Dictionary of National Biography, 1927 supplement/Nixon, John Eccles
NIXON, Sir JOHN ECCLES (1857–1921), general, was born at Brentford 16 August 1857. He was a younger son of Captain John Piggott Nixon, of the 25th Bombay native infantry, by his wife, Ellen, daughter of G. Cooper, of Brentford. His father afterwards held various appointments in the Indian political service, and retired as a major-general in 1879. John Eccles Nixon was educated at Wellington College, and was commissioned from Sandhurst as a sub-lieutenant in the 75th Foot in September 1875. He entered the Bengal staff corps in 1878, and was appointed to the 18th Bengal cavalry, in which, in the course of twenty-five years, he passed through successive grades up to that of second in command. During ten years of regimental duty he served in the Afghan War of 1879–1880, and took part in a very successful punitive expedition by a brigade of the Kurram force into the Zaimukht country, and was mentioned in dispatches. He was also present in the Mahsud Waziri expedition of 1881. In April 1888, as a captain, he was appointed for five years to the garrison instruction staff. Owing to almost continuous employment on the staff in peace and in war, he saw little regimental service during the next fifteen years, and in May 1903, having been appointed to a district command with the rank of brigadier-general, he quitted his regiment finally without having attained to the command of it.
Meantime Nixon had served on the staff in the Chitral relief force (1895), and in the Tochi field force (1897–1898). In both cases mentions in dispatches followed, and for the former service he was promoted to brevet lieutenant-colonel in January 1896, having attained the rank of major in the previous September. Having served on the staff as assistant quartermaster-general with the rank of colonel for more than two and a half years from March 1899, he was sent to South Africa towards the end of 1901 and served there till the end of the war, commanding a cavalry column in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. He received four clasps with the medal, was mentioned in dispatches, and was awarded the C.B. (1902).
On returning to India Nixon resumed his appointment as assistant quartermaster-general for intelligence (November 1902), became second-class district commander (May 1903), inspector-general of cavalry (August 1906), a divisional commander (May 1908), and in October 1912 received the important appointment of general-officer-commanding the Southern army of India, from which he was transferred to the command of the Northern army in February 1915. He had meantime been promoted to major-general (March 1904), lieutenant-general (February 1909), and general (May 1914), and had been created K.C.B. in 1911. In India he had long borne the reputation of an energetic and capable staff officer and commander; but it was the part that he played in the Mesopotamian expedition during the European War which brought his name prominently before the public.
The basis of the Indian preparations for war as organized under Earl Kitchener [q.v.] was that India would make the utmost effort on the frontier and would be reinforced by men and supplies from England. The reverse of this happened on the outbreak of war in 1914. Within a few weeks large and fully equipped forces had been sent from India to France, Egypt, and East Africa, besides reinforcements to Aden and other British outposts. A great demand had thus already been made upon the Indian military establishments when, on the entry of Turkey into the War (29 October 1914), it was decided that, as a precautionary and defensive measure, Basra and its neighbourhood should be occupied by a force from India—the 6th (Poona) division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Barrett. A naval force of some small vessels co-operated. Basra was occupied on 22 November, and Kurna, 47 miles up the Tigris, at its junction with the Euphrates, on 9 December. The Turks, preparing for offensive action, were in some force at Bahran on the Tigris, at Nazariyeh on the Euphrates, and at Ahwaz on the Karun river. Meantime Barrett's division was being reinforced from India by instalments of a new division, the 12th, and Sir John Nixon was appointed to the command of the whole force, taking it up on 9 April 1915. At this juncture Sir Arthur Barrett resigned the command of his division through ill-health, and was succeeded by Major-General (Sir) Charles Vere Ferrers Townshend from India; whilst Major-General (Sir) George Frederick Gorringe took command of the 12th division, incomplete and without artillery except such as he could borrow from Townshend's division. A few days after Nixon's arrival and before that of Townshend, the Turks, advancing from Nazariyeh, attacked an entrenched camp at Shaiba, west of Basra, and were dispersed after severe engagements.
The control of all operations in Mesopotamia had been reserved to the British government acting through the secretary of state for India, the government of India, and the commander-in-chief in India, General Sir Beauchamp Duff [q.v.]. On 24 April 1915 the secretary of state, telegraphing to the viceroy, stated that no advance beyond the present theatre of operations would be sanctioned at the moment, but that measures for the protection of the oil-pipe line from Persian Arabistan on the east, and an advance to Amara on the Tigris, would be approved if supported by the government of India. The telegram concluded, ‘In Mesopotamia a safe game must be played.’
Nixon, before leaving India, had received his instructions from the commander-in-chief, and these were not known to the secretary of state till 2 May. He was to retain control of the Basra vilayet, of all outlets to the sea, and of such portions of neighbouring territories as might affect his operations, and as far as possible to endeavour to secure the oilfields and pipe line on the east, and after acquainting himself on the spot with the existing situation, to submit, first, a plan for the effective occupation of the Basra vilayet, and secondly, a plan for a subsequent advance on Bagdad. He was also to report on his military requirements generally, and in particular on the adequacy and suitability of the water transport expected from India, Burma, and Egypt, details of which were given to him. An advance on Bagdad was, however, at this time and for some months longer, excluded from the plans of the government of India and of the Cabinet.
Nixon lost no time in acting with vigour on his instructions to secure the control of the Basra vilayet, and his successive advances for that purpose were made with the previous approval of government. The Turks had established a strong position at Bahran, astride the Tigris, in front of Kurna, and were showing activity on the Karun river. Here a force under Major-General Gorringe repulsed them, and then, by a flank movement, threatened the force at Bahran, which Townshend was to attack. The difficulty of the latter operation was greatly increased by the Tigris being in flood and much of the surrounding marshes under water, from which there stood out a line of redoubts on low hills. The only possible attack was a frontal one, supported by artillery fire from guns at Kurna and from the naval flotilla, and it had to be made by infantry punting forward in small country boats (bellums), each of which carried only about ten men. After some weeks of preparation and training, at much of which Nixon was present, Townshend advanced on 31 May. The difficult operation, afterwards known as ‘Townshend's regatta’, was completely successful, and the pursuit ended with the occupation of Amara, some 90 miles up the river from Kurna, on 3 June, and the capture of its governor and many prisoners. Nixon's next movement was against the threatening force of Turks at Nazariyeh on the Euphrates, 68 miles west of Kurna, and this position Gorringe captured, with prisoners and guns, on 25 July.
Shortly after the occupation of Amara Townshend was prostrated by a sudden illness, which necessitated two months' leave to India. During this interval Nixon proposed to the government, as a means of consolidating the control of the Basra vilayet, a further advance to Kut el Amara, an important town on the Tigris, about 150 miles beyond Amara, and a little beyond the boundary of the vilayet. A few miles below Kut the Turks were entrenching with about 10,000 men in strong positions athwart the river. The government of India considered this advance a matter of strategic necessity, and suggested that a reinforcement of a brigade from Aden should be supplied. The Cabinet could not give the reinforcement, but eventually sanctioned the advance. It was skilfully carried out by Townshend. His division captured all the hostile positions by severe fighting, and entered Kut on 29 September. Pursuing the routed Turks, he arrived on 3 October at Azizieh, a village 60 miles up river, which now became the northernmost British outpost.
The conquest of the Basra vilayet was now complete. No further advance could be made without the approval of the Cabinet; but Nixon had submitted his plan, or appreciation of the situation, on 30 August, and on 3 October, a few days after the capture of Kut, he had telegraphed direct to the secretary of state, ‘I consider I am strong enough to open the road to Bagdad, and with this intention I propose to concentrate at Azizieh.’ Two days later he telegraphed that he saw nothing which would justify letting slip such an opportunity. Townshend at the front, however, had found it impossible to press on at once beyond Azizieh, even if permitted to do so, and he soon realized the danger of attempting the capture of Bagdad without large reinforcements. His division was weary and greatly reduced by casualties and sickness, mainly due to the torrid heat in which his recent battles had been fought. He proposed to consolidate his position at Kut, and considered it absolutely necessary, if Bagdad were to be occupied without great risk, that the further advance should be carried out by two divisions, or at least by one division closely supported by another. As Nixon took a more optimistic view, the question of an early attempt on Bagdad was for some time discussed between himself, the government of India, and the secretary of state. On 5 October, pending further consideration, he was ordered to stop the advance.
A new element, however, had come into the discussion. The Allied attack upon the Dardanelles had been brought to a standstill, and British prestige, especially amongst Eastern peoples, was held to demand some conspicuous off-set to the successes of the Turks. This consideration turned the views of the Cabinet and its military advisers in favour of an advance on Bagdad, provided always that, if captured, it could be held. The practicability of this depended: first, on large reinforcements of Nixon's fighting and auxiliary forces; and secondly, on an increase of his river transport proportionate to his increased forces and to the lengthened distance from the front to the base, some 500 miles of a narrow, winding river, varying at different seasons from very shallow water to extensive floods, and flanked by hostile or treacherous tribes. The former of these requirements was to be met by sending out two Indian divisions from France; the latter received unaccountably little attention. The doubts of the commander-in-chief in India, submitted to the viceroy for transmission to the secretary of state—‘whether in the present state of the river combined with our present insufficient number of light-draught steamers, we could adequately supply our troops’—were omitted from the viceroy's telegram to London [Report, Mesopotamia Commission, pp. 22–3.]
Only to a very limited extent had it been found possible to meet from India and Burma Nixon's earlier demands for water transport, and that commander was aware that the large supply of tugs, barges, &c., which had been ordered from England in August could not arrive for many months. Moreover, the medical equipment of the expedition was already insufficient; the reserves in India of personnel and stores were greatly depleted, and medical stores were almost unobtainable from England. These conditions rendered a deadlock probable, unless the new advance should be exceptionally lucky and successful, and casualties few. Vague reports of Turkish reinforcements moving from Anatolia towards Bagdad had been received, but it was thought that they would not arrive for some months.
Such were the circumstances when, on 23 October 1915, the secretary of state telegraphed to India that Nixon might advance on Bagdad if satisfied as to the sufficiency of his forces, and that two divisions would be sent from France as soon as possible. Nixon, not sharing Townshend's views as to the insufficiency of his force, did not report them to India or to England, and ordered the advance. Townshend, deferring to the judgement of his superior, occupied some weeks in preparations for attacking the Turks in their entrenched position astride the Tigris near the ancient arch of Ctesiphon. He attacked on the morning of 22 November what he supposed to be a force somewhat greater in numbers than his own. But large reinforcements had arrived or were just arriving. The Turks were driven from their first entrenchments, but their increasing numbers gradually prevailed. The battle was lost by nightfall, and after standing on the defensive for some days and repelling heavy counter-attacks, Townshend, with the concurrence of Nixon, who had been present during the fighting, decided to retreat before the overwhelming Turkish force, which now consisted of several divisions. Keeping the enemy at bay, striking back effectively, and taking with him not only his wounded but 1,350 prisoners, he reached Kut without the loss of a gun. Here, with the approval of Nixon and of the Indian government, he decided to stand fast. He was closely besieged from 6 December till 29 April, when, though all assaults had been repelled, the imminent starvation of his force compelled unconditional surrender.
After the battle of Ctesiphon reinforcements of infantry and artillery were sent to Mesopotamia from India; but the two divisions from France and another ordered from Egypt had not begun to arrive, when, on 19 January 1916, Nixon, through ill-health, relinquished his command, after the first efforts of all available troops to relieve Kut had failed. The sufferings of the sick and wounded from Townshend's retreating division and from the troops under Nixon who first attempted his relief were primarily due to the inadequacy of the river transport, the disastrous results of which culminated in still worse conditions during later operations from January to April.
Nixon was summoned to England, with many other witnesses, to appear before the Mesopotamia commission of inquiry appointed in August 1916, the report of which (but not the evidence taken) was published in the following summer. The commissioners placed Nixon first in a graded list of officials, military and civil, declared to be chiefly responsible for the shortcomings of the expedition. ‘The weightiest share of responsibility’, they said, ‘lies with Sir John Nixon, whose confident optimism was the main cause of the decision to advance’ [Report, p. 111]. One of the commissioners, who recorded a separate report because he thought the commission's findings generally too lenient, dissociated himself from the censure of Nixon [Report, p. 121]. The government proposed to set up a special court to inquire further into the accusations against the incriminated officials, civil and military; but withdrew this proposal in deference to objections raised on various grounds in parliament, and decided that in respect of civilians no further inquiry should be held, but that the Army Council should call for written explanations from the soldiers, and, on receipt of them, consider what further action was to be taken. The result of this procedure in Nixon's case was an announcement in the House of Commons on 28 October 1918 that the Army Council had received and considered his explanation and had informed him that they regarded it as satisfactory. The G.C.M.G. was conferred on Nixon in 1919, and in 1922 the dignity of grand officier of the legion of honour was posthumously awarded him.
The nine months of command in Mesopotamia were Nixon's last active service. He lived, in gradually failing health, till 15 December 1921, when he died at St. Raphael, France. He had married in 1884 Amy Louisa, daughter of James Wilson, of Gratwicke, Billingshurst, and Felpham Manor, Sussex, and had one son.
[Official Army Lists; Naval and Military Dispatches, London Gazette, January–December 1916; Mesopotamia Commission Report, 17 May 1917, Cd. 8610; Parliamentary Debates, June–August 1917, and October 1918; Sir C. Townshend, My Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1920; personal knowledge.]