghai since Japan's control of the eastern Pacific is gradually embracing Shanghai.

But, after America recognized Soviet Russia, it had to strengthen its increasing stake in the Pacific area. More important still, it is to America's advantage to use its navy as a controlling element in the whole world of European-American culture. As a sea Power the United States occupies the same advantageous relationship to Europe as Japan does to America, for the American navy could cut off any European opponent from vital possessions and oversea sources of raw material. While Japan pursues its adventurous conquest into the heart of Asia, not only France but England has tended to welcome the opportunity to come to a dubious understanding with Japan in the Far East at the expense of American interests. For that reason, American diplomacy must above all else take a stronger tone toward Europe. Even those Americans who want to recognize Japan's Monroe Doctrine for eastern Asia have nothing against a loose association between Russia and China. As for Europe, it will do well to keep in mind the possibility that Roosevelt may ultimately play the same role in the Far East that Canning did in Europe and call into life a new world 'to redress the balance of the old.'