Davis v. United States (411 U.S. 233)

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Davis v. United States (1973)

Syllabus

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Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), was a 1973 United States Supreme Court case concerning criminal procedure and collateral attacks on criminal convictions. The majority opinion, authored by then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist, held that when claims of unconstitutional jury discrimination are brought on postconviction collateral review, they are subject to the timeliness requirement outlined in Rule 12 (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This rule required that federal criminal defendants raise "defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment" in pretrial motions, rather than in postconviction proceedings; it also stated that if such defenses were not raised in pretrial motions, this constituted a "waiver" of the right to raise them in the future.

Davis is now recognized by legal scholars as part of a gradual erosion of the broad availability of federal habeas corpus relief that the Supreme Court originally created in its 1963 decision in Fay v. Noia.

4801037Davis v. United States — Syllabus1973

Court Documents

Opinion of the Court

Dissenting Opinion: Marshall

Supreme Court of the United States

411 U.S. 233

Davis v. United States

Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

No. 71-6481. Argued: February 20, 1973 --- Decided: April 17, 1973

Three years after his conviction for a federal crime, petitioner brought this collateral attack on the ground of unconstitutional discrimination in the composition of the grand jury that indicted him. The District Court found that, though petitioner could have done so, he at no stage of the proceedings attacked the grand jury's composition, and it concluded that under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 12 (b)(2) he had waived his right to do so. The court also determined that since the challenged jury-selection method had long obtained, the grand jury that indicted petitioner indicted his two white accomplices, and the case against petitioner was "a strong one," there was no "cause shown" under the rule to grant relief from the waiver. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held:

1. The waiver standard set forth in Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 12 (b)(2) governs an untimely claim of grand jury discrimination, not only during the criminal proceeding but also later on collateral review. Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, followed; Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, distinguished. Pp. 236-243.

2. The District Court, in light of the record in this case, did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner relief from the application of the waiver provision. Pp. 243-245.

455 F.2d 919, affirmed.

REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS and BRENNAN, JJ., joined, post, p. 245.

Melvin L. Wulf argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.

Edward R. Korman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Petersen, and Sidney M. Glazer.^[1]

↑ Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, and Charles Stephen Ralston filed a brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal.

[ref1-1] Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, and Charles Stephen Ralston filed a brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal.

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