England's treasure by forraign trade/Chapter 17
Chap. XVII
Whether it be necessary for great Princes to lay up store of Treasure.
Before we set down the quantity of Treasure which Princes may conveniently lay up yearly without hurting the Common-wealth, it will be fit to examine whether the act it self of Treasuring be necessary: for in common conference we ever find some men who do so much dote or hope upon the Liberality of Princes, that they term it baseness, and conceive it needless for them to lay up store of Treasure, accounting the hounour and safety of great Princes to consist more in their Bounty, than in their Money, which they labour to confirm by the examples of Cæsar, Alexander, and others, who hating covetousness, atchieved many acts and victories by lavish gifts and liberal expences. Unto which they add also the little fruit which came by that great summ of money which King David laid up and left to his son Solomon, who notwithstanding this, and all his other rich Presents and wealthy Traffique in a quiet reign, consumed all with pomp and vain delights, excepting only that which was spent in building of the Temple. Whereupon (say they) if so much treasure gathered by so just a King, effect so little, what shall we hope for by the endeavours of this kind in other Princes? Sardanapalus left ten millions of pounds to them that slew him. Darius left twenty millions of pounds to Alexander that took him; Nero being left rich, and extorting much from his best Subjects, gave away above twelve millions of pounds to his base flatterers and such unworthy persons, which caused Galba after him to revoke those gifts. A Prince who hath store of mony hates peace, despiseth the friendship of his Neighbours and Allies, enters not only into necessary, but also into dangerous Wars, to the ruin and over-throw (sometimes) of his own estate: All which, with divers other weak arguments of this kind, (which for brevity I omit) make nothing against the lawful gathering and massing up of Treasure by wise and provident Princes, if they be rightly understood.
For first, concerning those worthies who have obtained to the highest top of honour and dignity, by their great gifts and expences, who know not that this hath been done rather upon the spoils of their Enemies than out of their own Cofers, which is indeed a Bounty that causeth neither loss nor peril?Excess and bounty brings beggery, which makes most men devise in their heads how to extort and get mony into their hands. Whereas on the countrary, those Princes which do not providently lay up Treasure, or do immoderately consume the same when they have it, will sodainly come to want and misery; for there is nothing doth so soon decay as Excessive Bounty, in using whereof they want the means to use it. And this was King Solomons case, notwithstanding, his infinite Treasure, which made him over-burthen his Subjects in such a manner, that (for this cause) many of them rebelled against his Son Rehoboam, who thereby lost a great part of his dominions, being so grosly mis-led by his young Counsellors. Therefore a Prince that will not oppress his people, and yet be able to maintain his Estate, and defend his Right, that will not run himself into Poverty, Contempt, Hate, and Danger, must lay up treasure, and be thrifty, for further proof whereof I might yet produce some other examples, which here I do omit as needless.
Only I will add this as a necessary rule to be observed, that when more treasure must be raised than can be received by the ordinary taxes, it ought ever to be done with equality to avoid the hate of the people, who are never pleased except their contributions be granted by general consent: For which purpose the invention of Parliaments is an excellent policie of Government, to keep a sweet concord between a King and his Subjects, by restraining the Insolency of the Nobility, and redressing the Injuries of the Commons, without engaging a Prince to adhere to either party, but indifferently to favour both. There could nothing be devised with more judgement for the common quiet of a Kingdom, or with greater care for the safety of a King, who hereby hath also good means to dispatch those things by others, which will move envy, and to execute that himself which will merit thanks.