Essay on Catholicism, Liberalism, and Socialism/Book 2/Chapter 4
CHAPTER IV.
In nothing does the incomparable beauty of Catholic solutions show itself so conspicuously as in its universality, that incommunicable attribute of divine solutions. The moment we embrace a Catholic solution, all that was previously dark and obscure becomes clear, night becomes day, and order proceeds from chaos. In each of these explanations may be found that sovereign attribute and secret virtue which produces the great wonder of universal light. The only obscure point, amid the light thus diffused, is the mystery itself, from which proceeds so much brightness; and the reason of this is, that man, not being God, cannot possess that divine attribute, by which the Lord, in his ineffable glory, clearly sees all things created. Man is condemned out of darkness to receive light, and out of light the explanation of what is obscure. For him, there is nothing evident which does not proceed from an impenetrable mystery. But between things mysterious and those that are evident, there is, however, this notable difference: that man may render obscure that which is evident, but he cannot explain the mysterious. When, in attempting to acquire that ineffable knowledge, which is in God, but which he has not himself, he rejects as obscure the divine explanations, he consigns himself to the intricate and gloomy labyrinths of human solutions; then follows, what we have just demonstrated, that his solution is partial, and as such incomplete, and therefore false. At first view, his solution may seem to explain something, but upon investigation it will be seen that it really fails to give an explanation of what it appears to solve, and reason, which begins by accepting it as plausible, finally rejects it as insufficient, contradictory, and absurd. This has been completely proved in the preceding chapter, with regard to the question which we are now considering; and, having shown the manifest deficiency of the human solution, it only remains for us to demonstrate the adequacy and entire consistency of the Catholic solution.
God, who is the absolute good, is the supreme creator of all good; and all that he creates is good. But as God cannot give the creature all that He possesses, nor give him that which He himself has not, it follows that it is altogether impossible either that God should communicate evil, which dwells not in Him, to any creature, or that He should communicate absolute good; both are manifest impossibilities, because we cannot conceive the imparting of that which one does not possess, nor can we conceive that the creator should remain absorbed by the creature. Not being able to communicate absolute goodness, which would be to make of the creature another God like himself, nor to impart evil, which dwells not in him in any manner, he therefore bestows a relative goodness, whereby he imparts all that it is in his power to give, namely, something of that which is in him, but which is not himself; thus producing between him and the creature a likeness which attests the derivation, and at the same time showing a difference which attests the infinite distinction between him and his creature; so that every creature, by the very fact of its existence, testifies that he is but a creature, and that God is his creator.
God being the creator of all things created, all creation is good by a relative goodness. Man is good as man, the angel as angel, and the tree as tree. Even the angel who gleams with lurid light in the abyss, and the very abyss from which proceeds this ghastly splendor, are things good and excellent. The prince of darkness is in himself good, because, in becoming what he is, he has not ceased to be an angel, and God created the angelical nature excellent above all things created; and the abyss is in itself good, because it is ordained for an end sovereignly good.
And, though all things created are good and excellent, Catholicism affirms the existence of evil, and the great and fearful ravage committed by it in the world. The question consists in establishing what is evil; and, on the other hand, whence it comes; and finally, in what way even its dissonance contributes to the general harmony.
Evil has its origin in the use which man made of the faculty of choice, which, as we have said, constitutes the imperfection of human liberty. This faculty was confined within certain limits imposed by the very nature of things. As all things were good, this faculty could not consist in choosing between things good, which necessarily existed, and things evil, which had no existence; it consisted only in embracing or renouncing good, in affirming or denying it. When the human mind, in the exercise of this power; withdrew itself from the divine mind, it was thus separated from truth, and ceased to comprehend it. When the human will deviate from the divine will, it was thus separated from good, ceased to desire 1t, and therefore to execute it. But as man could not cease to exercise his inherent and inamissible faculties, so he could not cease to understand, to will, and to act; for this would have been ceasing to exist. But, separated from God, what he understood was not the truth, which dwells in God alone; what he willed was not the good, which is to be found only in God; and what he did, could not be that which he neither understood nor willed; and which, not being accepted by his understanding or will, could not be the term of his actions. The term of his understanding was therefore error, which 1s the negation of truth; the term of his will was evil, which is the negation of good; and the end of his actions was sin, which is the simultaneous negation of truth and good; these being only diverse manifestations of the same thing, considered under different points of view.
As sin denies all that God affirms with his understanding, which is truth; and all that he affirms with his will, which is good; and as there are no other affirmations in God than truth, which is in his understanding, and good which 1s in his will—God being these same affirmations substantially considered —1it follows that sin, which denies all that God affirms, virtually denies God in all his affirmations; and because it denies him, and does no other thing but deny him, it is therefore the supreme, universal, and absolute negation.
This negation did not and could not affect the essence of things that exist independently of the human will, and which, after as before the prevarication, were not only good in themselves, but likewise perfect and excellent. But, if sin did not deprive them of this excellence, it disturbed the sovereign harmony that the divine creator established among them, that delicate connection and perfect order with which they were united the one to the other, and all to God, when they were brought forth from chaos by an act of God's infinite goodness. In this state of perfect order and admirable connection, all things tended toward God with a determined and irresistible impulsion. Impelled by the law of love, the angel, a pure spirit, gravitated with an ardent and impetuous desire toward God, as the center of all spirits. Man, less perfect but not less loving, was drawn by the same attraction to become associated with the angel in the bosom of God, the center of angelical and human gravitation. Even matter, agitated by a secret power of ascension, followed the gravitation of spirits toward the supreme creator, who sweetly attracts all things to himself. And thus, as all these things, considered in themselves, are the exterior manifestations of the essential good which is in God, so the manner of being we have just indicated is the exterior manifestation of God's manner of existence, and is, as his very essence, perfect and excellent. Things created had a perfection susceptible of change, and another perfection which was necessary and inadmissible. Their inadmissible and necessary perfection was the essential good that God imparted to every creature, and their perfection which is contingent and liable to be lost, was that manner of being which God gave to them when he created them out of nothing. God wished that they should always be what they are, but he did not wish that they should necessarily exist in the same manner; he withdrew the essences from all jurisdictions except his own, and he placed for a time the order in which they are, under the jurisdiction of those beings whom he formed intelligent and free; from which it follows that the evil, produced either by angelical or human free will, could not be, and was not, anything else than the negation of the order in which God has placed all things created. This negation is expressed by the word even which declares it, since it is called disorder. Disorder is the negation of order, that is to say, of the divine affirmation with regard to the manner of being of all things. And thus, as order consists in the union of things that God wished to be united, and in the separation of those which he wished to be separated, so disorder consists in uniting those things which God wished to be separated, and in separating those which God wished to be united.
The disorder produced by the angelical rebellion consisted In a partial separation of the rebel angel from God, who was his center, by a change in his manner of being, which converted his movement of gravitation toward God into a movement of rotation upon himself.
The disorder caused by man's prevarication resembled that produced by the rebellion of the angels. As there cannot be two different ways of being a prevaricator and a rebel, after man ceased to gravitate toward God by his understanding, his will, and his actions, he constituted himself the center of his own movements, and made himself the ultimate end of his works, his will, and his understanding.
The confusion produced by this prevarication was deep and profound. When man separated himself from God, all his faculties became immediately disconnected one from the other, constituting themselves into so many divergent centers. His understanding lost its authority over his will, his will no longer directed his actions, the flesh departed from its former obedience to the spirit, and the spirit, which had been submissive to God, became subjected to the flesh. Previously, all had been concordant and harmonious in man; but now, all was converted into war, tumult, contradiction, dissonance. His nature, which had been supremely harmonious, became profoundly antithetical.
This disorder, caused in man by himself, was transmitted from him to the universe, and affected the mode of being of all things which had been subjected to him, and which now revolted against him. When man ceased to be the servant of God, he ceased to be the prince of the earth, which is not surprising, when we reflect that the right to this terrestrial authority was based upon his obedience to God. Even the animals, to which he had given names, as a mark of his dominion over them, no longer heard his voice or obeyed his commands. The earth became overgrown with brambles; the heavens flashed lightning; the flowers armed themselves with thorns; all nature seemed as if possessed with an insensate rage against man; the seas, at his approach, lashed their waves into fury, and their depths resounded with a frightful clamor; the mountains raised their heads even to the clouds to arrest his progress; the fields were overrun by impetuous torrents; the whirlwind crushed his fragile dwelling; the reptiles spat forth against him their deadly venom; the herbs distilled their fatal poisons; and at every step he feared an ambush, and in every ambush death.
If we accept the Catholic interpretation of evil, all that without this explanation and outside of it appears and is inexplicable, becomes clear. Evil, according to the Catholic dogma, not having a real but a negative existence, cannot serve as material for a new creation, and consequently the difficulty which would arise from the coexistence of two diverse and simultaneous creations, 1s avoided. This difficulty would increase at every step of our examination, if we accepted the supposition of a dualism in creation. For, this hypothesis admitted, it would forcibly imply another dualism much more repugnant to human reason, that of an essential dualism in the divinity, whom we must either suppose to be a simple essence, or we cannot conceive at all. This divine dualism involves the idea of a rivalry, which would be at the same time necessary and impossible; necessary, because two Gods who are antagonistic, and two essences that are repugnant to each other, are condemned, by the very nature of things, to an incessant struggle; and impossible, because a definitive victory is the final object of every contest; and this definitive victory would be either in the suppression of evil for good, or of good for evil; and yet neither can be suppressed, because they both exist in an essential, and therefore in a necessary manner. I From the impossibility of suppression follows the impossibility of victory, which is the final object of all disputes, and therefore the radical impossibility of the dispute itself. The contradiction that exists in every system of Manicheism, as applied to the divinity, also exists as applied to man, in whom we cannot suppose the substantial coexistence of good and evil. This contradiction 1s absurd, and therefore inconceivable. To affirm of man that he is at the same time essentially good and essentially evil, is equivalent to the assertion of one of these two things: either, that man is a unit, formed of two opposite natures, and in this affirmation the Manichean system would unite what in the divinity it is obliged to separate; or, to assert that the essence of man is one, and that, being one, it is evil and good at the same time, which is at once to affirm and deny of the same thing all that is denied and affirmed of that very thing.
The Catholic system admits the existence of evil, but its existence is modal, not essential. Evil, thus considered, is synonymous with disorder, and, in reality, it is nothing else than the disordered condition of that which is essentially good, and which, by a secret and mysterious cause, has ceased to be properly regulated. But the Catholic system points out to us this secret and mysterious cause, and if, in this indication, there is much that surpasses our reason, there is nothing which contradicts or is repugnant to it. It is not necessary to have recourse to a divine intervention, in order to explain a modal perturbation in things which, after this disturbance, preserve their essence pure and intact; in such an explanation there would be no proportion between the effect and its cause. This fact is sufficiently explained by the anarchical intervention of free and intelligent beings; for, if these beings could not in any way alter the marvelous order and concerted harmony of creation, they could not be regarded as free or intelligent. Evil, then, is accidental and ephemeral in its nature, and as such we may affirm of it, without contradiction or inconsistency, these two things: first, that evil cannot in any way be a work of God; second, that whatever is accidental and ephemeral must be the work of man. In this way the affirmations of reason blend with the affirmations of Catholicism. According to the Catholic system, all absurdities disappear and all contradictions are suppressed. By this system, the creation is one, and God is one; and, in setting aside a divine dualism, we put an end to the war of the gods. Evil exists, because without it we cannot imagine human liberty. But the evil that exists is accidental and not essential, because, if it were essential and not accidental, it would be a work of God, the creator of all things. This would involve a contradiction, repugnant both to divine and human reason. Evil comes from man, and is in man, and, coming from and dwelling in him, there is in it a great agreement, and no contradiction whatever. There is agreement, because inasmuch as evil cannot be the work of God, man could not choose it, if he could not create it; and he would not be free, if he could not choose it. There is no contradiction in this, because Catholicism, in affirming of man that he is good in his essence, and evil, by accident, does not assert of him the same that it denies, nor does it deny what it affirms, because, to affirm of man that the evil in his nature is accidental and not essential, is not to affirm contradictory things, but only two different things.
Finally, the Catholic system subverts that blasphemous and impious system which supposes a perpetual antagonism between God and man, between the creator and the creature. Man, the author of evil, which is of itself accidental and transitory, cannot be compared with God, the creator, supporter, and regulator of all beings and all things. Nor can there exist any conceivable rivalry or possible competition between these two existences, which are separated by an infinite distance. The battle between the creator of essential good and the creator of essential evil, as asserted by the Manichean and Proudhonian systems, is inconceivable and absurd, because victory would be an impossibility in such a contest. The Catholic system does not suppose a contest, because there cannot be a conflict between parties, where one side must necessarily be victorious and the other necessarily vanquished. Two conditions are requisite for the existence of a contest: one, that victory is possible; and the other, that it should be uncertain. Every struggle is useless when the victory is certain, or when it is impossible; from which it follows that, in whatever way we consider it, the hypothesis of these great battles fought for universal domination and supreme sway is absurd. And the inconsistency is equally great, whether one sovereign or two are supposed: in the first case, because he who is one will always be alone; and secondly, because the two would never be one, but perpetually two. These gigantic contests are such, that they are either decided before they commence, or will never be decided.